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Richard Nixon's Position on Communist China. 1949-1960;
The Evolution of a Pacific Strategy
by
Glenn Speer
Adviser: Professor Herbert S. Parmet
This dissertation focuses on Richard Nixon's view of 
Communist China from the 1949 Revolution through the 1960 
presidential election. There is also an extended epilogue 
examining his position on the issue in the 1960s prior to his 
election as president, and a discussion of the opening to 
China in 1972.
It is, in essence, an attempt to trace Nixon's 
"education," so to speak, in the foreign policy arena during 
his early career— a "gestation" period, if you will, for his 
presidential China policy. This is discussed within the 
context of the Cold War and the never ending melodrama of 
domestic politics, in which Nixon played a vital role.
The thesis is that Nixon's approach to the Communist China 
question was far more consistent than most historians and 
journalists have recognized. The Nixon that emerges is 
pragmatic rather than ideological. He was a politician 
sensitive to the domestic political considerations of the 
emotional China issue. He was phenomenally adept in appearing 
bellicose before hard-line groups while offering hope of a 
modus vivendi when he addressed audiences not in lockstep with 
the China Lobby. Nixon was not a Janus nor should he be
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considered simply in terms of the tired images of "new" and 
"old" Nixons; rather, he was a complex, multifaceted 
politician who could be scurrilous on the hustings while 
pensive and far less partisan in private musings on foreign 
affairs.
Nixon's opening to China has usually been portrayed as a 
volte-face. The supposed "turnaround" has been emphasized 
rather than the maturation of Nixon's vision of China as an 
integral part of a "Pacific strategy" that served the 
interests of both nations. Nixon was hardly a conventional 
Republican right-wing politician because he was a staunch 
internationalist who backed Truman's Europe policy. In 
addition, he supported foreign aid as congressman, senator, 
vice president, president and "elder statesman."
Finally, there was far more consistency and continuity 
between Nixon the vice president and Nixon the president 
instead of the melodramatic metamorphosis that other 
historians have portrayed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PREFACE
When I began to look for a dissertation topic, I decided I 
wanted to write about one of the post-World War II presidents. 
I had also lived in Japan, and travelled briefly to the 
People's Republic of China, and this experience sparked an 
interest in Asia, especially America's relations with the 
countries of that continent. I wanted to find a president to 
study and write about who would best offer me an opportunity 
at the same time to delve into the evolving United States view 
of Asia. I also had a working background in journalism and 
wanted very much to interview the subject of my study.
I chose Richard Nixon, in part, because I hoped to get an 
interview with him. Alas, that hope has yet to be fulfilled. 
But like thousands of other "political junkies," I have a 
fascination with the rise and fall, and rise and fall again 
(not to mention yet another "comeback" in the so-called 
"post-presidential years") of Richard Nixon. Coupled with my 
interest in Asia, Nixon seemed the obvious candidate for a 
dissertation. One had heard so much in the 1970s to the 
effect that "Nixon was the only one who could go to China" 
because of his previous hard-line position against Peking, or 
that Nixon had made some dramatic turnaround and 
transformation that enabled him to deal with the aging men in 
power in the "Forbidden City."
I have always been a bit skeptical of such pat, 
conventional wisdom and I began to wonder, if indeed, Nixon 
had truly changed on this fundamental Cold War question of
-vii-
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Communist China. Was there, in fact, consistency throughout 
his career in his position toward Peking? To answer this 
pivotal question, I had to throughly examine Nixon's public 
speeches, his private papers and declassified government 
documents that ultimately rendered a fuller, more complex 
portrait of Nixon's view of the China issue. I found that 
what was particularly striking about Nixon's stance on China 
was his consistency, and that to portray it as a volte-face 
was off the mark.
Like any dissertation, mine is mostly derived from an 
abundance of primary sources. I used documents from the Los 
Angeles Branch of the National Archives (actually located in 
Laguna Niguel, California) where the Nixon Pre-Presidential 
Papers are housed. Any sources from this collection are 
referred to in the endnotes as NARA-LA, Nixon Papers. In 
addition, I came upon some revealing material concerning Nixon 
at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, 
Kansas. I make extensive use of minutes from Cabinet and 
National Security Council meetings as well as numerous Nixon 
speeches from the period. Materials quoted from the 
Eisenhower Library are abbreviated in the endnotes as DDEL.
The bulk of the sources from the Eisenhower Library come from 
the Ann C. Whitman File. Mrs. Whitman was President 
Eisenhower's secretary. On second reference in the endnotes, 
material from this collection is called ACW File. There are 
also instances in the endnotes when I refer to The New York 
Times as NYT.
-viii-
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I have also tapped the John Foster Dulles Papers at the 
Seeley 6. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University 
where 1 found correspondence and detailed memoranda of 
conversations between Nixon and Dulles. The memoranda of 
conversations actually were first housed only at the 
Eisenhower Library but now for the convenience of 
reserarchers, copies of these particular papers are also 
available at Seeley G. Mudd. Occasionally in the endnotes, I 
refer to the John Foster Dulles Papers as JFD. In addition, I 
draw on the Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Krock and Karl Lott Rankin 
Papers, which are also located at the Mudd Library. Any 
material from these various collections are published with the 
permission of the Princeton University Libraries.
I was most fortunate to have as my mentor, Professor 
Herbert S. Parmet. We both share the same enthusiasm for 
American political biography. I could not have had a better 
or wiser adviser. There are graduate students who often 
complain that they have trouble gaining access to their major 
professor. Not so with Professor Parmet. If I ever had a 
question regarding research or writing, he was readily 
available whether it was during his office hours or involved 
calling him at home at night, weekends, or even on holidays.
I would submit a chapter of my dissertation to Professor 
Parmet and by the next day he had not only read it, but had 
written extensive comments on it. He was particularly 
generous in giving me access to the notes of his own 
interviews with Richard Nixon and with the late Meade Alcorn,
-ix-
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who was Republican National Party chairman in the late 
Eisenhower years. Professor Parmet also took an interest in 
my future and has always been available to advise me and go 
the extra mile in helping me in my effort to establish myself 
as an historian. He encouraged me to write in a less formal 
style than most academics. I hope I have succeeded in 
achieving the clarity and flow of language that I aspired to. 
In addition, I served for two years as Professor Parmet's 
researcher and editorial assistant. I worked with him or. his 
recent book, Richard Nixon and His America. This proved to be 
invaluable experience as I learned how a work of history is 
put together.
I also want to thank the other members of my committee, 
Professor Hans L. Trefousse and Professor Thomas Kessnar. I 
had the pleasure of studying the Civil War and Reconstruction 
with Professor Trefousse, and American immigration with 
Professor Kessner. They also were available for questions and 
advise and were very encouraging about my work.
Professor Stuart Prall, the chairman of the History 
Department of the City University of New York Graduate School 
deserves special thanks for granting me financial aid. I am 
also grateful to his predecessor, Professor Abraham Ascher for 
awarding me a fellowship at the beginning of my studies at the 
Graduate School. Mrs. Betty Einerman, program assistant for 
the History Department, was a tremendous help in setting up 
the dissertation defense. I know I speak for all students and 
faculty in the department when I say that Mrs. Einerman keeps
- X -
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order in academic circumstances that could easily crumble into 
chaos.
The late Robert Gilleece, director of financial aid, was 
always kind and exceedingly generous, finding the funds to 
underwrite my research assistantship for Professor Parmet as 
well as providing a special grant that enabled me to travel to 
the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas. Mr. 
Gilleece's successor, Matthew G. Schoengood also enabled me to 
earn my way through the program by providing me with College 
Work Study. Mr. Gilleece was a political biography fanatic 
and we frequently spoke about Nixon and other prominent 
politicians. He, like myself, was obsessed with American 
politics. His untimely death was a loss to all of us at the 
CUNY Graduate School and we will always remember him.
I also received financial support from the Scheuer Family 
Foundation under the auspices of the Federation Employment and 
Guidance Service of New York.
As usual, any dissertation's acknowledgements would be 
incomplete without doffing one's hat to the knowledgeable 
librarians and archivists who steer naive and often 
misdirected graduate students to the proper sources. My 
warmest thanks goes to Mrs. Jean Holliday of the Seeley G.
Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University who spent 
several days guiding me through the John Foster Dulles, Adlai 
Stevenson, Arthur Krock and Karl Lott Rankin Papers. She is a 
delightful person with a keen sense of humor. I also want to 
thank Fred Klose who gave me considerable expert assistance
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while I went through the Pre-Presidential Papers of Richard 
Nixon at the National Archives Branch in Laguna Niguel, 
California. Jim Leyerzapf, archivist at the Eisenhower 
Library, put me on the track of some vital and extraordinary 
documents concerning the young Mr. Nixon's stance on Communist 
China. I had a very lovely stay in Albilene, Kansas, taking 
the train out and back. During my sojourn there I stayed at 
the home of Homer and Doris Jury who were wonderful, friendly 
hosts. I'll never forget that they drove nearly 70 miles 
during a torrential prairie thunderstorm to meet my train at 4 
a.m. in Newton, Kansas It was the kind of hospitality that 
would warm anyone's heart. I also want to thank Mrs. Judy 
Waldman, the dissertation librarian at the CUNY Graduate 
School, for her patience in answering my many questions 
regarding the final form and style of the manuscript.
Martin Dorn, the director of the Computer Center at the 
Brookdale Campus of Hunter College, patiently instructed me so 
that I eventually established the semblance of computer 
literacy. He also granted me unlimited access to the facility 
which was most convenient since I lived nearby.
When I was growing up I had the good luck to know the late 
political reporter, Mr. Stephen C. Flanders. He instilled in 
me an appreciation for both America's political past and the 
beauty of the English language. His widow, Carol Flanders, 
and their two historian sons Steve and Carl, who share my 
consuming interest in politics and history, always managed to 
keep up my morale.
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I owe a special debt of gratitude to Rabbi Jeshaia 
Schnitzer, who has been my rabbi since I was a small boy when 
my family joined Congregation Shomrei Emunah in my hometown of 
Montclair, New Jersey. Rabbi Schnitzer's spiritual guidance, 
steady counsel, patience and amazing ability to motivate me 
have helped me through many experiences above and beyond this 
dissertation. I can never properly thank him for all his help 
that he has unselfishly given to me and my family for over 30 
years.
But above all, I want to thank my mother and father, to 
whom this work is dedicated. My mother is the best literary 
critic I know and she went through portions of the manuscript 
and corrected my numerous grammatical errors. You see, in her 
generation, students actually learned English grammar in the 
public schools, something that is apparently considered too 
radical and controversial for American schools today. 1 envy 
her that prescious knowledge. My father was also very 
encouraging, imparting to me his respect for the inherent 
worth of graduate studies, and never doubting for a moment 
that I was on the right track. He especially inspired me from 
an early age to take an active interest in American history 
and led me to my fascination with political biography. Words 
alone cannot thank them appropriately for all they have given 
and taught me.
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CHAPTER 3>L_m , . NIXQN GQES.TQ WASHINgTQF 
Who was Richard Nixon? Was he the darling of the 
Republican Party's "Old Guard?" An "Asia Firster" with 
Anglophobic contempt for the Old World of Europe? Did he side 
with the isolationist wing of the GOP or did he favor an 
internationalist role for America in the post-World War II 
era? Was he a staunch member of the "China Lobby" who took 
his marching orders from the "Soong Dynasty"? Some historians 
and journalists have harped on the idea that there were many 
Richard Nixons, old and new. But on the paramount issue of 
Communist China, close examination reveals a surprising 
consistency in his views from the time of the Chinese 
Revolution to his opening to China as president as well as to 
his comments and writings in the years after his fall from 
power.
Nixon made an early name for himself as a vitriolic critic 
of President Harry Truman and his secretary of state, Dean 
Acheson. But as a young California congressman, Nixon 
actually supported Truman's program in Europe across the 
board. He voted for Greece-Turkey Aid, for the Marshall Plan 
and for the establishment in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).1
But even more significantly, Nixon was the only- freshman 
congressman chosen to serve on the 19-member Herter Committee, 
headed by Representative Christian A. Herter (R-MA) who went 
on to become President Dwight D. Eisenhower's secretary of 
state in 1959. The Herter Committee toured ravished postwar
— 1-
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Europe and came home with a strong endorsement of the Marshall 
Plan.2 In this instance, Nixon put some distance 
politically between himself and the Old Guard for whom further 
involvement in Europe was anathema. Nixon looked upon his 
service with the Herter Committee as the most instructive 
during his time in Congress.3
But American foreign policy in Asia was a different matter 
altogether. Nixon, along with the majority of Republicans in 
Congress, ultimately broke with Truman over China, making much 
political fodder over what they never tired of terming "the 
loss of China" to the Communists.
The China Issue or The Open Door Slams Shut
The domestic political rift over China can be traced back 
to Yalta and the subsequent American effort to mediate the 
Chinese civil war after the de.feat of Japan. Most historians 
agree now that the Soviet and Chinese communists were far from 
"monolithic," even in the closing days of World War II and the 
Chinese Civil War. Michael Schaller argues that Joseph Stalin 
displayed a "curious attitude" toward foreign Communists, 
especially the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Behind the 
facade of support for international revolutionary Communist 
movements, Schaller claims that Stalin was more than a little 
cautious about his relations with the CCP. The Soviet leader 
realized that the Chinese Communists under Mao's leadership in 
no way accepted him as their master. At Yalta, Stalin assured 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that he would support the
- 2-
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Nationalist Chinese regime of Chiang Kai-Shek once Japan was 
defeated. But in keeping with Russia's historical desire for 
concessions in Manchuria, Stalin insisted that the Soviets be 
granted special rights and a share in the control of the 
railroads and ports of that region. Although FDR was later 
castigated for his concessions to the Russians in the Far East 
(a "payment" for Stalin's pledge that Russia would join the 
war effort against Japan), FDR did not "give" anything that 
the Russians would not have taken on their own initiative. 
Schaller shrewdly points out that what Stalin and FDR did not 
take into account was that the Chinese Communists were 
independent and were not about to give up their quest to rule 
China just because the United States and the Soviet Union 
might not give them their blessing.4
When Truman succeeded to the presidency after FDR's death, 
he was surrounded by Roosevelt's advisers who were far more 
anti-Soviet than the president had been. The United States 
Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, was a rabid 
anticommunist. Without the benefit of having read revisionist 
historians, Hurley understood the Chinese Communists as mere 
puppets of the Kremlin, although foreign service officers such 
as John Service argued that the Chinese Communists should be 
seen as a nationalistic movement rather than a mere appendage 
of Moscow.5
Indeed, by the summer of 1945, Hurley was openly siding 
with the Nationalists against the Chinese Communists. To 
complicate matters further, negotiations between the two sides
-3-
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in Chungking broke down when Chiang refused to share power or 
territory with the Communists. By autumn 1945, Mao Tse-Tung's 
army had gained strength and the United States was put into 
the position of deciding whether to give additional aid to 
Chiang or to leave his fate in the hands of the Communists. 
General Albert Wedemeyer reported to Truman that Chiang had 
little or no chance of unifying China without direct American 
military intervention. Even with this pessimistic assessment 
of the situation in China, Truman and his foreign policy 
advisers believed that the major challenge racing America was 
the perceived threat that the Soviets posed to the stability 
of Europe. China was given low priority and by November 1945 
the Truman administration concluded that the rapidly 
deteriorating military situation in China could only be turned 
around through another American attempt at mediation.6
Hurley promptly resigned and blamed the Nationalists's 
decline on "traitors" in the State Department, a charge that 
was to be echoed all too many times after the eventual "loss 
of China" in 1949.
In an effort to counter Hurley's charges and more 
significantly, to try to preserve some American influence in 
China, Truman appointed General George Marshall to lead a new 
peace effort. The Marshall mission arrived in China in 
December 1945 and stayed in the country until January 1947. 
Although Marshall arranged a ceasefire in July 1946, it became 
unravelled by the end of the year. The Communists wanted to 
share power while Chiang was adamant in insisting that they be
-4-
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disarmed. Neither side could accept any compromise and 
Marshall was summoned back to Washington in January 1947 by 
the president to become secretary of state. The failure of 
the Marshall mission essentially marked the end of American 
efforts to provide a solution to the Chinese Civil War.
The Nationalist position continued to deteriorate as the 
Communists gradually took control of China. In August 1949, 
the State Department published the historic White Paper in 
response to criticism from Chiang's supporters and to argue 
that the United States had done all it could to prevent the 
Communist victory. The White Paper also made an issue of 
corruption among the Nationalists. Nevertheless, in an 
attempt to appease the nation's anticommunists, Acheson 
thought it prudent to attach a "cover letter" to the report 
which contradicted much of what the White Paper said (What was 
ironic was that Acheson was a dedicated opponent of communism, 
no matter how his Republican critics portrayed him.). In the 
letter, Acheson called the Chinese Communists villains who had 
renounced their ancient Chinese heritage and were subservient 
to Moscow.
And just where did Nixon stand on the historic events 
taking place in China in 1949? There is scant material on his 
views on China from this early period in the Nixon 
Pre-Presidential Papers. In fact, Nixon was not a leader in 
any sense of the word on this issue at this time in his 
career, choosing instead to focus on internal Communist 
subversion and basking in his new found fame garnered from the
-5-
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Alger Hiss case. The Republicans who actually took the lead 
on the issue were California's Senator William Knowland (often 
referred to half in jest as the Senator from Formosa) and 
Representative Walter Judd from Minnesota who had been a 
medical missionary to China when he was a young man.7
However, Nixon did speak out on China and rose in the 
House to attack the notion that the Chinese Communists might 
develop a "Titoist" distance from Moscow. On May 11, 1949, at 
the time that the crisis over Allied access to Berlin was 
temporarily resolved, Nixon insisted that developments in 
China might ultimately be of more importance than the European 
situation. He warned the House not to "overlook the fact that 
the Communists are winning a great victory in the Far East, a 
victory which may in the end far overshadow any of the recent 
developments in western Europe." He then castigated what he 
called "apologists" for the Chinese Communists "both in and 
out of the State Department" who were "taken in by the 
fallacious theory that the Chinese Communists somehow are 
different from Communists in other countries." For Nixon, Mao 
was no mere "agrarian reformer." Nixon, like Hurley, saw 
communism as a monolithic force. No one could accuse the 
young Californian of being a pre-revisionist, so to speak.
Nixon then inserted into the Congressional Record an 
article from the May 7, 1949 issue of the New Leader entitled 
"Mao No Tito." The congressman concluded that "the article 
erodes the myth of the independence of the Chinese Communists 
effectively and completely."8
- 6-
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War in Korea and the 1950 Senate Campaign
The China issue was to erupt domestically in the form of 
the Korean War, which brought home the tenuous geopolitical 
situation in Asia. Of course, Korea could not be discussed 
without regard to the Chinese Revolution. Communism in Asia 
and the Korean War were no small issues in the infamous 1950 
California Senate race between Nixon and Democratic 
Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas. Nixon, himself, 
perceived the election as a referendum on the Truman-Acheson 
foreign policy in Asia, most notably what he and his fellow 
Republicans loved to call the "loss of China."9
Ralph de Toledano, the future Nixon biographer then 
covering the election for Newsweek. wrote that Nixon 
campaigned on the theme that while the United States had been 
victorious militarily in World War II, the nation had managed 
to "lose the peace." Nixon claimed that while American 
foreign policy under Truman opposed the "international 
Communist conspiracy" in Europe, it fostered appeasement of 
the Communists in Asia. The candidate blamed the Truman 
administration for the Communist takeover of China and 
attacked the State Department under Acheson's secretaryship 
for having been naive about the intent and nature of the 
Chinese Communists. Throughout the campaign, Nixon 
persistently called for the ouster of Acheson, something he 
was to continue to do after he entered the Senate (In fact, 
Nixon was obsessed with Acheson and continued to make him an 
issue long after the secretary was out of office. Nixon
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
harped on Acheson in the campaigns of 1954, 1956 and 1958 as 
if the ultimate pin-striped diplomat still reigned over Foggy 
Bottom.)* As for his treatment of Mrs. Douglas, Nixon scored 
points politically by making an issue of her voting against 
Truman's proposal for unilateral aid to Greece and Turkey in 
1947, which Nixon had supported.10
Mrs. Douglas had attacked Nixon for not voting for aid to 
Korea in 1949. But Nixon and other Republicans had voted 
against the bill as a protest because it had omitted aid for 
Taiwan, although Nixon later voted for the bill when the 
funding provision for assistance to the Nationalists had been 
included. Nixon, and other Republican advocates of Chiang had 
used the Korean War as a pretext for pressuring the 
administration to support the Nationalist Chinese.
In an interview with U.S. News & World Report after his 
victory over Douglas, Nixon pointed to the Truman foreign 
policy in the Far East as the primary reason for winning the 
race. The senator-elect said the differences between Douglas 
and himself had been "clear-cut" and that she had even gone so 
far "as to defend in every respect the Yalta agreements."
Nixon explained that although he believed American policy in 
Europe had been successful and he had supported it, he had 
opposed the Truman policy in Asia. He told the conservative 
newsweekly that during the campaign, he had pointed out "that 
if it had not been for the fall of China, the Korean war would 
not have happened." This was to become a recurring theme in 
Nixon's speeches on Asia in the years ahead.
- 8-
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Nixon argued that the Communist invasion of South Korea 
would never have occurred unless China had gone Communist 
since the North Koreans "would never dare to move south unless 
they had a friendly government on their northern border."
Nixon echoed the remarks he had made the year before in the 
House when he gave the State Department ultimate blame for the 
"fall of China" since, he argued, the department had accepted 
the advice of a "clique who assumed that Chinese Communists 
were different from Communists in other parts of the world."
He charged that the State Department had misperceived them as 
"agrarian reformers" and "liberals" and had maintained that 
"it did not make any difference whether China was under a 
Communist government or even a bad non-Communist goverment." 
Nixon accused the department of making a "fatal error" leading 
to China's "loss" and in turn to the invasion of South 
Korea.11
It is particularly interesting that Nixon should cite the 
issue of Communist China and the Korean War as providing the 
impetus for his Senate victory rather than the perceived 
threat of communism emanating from Stalin's Kremlin. The 
temptation is to categorize young Nixon as an Asia Firster, 
but he must be considered in a separate category. Nixon 
actually spoke for Asian parity with Europe in the formation 
of American foreign policy aimed at fighting Communist 
expansion, and he consistently noted his support for Truman's 
European program. Yet, Nixon echoed the Asia Firsters by 
demagogically blaming the "loss of China" neatly on a "clique"
-9-
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of foreign service officers who in his view were naive in 
misreading the intent of the Chinese Communists. His contempt 
for the careerists in the State Department was obvious. Once 
ensconced in the Senate, Nixon was to continue his assault on 
the Truman-Acheson Asian policy. He rapidly rose to be one of 
the Republican Party's leading spokesmen against the perceived 
threat of Communism from Moscow and, not necessarily less 
important, from Peking.
Nixon returned to Washington as the youngest senator in 
the newly convened 82nd Congress. During his first months in 
the Senate, Nixon depicted the battle with Communism as an 
"ideological war." More importantly, Nixon stated that the 
United States was losing that war. Nixon warned that American 
military and economic strength were not enough to defeat 
communism and that the United States could "lose through its 
ideological defeat." The California senator used this as a 
rationale for calling for the enlargement of congressional 
power to conduct internal security investigations.12 
Indeed, as proved in his zealous and successful pursuit of 
Alger Hiss, Nixon wanted to battle Communist subversion not 
only in Asia and Europe, but at home as well.
Yet, Communist China remained of paramount concern to 
Nixon. After all, the issues of internal security and 
"ideological war" were integral to the perception of a 
Communist threat and the "loss of China." Throughout 1951, 
Nixon spoke of "The Great Debate" then taking place in America 
on foreign policy. The debate was not whether or not to fight
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communism. Rather, it centered on how and where to fight it, 
and whether in the conflict with communism, Asia should be 
considered of equal, if not more, strategic value than Europe.
Yet, Nixon early on recognized the limits of American 
military power acting alone in the world. In a March 1951 
speech in San Bernardino, California, he clearly equated the 
struggle with communism in Europe to the conflict against 
Communist domination in Asia. Nixon, like many American 
politicians before and after him, liked to project a virtual 
Wilsonian sense of America's mission as the world's great 
defender of democracy. However, he displayed a shrewd 
awareness that the United States could not single-handedly 
carry the weight of responsibility for defending the "Free 
World."
He told his fellow Californians that in order to maintain 
peace, America had to remain stronger militarily than the 
Communists. But he warned that "we must also recognize that 
the United States cannot do the job alone" since "we do not 
have the men nor the resources to wage a successful struggle 
against all the rest of the people of the world." To Nixon, 
one step toward a solution was for the nation to develop as 
many allies as possible, both in Europe and Asia.13
But here again, in a distinction from the Asia Firsters, 
Nixon chose to describe the conflict with communism in terms 
of global struggle. However, in April 1951, Truman's firing 
of MacArthur led Nixon to join the Asia Firsters in a call for 
a total military victory in Korea and again for the United
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States to give equal attention to its foreign policy in Asia 
and Europe. It was in the midst of the MacArthur controversy 
that Nixon, in speeches on the floor of the Senate and around 
the country, rallied to the flag of the Republican Party's 
"Old Guard" and forcefully stated his antagonism for the 
Communist Chinese and his enthusiastic support for Chiang's 
regime in Taiwan. Nixon made political hay against the 
background of the ouster of America's Number One Asia Firster, 
General Douglas MacArthur.
The MacArthur Episode
Herbert S. Parmet makes the point that the MacArthur 
episode signified the time where Nixon moved from one who had 
been primarily identified with internal security issues to 
someone who became a prominent GOP spokesman over how to 
handle the war in Korea. Although Nixon had supported Truman 
on the American intervention in the Korean peninsula, he broke 
with the president over MacArthur and in opposition to the 
concept of limited war.14
Roger Morris has called Truman's firing of MacArthur "an 
act by which eras are marked." For Morris, it initiated a 
period of setting a deliberate limit upon postwar, 
postcolonial conflicts which "gnawed at the boundaries of the 
the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the nuclear age." The sequel to 
this, he claims, was an era mired by frustration and division 
in American politics over "unwon but costly little wars of 
peripheral struggle from Korea to Vietnam."15
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The MacArthur dismissal also marked a turning point for 
Nixon's career. He emerged as the general's leading defender 
in Congress and was at the vanguard within the Republican 
Party in speaking out against the Truman policy in Korea. His 
being out front on this issue served to further catapult him 
to national attention. The young upstart who had "gotten" 
Alger Hiss, and whose campaign tactics against Jerry Voorhis 
and Mrs. Douglas were so distasteful to his critics, further 
secured his claim as a rising Republican star with his defense 
of the "Old Guard's" hero, MacArthur. He clearly enunciated 
his view on the conduct of the Korean War, the primacy of the 
issue of Communist China, and the urgent need for America to 
shift from what Nixon considered a Eurocentric foreign policy 
to one which would place parity on relations with Asian 
countries. Nixon also took advantage of the controversy to 
outline his view of how America had seemingly lost its 
dominant position in the world over the few short years since 
the surrender of Germany and Japan.
On April 11, the day of the dismissal, Nixon issued a 
statement which said, "The happiest group in the country over 
General MacArthur's removal will be the Communists and their 
stooges. They have been doing a hatchet job on him for the 
past ten years and now the president has given them what they 
have always wanted— MacArthur's scalp."16 Nixon, ever with 
his ear to the political ground, may well have been aware that 
Truman had been burned in effigy back in his home state of 
sunny California.
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Stephen E. Ambrose points out that Nixon, at heart an 
Anglophobe, found as his scapegoat Truman's "Europe-first" 
policy and its supposed desire "to appease the Labour 
government in Britain." For Nixon, Truman's crime was not 
just that he had "lost" China or somehow appeased Moscow and 
Peking but perhaps even worse, he had appeased that ancient 
American enemy, John Bull. Ambrose also observes that the 
MacArthur firing set off a second phase of the "Great Debate" 
between those on the right who wanted to destroy Communists in 
Asia and those who more realistically sought their 
containment.17
Nixon rose on the Senate floor on that April day not only 
to defend the five-star general but to underscore the 
importance of Asia in the battle against communism. The 
senator rejected the notion that "Asia is not the place to 
defeat communism in a war" and repeated his view expressed 
after his election to the upper house that China's fall to the 
Communists had been made possible by the erroneous judgment of 
the State Department under Acheson. Nixon said, "Asia may not 
be the place to defeat communism in a war, but Asia is a place 
where we can lose to communism without a war, and it is a 
place where we can lose to communism with a war— either 
way."18
The Californian then lambasted the Truman Asia policy 
although he took a moment before his harangue to state that he 
had supported the president in Europe. Even at this pivotal 
time for Asia Firsters and the China Lobby, Nixon was still
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distinct from the "Old Guard." But Nixon reverted to his 
critical voice, lashing into the State Department for having 
believed that the "Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers 
and liberals, and therefore it did not make any difference 
whether China went Communist." Nixon dragged up his 
oft-repeated charge that the North Koreans never would have 
"dared" to invade South Korea if they had not had the 
"friendly" Communist Chinese government on their northern 
border. China's falling under Mao's control made the Korean 
War "inevitable," while it simply could have been avoided if 
the State Department had not been taken in by naive,
idealistic foreign service officers and if the United States
had backed Chiang to the hilt. Nixon said further that those 
who had advocated such policies in the past, meaning Acheson 
and the coterie of China specialists in the Foreign Service, 
should be removed from their positions rather than MacArthur 
being ignominiously dumped.
At this juncture, Nixon was resolute in his perception of 
the Communist Chinese as orthodox, Kremlin-directed Communists 
and not as Chinese who used communism as a major part of their 
expression of Chinese nationalism. MacArthur was not really 
the issue for Nixon— the Acheson State Department was. During 
this debate, Nixon even suggested that the Chinese
Nationalists might still have been able to wage civil war in
China had not the United States withdrawn support from Chiang 
after World War II through the Marshall mission, although 
Michael Schaller has pointed out that the Kuomintang (KMT, the
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Nationalist Party) did in fact receive military aid despite 
Marshall's arms embargo. Nixon believed, or at least he said, 
that if Chiang could still be fighting the Communists on the 
mainland, it may have altogether prevented the Korean War.
Fawn Brodie has categorized this line of thinking in Nixon as 
a reflection of the China Lobby's influence on his position on 
China. But as Nixon told Parmet in 1988, he hardly needed to 
be "won over" to the Nationalist Chinese point of view.
Parmet also shows convincingly that Nixon was not under the 
"control" of the China Lobby and that it was consistent for 
him as a conservative Californian to oppose Kao so adamantly. 
It was a position he would have taken whether or not there had 
been a China Lobby. Many more politicians were far more 
widely identified with the China issue than Nixon was despite 
a two-part article in The Reporter magazine in April 1952 
which sought to identify Nixon so strongly with the China 
Lobby. Parmet rightly believes that China was just one of 
several issues for Nixon and although the MacArthur episode 
broadened Nixon's concerns and political appeal to the right, 
his Number One issue was still internal security.19
By this time, Nixon and the "Old Guard" virtually had a 
Pavlovian response that Acheson's "defense perimeter" speech 
of January 1950 was also responsible for the mess in Korea 
(Acheson had placed Korea outside of the defense perimeter of 
the United States, which ironically, MacArthur had also done 
the preceding year. Yet, not surprisingly, there was no 
criticism of MacArthur from the right on that.) Nixon's
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obsession with Acheson is akin to his distaste for Hiss who he 
felt was a condescending, sneering, Eastern aristocrat. As a 
middle-class Californian, he loathed Hiss and felt resentment 
for what Acheson represented to people of Nixon's ilk from 
Southern California: the snobby, Eastern, ivy-league, "striped 
pants" diplomatic set. Nixon called MacArthur's ouster a 
victory for the Acheson policies.
Nixon's criticism that day was not just reserved for 
Democrats and Foggy Bottom. Nixon advocated a trade embargo 
against Communist China and felt particularly bitter that, as 
he saw it, war materiel and other products were able to reach 
Communist China through the British colony, Hong Kong. There 
was already tension between the United States and Britain over 
China since the British had recently recognized Peking and by 
far and away took the softer line on Korea. Nixon understood 
well the undying hatred on the part of the "Old Guard" for the 
British and the remnants of the British Empire. Nixon cited 
news reports that said that the British advocated returning 
Formosa to China which Nixon decried as just the first step 
toward United States recognition of Peking and its admission 
to the United Nations. Nixon termed such recognition and U.N. 
admission as "bare-faced appeasement."20
Nixon further charged that Truman had "lined up with the 
British bloc of appeasers in the United Nations against the 
overwhelming majority of the American people" and 
demagogically theorized that Truman had dumped MacArthur so 
that the president "would be free to make a deal with the
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Chinese Communists along the lines proposed by the British." 
Nixon made it sound as if the United States, or at the very 
least the Truman administration, was under British rule.
As he was to do throughout the furor over MacArthur, Nixon 
drew the bottom line in terms of what he felt to be 
"politically acceptable to the American people." He clearly 
believed that Americans did not want a foreign policy tinged 
by what would be construed as undue British influence. The 
distrust of the Old World and an ancient enemy lived on in the 
1950s. It would seem that as far as the Anglophobes were 
concerned, America never "resolved" its feelings toward the 
mother country.
During the Senate debate, Nixon also offered his rendering 
of the "domino theory" long before it was expressed by Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. He applied it to Asia as well as Europe and 
left no doubt that Asia was as strategically important as 
Europe to the defense of the interests of the United States.
He warned that it might not be possible to defeat the 
Communists in China, but that America "may lose to communism" 
there "either with war or without a war." But his concern did 
not end with the Communist regime in Peking. His vision of 
falling dominos prophesized that should Formosa "go" and then 
Korea "go" that "it means Japan becomes untenable and all Asia 
goes." And then, the Californian predicted, war would be 
inevitable, not necessarily immediately but within a matter of 
a few years. But Nixon, ever the internationalist, used the 
European analogy of the debate over "U.S. troops to Europe"
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and said that it was previously and correctly reasoned that 
America had to send aid to Europe because if Europe were to 
"fall" to the Communists, it would mean a war in which the 
West would be undermanned and eventually lose.21 The 
senator was essentially trying to scare the country into 
supporting his position.
Nixon also contended that the U.S. was carrying more than 
its fair share of the burden than other members of the United 
Nations. He advocated the use of Chinese Nationalist forces 
from Formosa against the Chinese Communists on the mainland 
and in particular supported the use of KMT guerrilla forces to 
harass the Peking regime to divert the Communists from their 
fighting in Korea. But Nixon was sure to hold back from 
suggesting that American servicemen be sent to fight on 
Chinese soil.22 There were domestic political constraints 
over how far even Nixon could go in his support of Chiang.
Yet, this did not mean Nixon parted from MacArthur's quest 
for complete and total victory in Korea. The day after the 
dismissal, April 12, he issued another statement backing 
MacArthur and attacking the president. He categorized 
MacArthur's military approach in Korea as "realistic." He 
further disagreed with what he considered Truman's reading of 
the general's plans for widening the war as a 
"choice...between a little war in Korea or a much bigger war 
in Asia." Nixon called that a "complete distortion of the 
facts. The choice is not between a little war or a big war; 
the choice is between continuing the Korean war with no real
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hope of ending it or of adopting a new policy which will allow 
our commanders in the field to end the war with a military 
victory." To Nixon, MacArthur's plan to bomb supply depots in 
Manchuria, cut off all trade with Communist China, and make 
use of Chiang's forces would bring the war to a "decisive 
military conclusion" which was what the senator believed the 
American people wanted. The young senator had no doubt about 
the domestic political implications of the MacArthur 
incident. He believed that the "overwhelming majority of 
Americans were and are behind the realistic policy of General 
MacArthur to win and end the war decisively and not behind the 
Truman-Acheson policy of prolonging it with the desperate hope 
that the enemy will on some distant day give up."23 The 
enemy, of course, was the Communist Chinese, not merely the 
North Koreans.
Nixon also introduced Senate Resolution 126 which demanded 
the restoration of MacArthur to his command in Asia. In the 
resolution, Nixon said that MacArthur's removal reflects a 
policy of appeasement to the enemies of the United States."
The resolution, of course, never had any chance of passing and 
was just a symbolic gesture. It was referred to the Armed 
Services Committee, where no further action was taken.24 
But Nixon's accusations of appeasement aimed at Truman and 
Acheson were not to die, let alone fade away.
In another debate on the Senate floor on April 27, Nixon 
repeated his unqualified support of the Nationalist Chinese 
regime and scored opponents of aid to Chiang by comparing the
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Republic of China's position in 1951 to that of Greece on the 
eve of the Truman Doctrine. He observed that some members of 
Congress voted for aid to Loyalist Greece despite the belief 
by some congressmen that the regime there was weak and 
corrupt. Nixon added that those who opposed aid to Chiang 
charged that his government was also weak and corrupt but that 
they used that as a rationale to vote against aid to 
Taiwan.25 Nixon's reasoning here was undeniably cogent.
Nixon can hardly be accused of applying a double standard 
considering that he lent his support to Truman over the Truman 
Doctrine and Marshall Plan.
During this debate in the Senate chamber, Nixon called for 
the removal of the United States Navy's Seventh Fleet from the 
Formosan Strait, joining the chorus on the right of those who 
yearned for the "unleashing" of chiang. At the outset of the 
American intervention in Korea, Truman had ordered the 
interposition of the fleet in the strait not only to protect 
Taiwan from invasion but his critics argued, to prevent Chiang 
from invading the mainland and thereby widen the war. The 
fact that Chiang's true military capabilities ruled out any 
realistic hope for successfully "regaining" the mainland was 
not addressed by Truman's opponents. But Nixon was at least a 
little more down to earth than much of the Old Guard. His 
point was that even the possibility of invasion of the 
mainland by the Nationalists would divert Chinese Communist 
forces from Korea.26 (Although by 1953, after President 
Eisenhower had removed the Seventh Fleet from the strait, the
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Nationalists were able to mount some guerrilla attacks, they 
never really made any strategic difference.)
Nixon brought his case for change in United States Asian 
policy to a national radio audience on the May 1, 1951 
broadcast of America's Town HallMeeting of the Air 
originating in Toledo, Ohio. He shared the podium that night 
with Senator John Sparkman, the Alabama Democrat, destined to 
be the vice presidential candidate of his party in 1952 
against the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket. The subject for that 
evening's discussion was "How Can We End the War in Asia?"
In his opening statement, Nixon commented that the war in 
Asia could be ended in one of three ways. First, the United 
States could "get out of Korea"; second, the United States 
could "win the war through a military victory on the 
battlefield"; and third, the U.S. could end the war by a 
"political settlement at the conference table." Nixon 
rejected the first option on the grounds that America's 
abandonment of Korea "would be the greatest possible 
encouragement we could give to the Communist aggressors in 
Asia and would probably result eventually in the fall of all 
Asia to the Communists and then a Third World War." Nixon 
rejected a political settlement of the war because he believed 
the Chinese Communists would "insist that such a settlement 
must give them a seat in the United Nations and control over 
the Island of Formosa. To agree to such conditions now or in 
the future would be outright appeasement, and this course 
would lead to World War III." The hawkish senator concluded
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that the only feasible option for the United States to pursue 
was exactly what MacArthur had been advocating: to "win it 
(the war in Korea) on the battlefield."27 And the only way 
to win was to dramatically escalate the war.
Nixon stated that "Victory on the battlefield is not 
possible under the present restrictions which have been 
imposed on our field commanders and fighting forces by the 
United Nations." The Californian then proposed five steps 
which he believed would end the war in Korea "with victory, 
and not appeasement." First, he recommended that all trade 
with Communist China be stopped along with this stab at the 
island nation ally across the Atlantic: "including the billion 
dollars worth of goods which the British are shipping into the 
port of Hong Kong annually." Second, Nixon insisted that 
United States commanders be given the "right to establish air 
reconnaissance over the mainland of China so that we can at 
least prepare for the offenses which they are mounting."
Third, he repeated his pet point made just days before in the 
Senate, that "restrictions" on the Chinese Nationalists on 
Taiwan be removed "so that Communists will have to divert some 
of their troops from the Korean battlefield, in order to 
defend against the threat of the invasion from the south." 
Fourth, he once again called for more help from "the other 
allies on the Korean battlefield" who "have as great an 
interest in bringing this war to a successful conclusion as we 
have." Fifth, and finally, Nixon urged that the U.S. "warn 
the Chinese Communists that unless they cease sending troops
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and supplies into Korea by a certain date, our commanders in 
the field will be given the authority to bomb the bases from 
which those troops and supplies are coming."28 Nixon left 
his national audience with no doubt that he was a staunch 
MacArthurite, willing to win in Korea no matter what the 
ramifications of widening the war.
Nixon brought in an element of lawyerly shrewdness to the 
MacArthur debate and not a small bit of legerdemain. Less 
than two weeks later, he portrayed the general's dismissal not 
as a repudiation of his position on the war but ironically as 
nothing less than a victory for all those who supported 
MacArthur's emphasis on Asia and a hard-line posture in favor 
of Chiang. While the MacArthur hearings were being conducted 
in Washington, Nixon told the Ohio State Bar Association on 
May 12 in Akron that no matter what happened in the hearings, 
"MacArthur had already won a decisive personal victory over 
his critics in the great debate." Nixon saw victory in 
apparent defeat and painted Truman's ouster of MacArthur as 
inducing the administration to have a Far Eastern policy where 
none had existed before. Of course, Nixon was lost here in 
the hyperbole of political argument but allowing for the 
political version of poetic license, Nixon discerned that the 
administration was actually shifting toward encompassing much 
of what could be called the Asia First program. Nixon 
detected a change from the recent history of "appeasement" he 
understood as emanating from Yalta, but did not think this 
so-called shift would have been possible without the public
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uproar over Truman's firing of MacArthur. Yet, Nixon was 
hardly praising the administration. "For the first time since 
the Yalta conference," he said, "the weasel statements, double 
talk, the outright appeasement, which have too often 
characterized our State Department's Far Eastern policy, are 
being gradually replaced with policies that have elements of 
firmness and decision" although Nixon remarked that there was 
still a "considerable distance to go" before that policy would 
be satisfactory to him and his political kindred.29
Nixon then credited MacArthur with having been ultimately 
responsible for what Nixon perceived as a change in 
administration policy. Most importantly, he detected an 
altered attitude by the administration on the issue of 
Communist China and Taiwan as proof of a new look to the 
administration's program in the Far East. Nixon cited recent 
statements made on behalf of the administration by that 
hitherto bete noire of the Asia Firsters and Old Guard,
General Ceorge Marshall, then secretary of defense. As Nixon 
portrayed them, the Marshall remarks were nothing less than a 
complete vindication of the Asia Firsters and China Bloc's 
(those in Congress who were devotees of the Nationalist 
Chiang) rendition of the causes of the "loss of China" to the 
Communists.
Nixon said that Marshall now recognized that Taiwan was 
essential to American defenses and "that it will not be turned 
over to the Chinese Communists." But the partisan Republican 
in Nixon just could not let up as he charged that "Attempts
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are now being made to cover up the past record by claiming 
that this has been the policy of the Administration all along 
but the record is exactly the contrary."
The senator then pointed out that Marshall had also now 
said unequivocably that Communist China should not be admitted 
to the U.N. and that the secretary of defense indirectly 
admitted that it was a "mistake" to try to arrange a coalition 
of the Nationalists and Communists in China during the 
Marshall mission from 1945-1947. But perhaps most important 
from where the Californian stood, in the aftermath of the 
MacArthur incident the administration had been "forced to 
recognize the basic importance of defending Asia as well as 
Europe from Communists" although he quickly added that the 
Truman policy still placed more emphasis on Europe than Asia. 
One has to wonder if Nixon did not have his tongue in his 
cheek since after all, the president had immediately responded 
to the North Korean invasion by committing United States 
military forces to the defense of South Korea. Perhaps Nixon 
was merely pointing out what he considered to be a qualitative 
difference in the administration's approach to these two 
strategically and geopolitically vital continents in the 
world.
Nixon also claimed that progress had been made in trying 
to establish an economic blockade of Communist China and that 
the British had to concede to American criticism and "tighten 
up on their shipment of strategic materials to China." He 
also said that now, after months of inaction, the American
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delegation to the U.N. was looking toward an embargo by that 
international organization of arms to China. Nixon exulted in 
pointing out that an American military aid mission had been 
sent to Taiwan and that U.S. commanders in Korea had been 
given authority to bomb Manchurian bases in the event of 
Communist air attacks.
He noted that our delegates to the United Nations were 
then busily engaged in trying to obtain reinforcements from 
American allies in the organization, all as a result of the 
fallout from the MacArthur incident. And Nixon could not let 
the opportunity pass before this Ohio group to take a stab at 
his nemesis, Dean Acheson, the Mammon in the Paradise Lost of 
the Republican's vision of an Edenic era prior to Democratic 
control of foreign policy. "Even the staunchest 
Administration supporters in and out of Congress have finally 
come to the conclusion that Secretary Acheson must go," Nixon 
claimed, calling the secretary's resignation "inevitable."
Finally, Nixon explained that the administration now had 
been forced to concede that the only way to bring the war in 
Korea to a conclusion was with "victory on the battlefield" 
and that additional authority had to be granted to American 
commanders in the field, although not as much as MacArthur had 
desired.30
All of this was so much wishful thinking on Nixon's part. 
He was far too discerning and intelligent a politician to have 
believed that Acheson was on the verge of stepping down or 
that the Truman administration would ever adopt MacArthur's
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remedy for the war on the Korean peninsula. But he knew what 
his growing constituency wanted to hear and he also knew how 
to make the most political capital out of the golden 
opportunity that the sacking of MacArthur presented. The 
truth is not always what makes political gain but the 
artfulness of argument can score points for the opposition. 
Today the political swamis might term Nixon the first "spin 
doctor" for putting a winning spin on the MacArthur debacle.
On May 24, Nixon repeated many of the points he had made 
in Akron to a meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute 
in New York. He again spoke of the necessity of the United 
States maintaining its military power but he was realistic 
enough to say that "we must be as strong militarily as we can 
without irreparably damaging the economy of the country."31
But just two days later, on May 26, Nixon was back on the 
offensive against the administration in a speech before the 
Republican State Central Committee in Charleston, West 
Virginia. He was his old vitriolic self as he charged that 
the Truman administration had "reached an all-time low in 
political hypocrisy in its efforts to confuse the real issues 
in the MacArthur controversy." The young Republican took the 
low road and went right for the Democratic jugular when he 
accused Democratic spokesmen of using the "'big lie technique1 
in a way which would have turned Hitler green with envy" and 
he refuted the Democracy’s charge that the GOP had "no foreign 
policy." He rebutted this statement by hitting back hard, 
running through the litany of Democratic sins in foreign
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affairs, especially Asia. "Look who's talking!," the 
Californian countered. "The record shows that the question 
before the country now is not between MacArthur's policy and 
an administration policy, but between MacArthur's policy and 
no policy at all," he added. Mixon seemed to have 
conveniently forgotten his stand of just a couple of weeks 
prior that the administration had actually adopted much of the 
the general's policy in the wake of the MacArthur hearings.
"We do not know from one day to another what administration 
leaders are going to say on such vital issues as the admission 
of Red China to the United Nations, the defense of Formosa, 
the character of the Chinese Communist movement. Secretary 
Acheson, Dean Rusk, Secretary Marshall, President Truman and 
other administration spokesmen have made completely 
contradictory statements on all these major issues within the 
past two years."32 It is not so much that Nixon was 
politically inconsistent, because in essence, he really was 
not, but he simply could not resist pandering to this 
Republican audience in a way that he would not have addressed 
the ostensibly nonpartisan Ohio Bar Association. After all, 
boys will be boys and politicians will be politicians. Nixon, 
himself, in his latest book In the Arena is fond of saying 
that politics is an art and not a science and in the 1951 
MacArthur episode, he was the painter with the broadest and 
most colorful strokes.
Any good politician is by necessity an ambitious 
politician and the tenacious Nixon never suffered from
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diffidence over any efforts to move up the ladder. He already 
was looking ahead to the 1952 presidential election when the 
long-awaited, much-hoped-for Republican Restoration would take 
place. In this West Virginia speech, some 16 months before 
the election, Nixon was already speaking about the 
repercussions of the MacArthur controversy on 1952. He 
stressed that the furor over the dumping of MacArthur 
indicated that the public's attention was now focused on what 
the Republicans considered to be the Truman administration's 
failures in the Far East. Indeed, Korea and the inevitably 
linked China issue would emerge as a central theme of the 
Eisenhower-Nixon campaign as the GOP successfully placed the 
Democrats in exile from the White House and removed them from 
control of the Congress.
Nixon's Strategy for Republican victory
Nixon revealed his strategy for a Republican victory in 
1952 on June 28, 1951, when he addressed the Young Republican 
National Federation in Boston. In this speech, called "The 
Challenge of 1952," Nixon represented the Republicans as "true 
ons-worlders." (Nixon had cast his first presidential ballot 
for Wendell Willkie in 1940 and as a young Whittier lawyer, 
had spoken in behalf of the GOP nominee in the Los Angeles 
basin during that campaign.) In this Willkiesque turn of 
phrase, he was actually finding another way to incorporate the 
China issue in his criticism of the Democrats, albeit on a 
higher plain than he had exhibited earlier in the year during
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the MacArthur incident. "We can develop a policy which will 
not have in it the seeds of the error which curses our present
policy; the error which led to the fall of China," he told the
future leaders of the GOP. But being a "one-worlder" for 
Nixon in 1951 meant that he could reinvigorate his pet theme 
of parity between Europe and Asia for American foreign policy. 
"We have consistently been true one-worlders insofar as 
military and diplomatic policy is concerned," the Senator 
continued, "and not half-worlders, and for that reason we can 
and will develop a policy and a program which will have the 
best chance of keeping both Asia and Europe on our side in the
struggle in which we are engaged."33 Nixon again further
distinguished himself from the Asia Firsters with a rallying 
cry for One-World First, if you will— a clarion call for the 
United States to deal equally with both Asia and Europe.
Nixon left this collection of young party stalwarts in the 
bastion of Republican Eastern Establishment-style 
internationalism with no doubt that he was commiting himself 
to an ardent world posture for the United States rather than 
the "Gibraltar" or "Fortress America" poise backed by the Old 
Guard wing of the party, led by Ohio Senator Robert Taft and 
former President Herbert Hoover.
The following February, Nixon returned to the Bay State to 
give a Lincoln Day address in Springfield in which he defined 
what the major issue should be in the upcoming 1952 national 
election campaign. He rejected out of hand "prosperity" as an 
issue for the Republicans arguing that the matter of bread and
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butter was transcended by the threat of communism "at home and 
abroad" to the "survival of the nation itself." That was the 
issue that demanded the full political energy of the party.
Before this partisan audience, just as he had the year 
before, Nixon presented himself clearly as an internationalist 
imbued with the idealistic Willkie "One World" rhetoric. He 
argued that the United States had to be concerned with 
maintaining the liberty of foreign nations because "a threat 
to the security or the liberty of peoples any place in the 
world is a threat to our own security and our own liberty."
He added in a tone all too reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson, and 
yes, even Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that "If we are to have 
peace and if we are to continue to enjoy our liberties we must 
assume the full responsibilities of world leadership." The 
senator was on the high road here and his statesmanlike 
pronouncement differed little with the sense of the Truman 
Doctrine. Was Nixon, in reality, a "Me Too" Republican on 
foreign policy? He clearly saw the need for collective 
security and was thoroughly convinced, like Eisenhower, that 
America could no longer stand aloof from events anywhere in 
the world. And as already discussed, he wanted even a greater 
American commitment to freedom in Asia.34
Despite his well-earned reputation as the hardest-hitting 
partisan Republican this side of Senator Joe McCarthy, Nixon 
could read the bottom line. He was a political realist who 
understood all too well that a Republican could not be elected 
to the White House in 1952 without the votes of millions of
-32-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Democrats, just as he had won his Senate victory in 1950 by 
garnering Democratic votes in California where Republicans 
made up a minority of the registered voters. Back in his home 
state on April 29, Nixon invoked a militaristic rhythm to his 
political rhetoric when he urged a "Republican Preparedness 
Dinner" in San Francisco to seek Democratic votes as the party 
readied itself for its great crusade to liberate the White 
House and the halls of Congress. Nixon realized that the 
Democrats would have to compromise on civil rights if they 
wanted to be assured of the support of the "Solid South." It 
seemed that Nixon was writing off the South at that juncture. 
Perhaps he did not expect that even Eisenhower would do so 
well as to carry Virginia, Tennessee and Texas in 1952 nor did 
Nixon envision his own later successful attempt in 
presidential politics of Republican realignment through his 
own controversial "Southern Strategy."). But the senator 
believed that the key to electing a Republican to the White 
House would lie in the candidate's ability to "carry the great 
industrial states of the North, like California, where 
Democrats are substantially in the majority."35 And for 
Nixon, the "security" of the nation against the perceived 
Communist threat seemed to be just the issue that the 
political doctor ordered to try to seduce Democratic voters 
over to the Republican column.
On the Ticket
With the notoriety Nixon gained from the Hiss case, his
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victory over Mrs. Douglas and his high visibility following 
the firing of MacArthur, it was not surprising that 
speculation began to mount that he might be the choice for the 
second spot on the 1952 Republican national ticket. What 
might be surprising to those who categorize Nixon as 
predominantly Old Guard is that his biggest booster for 
getting him on the ticket with General Eisenhower was none 
other than the nemesis of the GOP right-wing, the 
twice-defeated party nominee for president, Governor Thomas 
Dewey of New York. When Nixon was finally selected as 
Eisenhower's running mate, he was not perceived to be in the 
pocket of the Old Guard, although he was certainly more than 
acceptable to it. James Reston actually pointed to 
Eisenhower's choice of Nixon as proof that the general was 
indeed a "middle-of-the-road-Man." Reston wrote in The New 
York Times that Eisenhower had spurned a request from some 
advisers that he try to mollify the defeated Republican right 
wing by selecting a running mate identified with the Taft wing 
of the GOP. Reston added that Eisenhower decided against 
asking Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen as his running mate 
after Dirksen had attacked Dewey in a speech at the Chicago 
convention, melodramatically accusing the New Yorker of having 
led the party ignominiously down to defeat twice before. The 
general was not about to pick someone who showed that kind of 
insubordination to the very man who had so vigorously espoused 
his own candidacy. The Times also observed that Nixon's 
selection was, again not surprisingly, influenced by his "fame
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as a Congressional anti-Communist" who was somewhat distanced 
from the extremism of McCarthy. The newspaper also pointed to 
the attraction of Nixon's youth (he was only 39) as well as 
the geographical appeal of his California origins to nicely 
balance the ticket. Not unnoticed was Nixon's extraordinary 
capacity as a vote-getter in his landslide victory over 
Douglas for the Senate seat.36
As for the the Republican platform that year, it clearly 
indicated at least a rhetorical victory for the Asia Firsters 
calling the Truman foreign policy one of "Asia Last" 
contrasted with the Russians's own view of "Asia First."37 
This was all just so much political bombast because it is 
clear to historians today that in 1952, and even before,
Stalin was first and foremost concerned with extending Soviet 
influence in Europe and felt a certain unease with the reality 
of another Communist giant just south of the border sharing a 
4,000-mile boundary with Mother Russia. But the important 
thing to the Republicans was that they thought, and rightly 
so, that they could make political hay over Asia because of 
the reality of Americans engaged in hostilities on that 
continent against the North Koreans and their Communist 
Chinese allies. This was the sine qua non for Nixon 
throughout the campaign as he emphasized foreign policy, 
particularly towards Asia, over domestic issues.
On July 26, Nixon flew to Denver to meet with Eisenhower 
to plan campaign strategy. At an impromptu news conference, 
Nixon told reporters that foreign policy was "potentially" the
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"big issue" of that election year. The vice presidential 
nominee then contrasted the approach he believed Eisenhower 
would bring to foreign affairs with what he expected from the 
Democratic choice for the top spot, Illinois Governor Adlai E. 
Stevenson. He employed his standard charge that foreign 
policy had been the biggest failure of the Truman 
administration and ever the punster, said that the Democrats 
had picked "some new faces but the same old deal." Nixon made 
the obvious point that Eisenhower could "offer new leadership" 
in foreign affairs while Stevenson had to accept the Truman 
foreign policy, that the Republican nominee bore no 
responsibility for past errors of the administration in the 
Far East and that Stevenson would be forced to defend the 
Democratic record in Asia.38 For Nixon, the fact that 
Stevenson was a Democrat was enough to taint him with the onus 
of all that the GOP considered as Truman's failings.
At the beginning of the campaign that August, Nixon 
attacked Stevenson as the candidate of the Democratic "bosses" 
and challenged the governor to repudiate Truman and his 
policies. This was a shrewd way of trying to associate 
Stevenson all the more with the politically damaged goods 
that, in essence, was President Truman in 1952. Nixon made 
these remarks on Stevenson's home turf at the Illinois State 
Fair in Springfield August 13. Later that day he told 
reporters that as far as the Korean war was concerned, 
Eisenhower would criticize the Democrats for being responsible 
in the first place for the events which led America into war
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in Korea. But the senator tempered the criticism somewhat by 
saying that the general would not criticize Truman's initial 
decision to intervene and, Nixon reminded the newsmen that he, 
too, had supported Truman over sending American troops to 
Korea. However, he still insisted on the theme that virtually 
had become a Greek chorus in any of his political remarks, 
that the party of Truman would have to take the blame for what 
had started the war in the first place: the "loss of China" to 
the Communists. Here, in the midst of his first national 
campaign, he repeated his MacArthuresque critique of Truman 
for not fighting through for a military victory in Korea.
Nixon was sure to elaborate on China in this give and take 
session with reporters. He asserted as he had so many times 
before that the very least the United States could have done 
in Korea was to blockade the Chinese coast and remove what 
amounted to the Seventh Fleet blockading Taiwan and Chiang's 
troops. He again advocated American bombing of Chinese 
installations within Manchuria, stating that these actions 
could change the course of the war. However, when newsmen 
pressed Nixon as to whether or not Eisenhower would follow 
MacArthur's proposals for the conduct of the war or simply 
continue the policy of containment supported by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the vice presidential nominee retreated. He 
did not want to give any indication that Eisenhower would take 
one side or the other and said the general would address that 
issue later in the campaign. Nixon added that the tactics and 
strategy of the war, distinct from the Truman foreign policy,
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ought not be discussed in the campaign. This was a rather 
peculiar position for the man who had spent most of the last 
year and a half rampaging up and down the country about the 
dangerous shortcomings of the Truman administration's military 
strategy in Korea. Yet, Nixon was quick to point out that if 
debate over the Democrat's foreign policy was excluded from 
the campaign, "the security of the United States would be in 
peril."39
In September, Nixon was forced to fight for his political 
life as he became embroiled in a personal "crisis"— the 
scandal over the so-called "slush fund" set up by some 
California businessmen to help him meet some of his political 
expenses not covered by his Senate salary. The nationally 
televised "Checkers" speech, in which Nixon attempted to 
vindicate himself and save his spot on the ticket is now part 
of American political folklore (although nearly four decades 
later his unrelenting critics still consider him unredeemed 
from this particular imbroglio).
The historian Robert Divine claims that the "Checkers" 
scandal "transformed Richard Nixon into a political celebrity 
in his own right" while at the same time strengthening the 
ticket by assuring both the Old Guard, who were afraid the 
party would be lost to Dewey's people, and the Eastern 
Establishment. The Taftites, Divine argues, now believed they 
had their man on the ticket and he adds, Nixon spoke out more 
forcefully on foreign policy for the duration of the campaign.
Divine is really only half-right. While not exactly the
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embodiment of a personality cult, Nixon had a distinct 
following within his party that went back to the Hiss case.
And although Nixon did indeed speak out vehemently against the 
Truman administration, the tone was no different than the one 
he h a d  taken during the "great debate" over the MacArthur 
ouster. Nixon had proven time and again in his brief six-year 
political career that he was equally capable of taking either 
the low-road or high-road. His critics seldom, if ever, gave 
him credit in their diabolical rendering of Nixon for anything 
that might even resemble the smallest budding of 
statesmanship. Also, although the Taftites had found Nixon 
more to their liking, as pointed out previously, Nixon was 
never one of them. He never appeased the Old Guard by 
retreating from his belief in the full American commitment to 
the defense of Europe. Nixon was in essence, as he might well 
have put it, a "one-worlder." Willkieite One-Worlders do not 
make good Old Guard, right-wing, midwestem, Taftite 
isolationists.
Divine points out that Nixon retreaded a lot of his old, 
standard charges with new embellishments earmarked for 
Stevenson. Nixon again lambasted Truman for "losing" 
600,000,000 people to communism and had a field day in 
suggesting that Stevenson's support of Hiss was indicative of 
the Democratic nominee being soft on communism (However, Nixon 
discreetly omitted any mention that the architect of 
"liberation theology" himself, John Foster Dulles, had once 
served as a character reference for Hiss. " L i b e r a t i o n "  was
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the Republican rhetorical policy rejecting the Truman-George 
Kennan notion of "containing" communism. Containment, Dulles 
and his followers argued, was simply not enough in the face of 
the atheistic evil of communism. Only the complete rollback 
of communism in Eastern Europe and China, leading to the 
liberation of all of its peoples, would be acceptable. Of 
course, once ensconced in power, the Eisenhower administration 
soon discovered that the rhetoric of liberation was far easier 
than making it reality. In fact, historian Gordon H. Chang 
argues in his recent book, Friends and Enemies: The United 
States. Soviet Union and China. 1948-1972 that Eisenhower and 
Dulles wound up adopting the containment policy of Truman 
despite all the liberation and rollback rhetoric.).
In perhaps his lowest attack of all during that campaign, 
Nixon suggested that "nothing would please the Kremlin more" 
than Stevenson's ascendency to the presidency. The articulate 
Californian also showed an affinity for alliteration by 
calling Stevenson "Adlai the Appeaser" and a Ph.D. recipient 
from "Dean Acheson's Cowardly College of Communist 
Containment." Nor did Nixon shy away from that old standby in 
the heat of a political fight: the scare tactic with what 
Nixon must have thought was a literary flourish. Me warned 
that if the Democrats retained the White House, it could lead 
to "the awful prospect of still more wars under the 
Truman-Acheson and now Stevenson-Alice-in-Wonderland policy of 
Communist containment."40
In the last two weeks of the campaign, Nixon was again to
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turn to China as a prime issue. In a San Francisco speech on 
October 28th, he declared that Stevenson's position on the Far 
East would "mean suicide for America." He demanded that the 
Democratic nominee "renounce his previously expressed ideas 
and declare unequivocably" that he opposed recognition of Red 
China, supports free China...and opposes giving Formosa to the 
Communists." Nixon asserted that if Stevenson did not 
renounce his prior statements on the Far East, "he forfeits 
the right even to be considered for the Presidency.
Nixon was referrring to Stevenson's view supporting the then 
"unorthodox" and suspect notion that nationalism, not 
communism, might be the determining political force in China 
and elsewhere in Asia.
Undoubtedly Nixon's tactics alienated some voters but 
there is no denying that his onslaught against Stevenson and 
Truman also galvanized support for the Republican ticket. 
Perhaps it did not matter whom Eisenhower chose as his running 
mate since his popularity alone may have ensured victory but 
the debate over how Nixon helped or hindered the Republican 
national ticket in 1952 can be left to political scientists 
who wish to quantify such important questions. What matters 
is that Nixon had been elected to the second highest office in 
the land and would use his position within the new 
administration to steep himself in foreign affairs, travel and 
study as he evolved his own philosophy of foreign policy.
China and a developing Pacific geopolitical strategy would not 
be lost in myopic concern over Europe although the defense of
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Europe remained important to him, whereas the Asia Firsters 
might well have been happy to abandon that Old World 
entirely. Nixon would continue to devote much but hardly all 
of his energy to the situation in Asia. He was, after all, 
one of many who had spoken out vigorously against the Truman 
policy in the Korea War and the rest of the Asian continent. 
Nixon grabbed the spotlight over MacArthur's ouster but as has 
already been suggested, he was hardly focused solely on the 
China issue.
During Nixon's first year as vice president, Eisenhower 
would send him abroad on an unprecedented trip to some 19 
Asian countries, making Nixon the highest ranking American 
official up to that time to visit that part of the world in an 
official capacity. It was on that journey that Nixon was able 
to hone his vision of America's proper role in Asia and the 
pivotal issue of how the United States should deal with the 
region's most vital and divisive issue, the China question.
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CHAPTER 2; THE GRAND TOUR OF ASIA
On July 7, 1953, the White House announced that Vice 
President Nixon would make a goodwill tour of the Far East.
At the time, the assignment was interpreted as evidence that 
Eisenhower felt that the Truman administration had seriously 
neglected developing "formal national friendships" in that 
part of the globe. The Nixon trip was also viewed as a 
follow-up to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's 
diplomatic mission to the Middle East that past spring.1
When Nixon left Washington in October, The New York Times 
hailed him as "a kind of Assistant President" and praised the 
large role they considered the vice president to be playing in 
the new administration. The Times noted that with the young 
Californian in the Number Two slot, the job had taken on 
"larger dimensions" with Nixon regularly attending Cabinet and 
National Security Council meetings as well as serving as 
Eisenhower's liason to GOP leaders on the Hill. After only 
half a dozen years or so in existence, the NSC had become an 
"inner cabinet" and The Times was impressed that Nixon chaired 
the meetings of the council whenever Eisenhower had other 
obligations. Not surprisingly, that bastion of Old Guard 
opinion, U.S. News & World Report joined in the chorus of 
praise for the nation's youngest vice president since John 
Breckinridge. However, although Nixon enjoyed far more 
respect from the mainstream press at that time than people who 
prefer to only rememember his beleaguered and ultimately 
disgraced presidency can recall, there was not unanimous
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support for the journey to the other side of the world. The 
liberal biweekly The Reporter, which had criticized Nixon in 
April 1952 as being too closely aligned with the China Lobby 
and had run another article excoriating him in that year's 
national campaign, editorialized that a vice president's place 
should be here at home. With some prescience, the magazine 
had no doubt that Nixon would be "royally received" by 
Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, but wondered whether he would 
"be prepared...for conversations on a high intellectual level 
with a man like Nehru, that sophisticated and almost 
petulantly independent statesman"? (As things turned out, 
Nixon's meeting in New Delhi with the "neutralist" Nehru was 
the lowpoint of what was later widely interpreted as a 
successful trip.). The Reporter recalled that Nixon's 
California backers took tremendous pride in Nixon's 
"salesmanship" but the journal worried that Nixon might be 
ill-suited to deal with a part of the world which is 
"developing a strong sales resistance to American advertising 
techniques." The liberal Italian immigrant Max Ascoli's 
publication concluded that "the education of Richard Nixon 
could be disastrously affected by a holiday from the 
Washington school of responsibility and a premature exposure 
to the eyes and ears of a critical world." Functioning on the 
highest levels of international diplomacy did not strike The 
Reporter as requiring the same kind of experience involved in 
speaking to a group of rotarians in southern California. But 
the strident tone of this editorial aside, Nixon had earned
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respect from the mainstream press, and all this in just a year 
since the debacle over the fund.2
Yet, that voice of the Eastern Establishment, The New York 
Times. remained strongly in Nixon's corner as he set out on 
his grand tour. The paper pointed out that although extended 
travel abroad by a vice president was not unprecedented (FDR 
had sent Vice President Henry Wallace to the Soviet Union, 
China and South America), the scope of Nixon's ten-week, 
38,000-mile trip with stops in some 19 countries distinguished 
his mission from previous ones. In a news analysis, W.H. 
Lawrence called the Nixon trip the most important ever taken 
by any vice president. He, too, perceived the assignment as 
proof of Nixon's "amazing comeback" in the aftermath of the 
Checkers speech as well as further evidence that he enjoyed 
Eisenhower's "full confidence" and was being kept completely 
informed of all the problems he would face should he have to 
succeed to the highest office in the land (The implication 
being, of course, to quell fear that Nixon might be as removed 
from the action as Truman had been at the time he became 
president.). Lawrence claimed that the Asian trip was seen as 
a "build-up" for Nixon which the White House did not 
discourage even though questions remained that should the 
president choose not to seek re-election in 1956, he would 
want Nixon to succeed him.
The trip was also taken by Lawrence as proof that the new 
administration was trying to strike more of a balance in the 
nation's foreign policy by paying more attention to Asia
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rather than concentrating its diplomacy on Europe. But 
despite the so-called Nixon "buildup," the political writer 
believed that Nixon would be more of a "reporter than a roving 
ambassador" and that he had "no particular message" to impart 
to Asian leaders.
After stops in Australia and New Zealand, Nixon moved on 
to Saigon where on October 31 he called not only for the 
defeat of the Communist Vietminh but for a free and 
independent Vietnam, which could only have discomforted his 
French colonial hosts. Nixon again invoked the pre-Eisenhower 
"domino theory" by saying that if the Communists triumphed in 
Indochina, "independence would be lost to this whole part of 
the world." But independence from communism was not enough to 
satisfy the Wilsonian idealist in Nixon who insisted that the 
independence of Vietnam from the French should be the aim of 
the war. He then attempted to give a history lesson to his 
hosts by reminding them that France had helped the United 
States achieve its independence. (But just as French 
objectives differed from American ones in the American 
Revolution, so too did they diverge in the 1950s as France 
still hoped to retain the vestiges of its empire in Southeast 
Asia.) The vice president then tried to give both the 
Vietnamese and French a sense of mutual purpose by stating 
that Vietnamese independence could not be achieved without 
destroying the Communists in Vietnam.3
However, on November 2, while still in Saigon, Nixon 
modified that statement he had made upon arrival in Vietnam.
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The vice president reportedly told the staunch anti-Communist 
emperor Bao Dai, the Vietnamese chief of state, that the 
United States disapproved of the campaign of the Vietnamese 
"ultranationalists" against the French. Nixon told the 
emperor that for Vietnam to gain independence they had to 
first destroy the Communists but would not be able to do so 
without the assistance of French troops (and he could have 
easily added the funds and materiel that the United States was 
supplying to the French).
The Vietnamese figurehead was said to agree with the vice 
president's emphasis on the necessity for allies in the 
struggle against the Vietminh. Bao Dai told Nixon that he 
believed Mao and Vietminh leader Ho Chi Minh had an 
understanding that should the Communists triumph in Indochina, 
the Vietminh would take all of Southeast Asia while China 
would extend its sphere of influence over the rest of the Far 
East. The emperor added that he feared the Communist Chinese 
would aid the Vietminh should the tide be turned against 
them. Nixon recalls in his memoirs that Bao Dai was opposed 
to negotiations of any kind with the Communists and he later 
claimed that the emperor warned him that "There is no point in 
negotiating with them. At the very least we would end up with 
a conference which would divide my country between us and 
them. And if Vietnam is divided, we will eventually lose it 
all."4 Was Bao Dai really so shrewd or is this just Nixon's 
own rendering in hindsight of a prophecy for what he believed 
would occur in Vietnam if the country was divided at that
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point? (And of course, that is exactly what did happen since 
as a result of the Geneva Conference of 1954, the country was 
divided and finally reunified after the victory of the 
Communists in 1975).
What is particularly interesting here is the misperception 
that Bao Dai had of the nature of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance 
just as for the public record, American politicians in both 
the Republican and Democratic parties often spoke of 
monolithic communism in the guise of the Sino-Soviet 
relationship. Bao Dai certainly misread this, at least in the 
historical sense, since the peoples of Indochina and China had 
been dire enemies for centuries and over 20 years later, after 
the modem nations that composed Indochina fell, the ensuing 
major conflict in the region was over who would exercise 
influence in Cambodia: the Vietnamese or the Chinese-backed 
faction. Yet, making this statement is in no way an attempt 
to line up completely with revisionist historians who place 
far too much emphasis on the nationalistic nature of the 
Vietnamese and Chinese Revolutions. The middle ground is more 
tenable where one indeed understands the motives of those 
revolutions as being nationalistic, yes, but a nationalism 
distinctly marked by Communist ideology not necessarily in 
tune with the Kremlin, but Marxist-Leninist nonetheless. 
Actually despite the public posture that Nixon, Eisenhower and 
Dulles took regarding Sino-Soviet entente, historian Gordon H. 
Chang argues that the American leadership in the new 
Republican administration early on privately recognized the
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possibilities of separating the Chinese Communists from 
Moscow. But this simply was not politique to mention in an 
era when so much of American foreign policy in Asia rested on 
the cornerstone of complete and unadulterated Communist 
conspiracy under the orchestration of Stalin's Kremlin.5
In Hanoi on November 4, Nixon said that the United States 
would not approve of any peace negotiations in Indochina that 
would deprive its people of their freedom. He called for a 
complete victory over the Communists in Indochina just as he 
had rallied behind MacArthur's cry for a total triumph in 
Korea. He backed off a bit again from his earlier Wilsonian 
urging for Vietnamese independence by restating that it was 
essential for the Vietnamese to remain within the French Union 
in order to defeat the Vietminh.
While in Vietnam, the vice president toured the front by 
jeep and was briefed by French military officals who said 
their troops did not have enough supplies and materiel to wage 
the war. They urged Nixon to try to get the United States to 
supply the anticommunist forces in Indochina, although America 
had been bankrolling the French since 1946. Nixon promised to 
take the matter up with Eisenhower on his return to 
Washington. But the anti-colonialist Nixon had little 
sympathy for the French as much as he wanted them to destroy 
the Vietminh. In his memoirs, EN» he goes to some length 
criticizing the French for their condescending and undeniably 
racist attitude toward the indigenous troops and people of 
Indochina. The southern Californian so steeped in American
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middle-class egalitarian and democratic values found the 
rather decadent sight of the French dining in luxury 
particularly offensive, commenting that at one dinner he felt 
that he could just as easily have been at a mayoral banquet in 
Dijon or Toulouse.6
Nixon's anti-colonial, Wilsonian sensibilities were to be 
further offended upon his exposure to Hong Kong. But for the 
record he described the British crown colony as a last point 
of contact with the Chinese mainland and he praised its 
ability to take care of refugees, although Hong Kong could not 
possibly accommodate all those millions who would have wished 
to flee there. To Nixon, Hong Kong's political importance lay 
in its functioning as a "shining example of what life could be 
like on the mainland" if the Communists government "changed 
its ways or the present government was changed." Then, in 
echoing Wilson's comments on the friendship between the 
American and Russian peoples despite the differences between 
their governments, Nixon added that the friendship that 
existed between the Western world and the Chinese people could 
not be disrupted forever by the totalitarian Chinese 
government in Peking. But his memoirs make clear how much 
disdain he felt for continued British rule of Hong Kong.7 
There was truly much of the Wilsonian idealist in Nixon.
The vice president arrived in Taiwan on November 8 where 
he delivered a nationwide broadcast in which Reuters reported 
that he said that the people of China would "reopen 
communications and become friendly with the rest of the
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world." However, a transcript of the broadcast included in 
the Nixon Pre-Presidential Papers clearly shows that although 
Nixon spoke of what he considered the natural amity between 
the Chinese and American peoples, he hardly indicated that he 
expected communications with the mainland to be reopened. 
Perhaps not too much should be made of what could be a matter 
of semantics but so much of diplomacy in the end comes down to 
the nuance of an altered phrase which can change perceptions. 
This could have been a case where a reporter summarized a 
speech in a convenient phrase or perhaps where Nixon departed 
from the text that is included in his papers. These are the 
very vagueries that keep historians in business although no 
matter how much work is done to clarify such points, there are 
instances where the "truth" may very well never be uncovered.
The transcript indicates that Nixon referred to the 
actions of the Peking government as "one of the tragedies of 
our time" since it effectively cut off millions of Chinese on 
the mainland from America and the rest of the free world. For 
the vice president, the tragedy lay in that he believed the 
Chinese people are "basically friendly to America and friendly 
to the free nations" and that they should "have the 
opportunity to express their friendship through open 
communication," not that he expected communication to be 
reopened as Reuters had reported. He firmed up the American 
commitment to Taipei by telling his listening audience that 
the United States "recognizes the government of Free China as 
the one which most truly represents the Chinese nation and the
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Chinese people." He added that he was "confident that this 
situation in which millions of Chinese people are cut off from 
the rest of the free world due to the actions of the 
government which has been imposed on them cannot endure 
indefinitely." Nixon concluded his remarks by saying he 
looked forward to the day when the people of China and the 
free world "can live together in peace and friendship."8
What is striking in Nixon's comments in Chiang's capital 
is the marked change in tone from the one he used for domestic 
political consumption. His rhetoric is conciliatory rather 
than inflamatory and antagonistic. Instead of taking 
advantage of a potential opportunity to attack Peking 
aggressively and goad Chiang on to regain the mainland, he 
chose to couch his language in unbelligerent terms addressing 
a future hope that the Chinese and American peoples would be 
able to resume their natural friendship without specifically 
addressing how that would be brought about. Nor did he 
directly say that such resumption of friendship between the 
two peoples even required the ouster of the Communist regime 
or the restoration of Chiang and the KMT to power in Peking. 
This was not the strident Richard Nixon who his critics at 
home so despised and this pattern of conciliatory language, 
without the bombastic rhetoric, continued through his five-day 
visit to the Republic of China.
On November 9, Nixon's second day in the island nation, he 
was greeted by cheering crowds in the streets. He gave a 
speech before the parliament in which he reaffirmed the
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American position that the government in Taiwan was the one 
true, legitimate government representing the Chinese people. 
Nixon overrated the quality and depth of Chiang*s democracy 
when he lauded the legislators for having been chosen by the 
people of Taiwan to represent them whereas the Communist 
government in the mainland was "imposed upon the people by 
force." To Nixon, what distinguished totalitarian and free 
nations was "the right of people to determine the type of 
government they want" although this statement conveniently 
ignored the dictatorial nature of Chiang's regime on Taiwan 
and particularly his oppression of the native Taiwanese in 
favor of those exiled Chinese from the mainland. But despite 
the mark of Wilsonian idealism suggested earlier on Nixon, 
underneath there lay a very cool, though perhaps still too 
young and eager, student of international affairs who was 
beginning to have a grasp over the dilemmas of choice in the 
world of realpolitik. Although Chiang was hardly in the mold 
of a Jeffersonian, to Nixon and those in his camp, he was 
preferable to the Communist Mao.
The vice president implored the legislators to hold up 
Taiwan as an example to its own people and those who inhabited 
the mainland of "what a free people and representative 
government can do." Nixon, invoking a Lincolnesque spirit in 
his address, added that Taiwan was showing that a "free 
government is always better for the people in the long run 
than a slave government." All that was left to be asked was 
whether or not China could survive half-slave and half-free.
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Nixon then elaborated on his favorite theme of 
Chinese-American friendship and that this amity existed by 
pointing out that "despite the actions of the ruthless 
government which dominates the Mainland" and that the "genuine 
affection which the people of the United States have also 
always had for the Chinese people has never wavered in any 
respect." Nixon was very much a child of the allure of the 
"China Myth" in which the affinity between Americans and 
Chinese was often romanticized and exaggerated to the 
detriment of true American understanding of Chinese politics 
and social movements. Despite Nixon's classic American 
romance for the Chinese people, he interpreted Mao's 
Communists as an undeniably pernicious and a major threat to 
the peace and stability of Asia and the western Pacific.
He concluded this speech by saying he was confident that 
the "artificial line" which had been drawn between the people 
of the two nations could not go on forever and that he was 
sure that in the end, "it will be the cause of freedom, the 
cause of representative government rather than the cause of 
slavery which will triumph not only in China but throughout 
the world."9
The vice president continued to laud Chinese-American 
amity in a speech later that day before 24 of Taiwan's civic 
organizations. Nixon told this Chinese version of rotarians 
that they, too, and not only their government, had a great 
"responsibility to keep the fire of freedom burning in the 
hearts of the Chinese people not only here (Taiwan) but on the
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mainland as well." He then expressed his confidence that "the 
cause of free and representative government for all the people 
of China is one that cannot lose" and that in the end it would 
be victorious. It is hard to believe that Nixon really 
believed this since he had a good grasp of how difficult it 
would be to bring down the Communists in Peking. But the 
important thing is that he did not merely want to pander to 
his audience, but somehow keep the hope alive that China would 
one day be "free." A little hope, no matter how unrealistic, 
can go a long way among allies in international relations.
He then offered a critique of the Communist Chinese 
government that might have pleased any sophist in ancient 
Athens. He challenged the notion that the Peking government 
was a "people's" government and said that the Chinese people 
themselves would ultimately change the government. Nixon 
theorized that communism in China could not possibly survive 
because of the importance the Chinese people place on family, 
in contrast to Communist doctrine. (This line of thinking 
follows the oft expressed view within the China Lobby before 
the revolution that China simply could not go Communist 
because of the Chinese people's venerable, traditional 
heritage, ostensibly so antithetical to communism. This was 
wishful thinking on the part of the proponents of Chiang for 
although it is true on the surface, the preeminent China 
scholar John King Fairbank has successfully argued that Mao's 
Communism retained many Chinese elements in its character even 
though one could hardly use the modern nomenclature "pro
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family" to describe it.) To attempt to ignite a sense of 
fraternity with America in his Chinese audience, Nixon said 
that Americans have close families, too, and that they play 
such an integral role in both societies. (This is something 
that President Ronald Reagan would echo during his 1984 trip 
to Tokyo when speaking about the supposed similarities between 
Japanese and Americans. Could Reagan have been trying to 
invent the Japan Myth?) Nixon further described how the 
Chinese, just like the Americans, are gregarious people who 
"like to get together in Junior Chambers of Commerce, and 
Rotary Clubs and labor organizations such as are represented 
here." This, Nixon argued was as far removed as possible from 
life under a Communist government which would say that "no 
such organizations can exist under our system unless we set 
them up, we control them, and we run them." Nixon, ever the 
smooth debater, added that although the Communists "call their 
government a people's government— it will fail because it is 
not a people's government." Nixon concluded that the "great 
friendship" between Americans and Chinese simply could not be 
resisted and that in the future those on the mainland and in 
the United States would be friends.^-0
These remarks were made by the American politician,
Richard Nixon, accustomed to speaking to American civic groups 
when he would go out on the hustings back home. That day he 
was truly before his kind of audience. Boosters. Babbits. 
Only this time Main Street ran through downtown Taipei.
Somehow in this speech, the artful Nixon managed to relate the
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traditions of Confucian China to the American way of life. 
Through the use of this kind of effective rhetoric, Nixon 
sought to bring the Chinese and Americans closer together and 
keep the hope raised high that China would one day be free, 
although he never seems to direct the most vital issue at 
hand: just exactly how that very feat could be achieved.
The next day, November 10, after reviewing Chinese 
Nationalist troops, Nixon commented that Chiang's army was 
stronger than many in the West had thought. Of course, the 
question immediately arises that if they were so strong, what 
were they doing in Taiwan in the first place? But the vice 
president was diplomatically and politely trying to keep their 
morale up. He could not exactly say that they were as weak or 
even weaker than the "experts” in the West believed. He 
praised the Nationalists by pointing out that some of them had 
"been fighting communism for over thirty years" and pungently 
added that there were "leaders in the United States (who) 
didn't recognize that Communism existed until a few years 
ago."11 If the vice president had been campaigning at home, 
he most surely would have gone on to denounce Roosevelt at 
Yalta and Truman and Acheson over their Asian policy (or lack 
of it, as he would have preferred to say), but this being a 
diplomatic mission, he refrained from directly attacking the 
Democratic opposition back in the U.S.
The following day the vice president participated in 
ground-breaking ceremonies at Tunghai University. Nixon used 
this occasion to express his wish that many of the so-called
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Overseas Chinese (Chinese living outside of China) night cone 
to Taiwan for their higher education. He was especially 
concerned that a large number of Overseas Chinese were going 
to the mainland for their education where he knew only too 
well they would be indoctrinated with Communist ideology.
Nixon stressed the importance of education in the battle for 
"the minds and the hearts and the souls of men" which he 
termed "the great struggle... in the world today." To Nixon, 
it was important that Free China be "not only a bastion of 
military and economic strength...but a bastion of cultural 
strength, of spiritual strength" and an example for free 
people around the world. Education was the sine qua non in 
what Nixon liked to refer to as the "ideological conflict" 
with communism.12
The highlight of the trip to Taiwan was Nixon's private 
meeting with Chiang, where Madame Chiang served as 
interpreter. Nixon recalled his meeting with the 
Generalissimo 25 years later in his memoirs. Nixon, more than 
Eisenhower's mere "reporter," had a terribly unpleasant 
message to impart to Chiang: namely, that the United States 
would not commit its military power to support any invasion 
that Chiang might launch against the mainland. However, Nixon 
had to be diplomatic and "could not tell Chiang outright that 
his chances of reuniting China were virtually nonexistant."
In retrospect, Nixon called Chiang's "plans to return to the 
mainland totally unrealistic."13
Now, this does not mean that the Eisenhower administration
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and Nixon were ready to accept the Peking regime formally. 
Hardly. But there was an awareness within the administration 
of the reality of Communist power in Peking that if ever 
stated publicly would have roused the China Lobby in all its 
fury. In fact, throughout the Eisenhower years, the 
administration, and Nixon in particular, frequently had to 
shoot down rumors that the United States might alter its 
policy of non-recognition of China and its stand against that 
country's admission to the United Nations. The American 
government's public posture of absolute unwillingness to 
compromise on China and the private, gruesome recognition that 
the Communists would be impossible to dislodge from Peking 
marked the 1950s. Acceptance of realities, no matter how 
distasteful, in the privacy of government councils and the 
necessity to maintain an idealistic, if often unrealistic 
position to the world, is not hypocritical. The facts of 
political life in America are that the domestic political 
climate simply did not allow for any change in the China 
policy at that time. In the American political system, 
domestic political considerations, whether worthy or not, 
nearly always reign supreme over political realities abroad. 
Whether this is right or wrong is not the point. It is real, 
the way of the American political world.
Ambassador Karl Lott Rankin, United States envoy to the 
Republic of China during Nixon's visit, later reported that 
Chiang perceived the questions of Korea and Indochina as 
problems that were "insoluble by themselves." Chiang believed
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that as long as the mainland remained under Communist rule, 
all countries in the region were under the "constant threat of 
aggression." Rankin reported to Washington that Chiang told 
Nixon that Communist Chinese efforts in Korea "represented 
their maximum present capability, and that increasingly long 
and difficult communications would reduce that capability...as 
the projected theater of operations is moved to the south."
(By which, one assumes, Chiang meant any distraction his 
forces could induce by fighting to regain the mainland.)14 
Chiang, of course, was echoing what Nixon had proposed during 
the wake of MacArthur's firing. Unfortunately, Rankin does 
not reveal what reply, if any, Nixon had to Chiang's comments.
Nixon suffered some embarrassment in Taiwan when Secretary 
of State Dulles held a press conference in Washington in which 
he said that the United States was "not forever opposed to a 
recognition of a Communist government in China," this coming 
on the heels of Nixon's effort to shore up the regime publicly 
on Taiwan. However, Dulles was quick to add that the matter 
of recognition could not be considered as long as Peking was a 
"proclaimed aggressor in Korea and has not purged itself" and 
was "promoting aggression in Indo-China" as well as continuing 
to act in a way "which is not becoming of a nation which 
presumably has the obligations...expressed in the (United 
Nations) Charter." The secretary of state pointed out as well 
that this view had never been articulated diplomatically. He 
was in no way calling for a change in American policy.
Perhaps his intention was indeed, to make such remarks while
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Nixon was in Taipei, to drive home to Chiang that the U.S. 
would not offer military assistance should Chiang try to 
regain the mainland. Or perhaps Dulles was just rendering one 
of his pedantic lawyerly briefs over the legal complications 
of the issue of Chinese admission to the U.N. What is 
surprising is that Dulles seemed to hold open the door to the 
very theoretical possibility of "two" Chinas in the United 
Nations. He told reporters that he recognized the possibility 
that Communist China might be represented in the General
Assembly while the government on Taiwan could be on the
Security Council. He pointed out that "China," as such, was a 
charter member of the United Nations and that the question of 
which government represented China was another matter. Dulles 
pointed out that only in the case of new member nations 
admitted to the U.N. was it required that both the Assembly 
and Security Council approve.15 This professorial 
digression was the last thing Nixon needed to contend with on
this sensitive part of the trip. Young Nixon just might have
been Dulles's "prat boy" on this mission.
But Dulles was just stating an interpretation of what 
constituted membership in the United Nations. He was hardly 
advocating recognition of Communist China nor its admission to 
the U.N. Furthermore, the secretary's comments did not stir 
up any controversy at home so it is hardly likely that Dulles 
was signaling any change in United States policy. After all, 
"forever" is a long time.
But Rankin reported back to Washington that several Taiwan
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newspapers editorialized against the Dulles remarks and 
perceived that the Eisenhower administration might just not be 
tough enough on the Communists and one paper complained that 
from the position of Taipei, the new administration was no 
better than the Truman team.16
Nixon was also reportedly angry about the Dulles 
statement. The vice president was described in a November 10 
United Press account as "obviously angered" and as having told 
a dinner audience that he was "confident that in the final 
analysis the Chinese people will never allow a Communist 
government to prevail over them." The wire service story 
maintained that the Nixon response was "interpreted by 
observers as an indirect reply to Mr. Dulles although Mr.
Nixon did not name him." Before departing Taiwan for South 
Korea on November 12, Nixon issued another statement trying to 
clarify what Dulles had said. The vice president insisted the 
secretary's comments did not represent any change in American 
policy toward China, and the U.S. would continue to oppose the 
admission of Communist China into the U.N. Nixon matched 
Dulles in discussing the legal niceties of the China issue and 
the U.N. He explained that the secretary had actually 
discussed two separate problems: U.S. recognition of China and 
its admission to the U.N. He pointed out that Dulles had said 
that the United States could not consider recognition as long 
as the "Red regime continues to be an agressor in Korea; 
promotes aggression in Indochina; (and) conducts itself not in 
accord with the United Nations Charter." Nixon added that it
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all boiled down to that the U.S. would not even think about 
recognition "unless Red China quits following Communist policy 
and quits taking orders from Moscow." As for the U.N., the 
vice president said the United States would continue to be 
against the admission of "a government which has waged war 
against the United Nations...has on its hands the blood of 
over 150,000 men from members of the United Nations... and 
obstructs the United Nations in its efforts to bring peace to 
Korea."17 For one who at home so stridently criticized the 
lack of support from other members of the U.N., Nikon abroad 
was only too happy to draw them in for the sake of his 
argument.
However, although Rankin wrote the State Department that 
the Taiwan press was still not entirely satisfied with Nixon's 
response, The New York Times said that the vice president's 
explanation of Dulles's comments "softened what would 
otherwise have been a heavier blow."18
This particular episode is important because it reveals 
how the young vice president, on his first trip abroad for the 
administration, treated the highly sensitive issue of United 
States recognition of Communist China (and the question of its 
admission into the United Nations) while he was in the very 
diplomatically delicate position of being a visitor in 
Chiang's Taiwan. However, at this point in the mission it 
appeared that Nixon might well indeed have been in a little 
hot water ith the secretary of state. Drew Pearson wrote in 
the Washington Post of November 23 that Dulles was "not happy,
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to put it mildly, over Vice President Richard Nixon's 
impromptu diplomacy on his Far Eastern tour." Dulles, Pearson 
reported, was especially perturbed over the way Nixon handled 
the recognition question that arose during the visit to 
Taiwan. "After Dulles announced that the United States may 
someday recognize Red China," the columnist wrote, "Nixon 
assured Chiang Kai-Shek in Formosa that the secretary of state 
really didn't mean what he said. Naturally, Dulles was 
furious." As Pearson told the story, Dulles objected to 
Nixon's showmanship. "Nixon reached for too many headlines," 
he wrote, and "may have put personal publicity ahead of 
American foreign policy."
As if that was not enough trouble for the earnest "Young 
Richard," Dulles was also said to be displeased over Nixon's 
performance in Indochina where the vice president had urged 
the French to fight for total victory against the Communist 
guerrillas. Pearson claimed that the French "protested 
afterward that the United States didn't fight the Korean war 
to total victory, and that the French might settle for an 
honorable truce in Indo-China too." To add insult to injury, 
the highly influential Washington columnist revealed that the 
secretary was so unhappy with Nixon's recent behavior abroad 
that the vice president was now being forced to read prepared 
speeches "scrutinized" in advance by American diplomats.19 
If indeed, what Pearson wrote was true, it must have rankled 
Nixon because he prided himself on drafting his own speeches 
and being able to speak extemporaneously when the need arose.
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Nixon and his wife Pat, who had accompanied him on the trip, 
had insisted to the State Department that they not follow the 
usual routine of only high-level meetings and formal state 
dinners. Rather, the young southern California couple wanted 
to be sure to have ample opportunity to meet with the common 
people and tour marketplaces, schools, hospitals and even 
speak to opposition leaders. This undoubtedly alienated the 
"striped pants" set. Pearson was already a committed Nixon 
opponent who had continued to question the candidate's 
personal finances after the Checkers speech and attack him 
personally. Pearson, of course must have had numerous sources 
at Foggy Bottom, but one has to read Pearson with the 
knowledge that he was no Nixon fan. Dulles, may well have 
been annoyed at the time, but when the whole relationship 
between the secretary and the vice president is considered, 
this minor flap was a deviation. The two developed a close 
personal relationship, in essence, one of mentor-student in 
which Dulles played the professor of foreign affairs to the 
eager, bright young student, Nixon. To Nixon's credit, the 
secretary also had ample respect for Nixon's political 
abilities and insight in dealing with Congress and often 
looked to him to get the "inside dope" on how key players on 
the Hill were leaning on major foreign policy issues.20
Nixon left Taiwan for South Korea where he had another 
vital message to impart to that nation's president, Syngman 
Rhee. The vice president was greeted upon arrival with 
placards calling for the "liberation" of North Korea. His
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speeches on this stop readily recognized that "Korea means 
something to the United States, Korea means something to the 
world", yet none of Nixon's remarks came close to conveying 
the emotional tone he set in Taiwan extolling the tradition of 
friendship between the Chinese and American peoples. China 
had won a sentimental place in his heart and historical 
imagination, and in the hearts of thousands, if not millions, 
of other Americans. Korea simply had not touched the American 
spirit as China had. This was so in spite of the fact that 
the United States had just been allied with the South Koreans 
in a bloody conflict against Communists, thousands upon 
thousands of whom just happened to be Chinese. But the roots 
of the China Myth ran deep in Nixon as with so many other 
Americans and there was no comparable, deep-seated feeling 
that contributed to any "Korea Myth." Nixon spoke before the 
Korean National Assembly on November 13 and urged that the 
United States and South Korea "stand firmly side by side" in 
an effort to win "a free, united and independent Korea. It is 
our responsibility as legislators-leaders of our people-to 
accomplish" the reunification "if we can win in peace," he 
concluded.21
In his memoirs, Nixon recalled that he spent a good deal 
of his time in Korea trying to get the message across to Rhee 
that Eisenhower was adamantly against any unilateral military 
action by South Korea to reunify his country. Nixon claims 
that he finally got Rhee to assent to the Eisenhower request, 
although he was markedly impressed by Rhee's contention that
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the element of unpredictability was vital in combating the 
Communists. Rhee felt that his hand was strengthened if the 
North Koreans thought he just might have the audacity to take 
action on his own. The Eisenhower administration disagreed, 
just having concluded the hostilities which cost some 34,000 
American lives. But Rhee's lesson was not lost on Nixon and 
one thinks of how during his presidency, the "madman" theory, 
i.e., that Nixon was willing to stand up to possible Russian 
intervention in the Yom Kippur War, prevented Leonid Brezhnev 
from daring to intercede directly in that conflict. The 
so-called "madman" theory was also said to have been respected 
by the North Vietnamese before the signing of the peace 
accords when then-President Nixon relentlessly bombed the 
North.
Yet, at the time of the visit to Korea, Drew Pearson would 
not let up on his attack of the vice president. Pearson 
suggested that Nixon actually pledged American support to Rhee 
for unilaterally seeking militarily Korean reunification even 
though that was precisely against what Eisenhower wanted. For 
Pearson, this was further fuel for the fire that ignited 
Dulles's anger towards Nixon. But in sharp contrast to 
Pearson's portrayal of Nixon's stop in Korea, The New York 
Times reported that the vice president had actually "helped 
soften...Rhee's determination to renew the war if an early 
solution was not found to the problem of unification of the 
peninsula." The Times added that the vice president "got a 
renewed pledge from the Republic of Korea leader to consult
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fully with the United States. In turn, Mr. Nixon was reported 
to have assured Dr. Rhee he could rely fully on United States 
support." Now, The Tiroes version is a bit less tempered than 
Nixon's own recollections, but perhaps even the American 
government did not want it publicized that Rhee had 
absolutely, positively ruled out all military options. What 
was desired was the appearance that it would not involve the 
United States and Nixon's reported assurance of "support" does 
not specifically mention the employment of American 
troops.22 This is another case of just who should an 
historian believe: a president's memoirs, the reporting of 
America's "newspaper of record," or a story by a prestigious, 
albeit staunchly anti-Nixon, Washington correspondent? 
Pearson's anti-Nixon bias leads one to exercise caution in 
reading his account.
There was even more controversy to come when Nixon got to 
Japan. The furor came over remarks he made calling America's 
prior insistence on Japanese disarmament a "mistake" in light 
of Soviet geopolitical developments since the end of World War 
II. Nixon actually acquitted himself quite nicely from what 
could have been a nasty morass and was generally praised back 
home by a variety of newspapers across the political 
spectrum. The incident was stirred up when on November 19, 
Nixon addressed the Japan-America Society in Tokyo and said 
that considering the Communist threat emanating from Moscow, 
the United States had "made a mistake in 1946" when it 
persuaded Japan not to have an army and navy with offensive
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capabilities. The United States did not readily look to admit 
past or present errors in the harsh Cold War climate of 1953. 
This comment was so very highly inflammable because of the 
American insistence that the Japanese renounce war in their 
1947 constitution. The renunciation of war had been embraced 
by the Japanese themselves, whose own country had been so 
devastated by the war they had initiated. So? here was the 
seemingly audacious young Nixon seeking the reversal of what 
had been the heart of United States postwar policy towards 
Japan. "We misjudged the intensions of the Soviet leaders," 
he said. "We believe in peace; we believe in disarmament," he 
added. Then the vice president posed a rhetorical question. 
"We felt disarmament was proper in 1946. Why is it wrong then 
in 1953?" The answer, to him, was obvious. "It is the threat 
from the Communist nations and the threat centered in Moscow," 
he pointed out concluding that "if it were not for the 
Communist threat, the free world could live in peace."
Nixon then urged his Tokyo audience to "analyze" the 
threat to peace seen in the recently concluded Korean war and 
the fighting then taking place in Indochina. "If we want 
peace we must be militarily stronger than the Communist 
nations," he said. But military strength alone was not enough 
as he stated that it was "essential" to maintain "economic 
strength as well." Nixon was only too cognizant that the 
United States could not fight communism alone as he added that 
"all the free nations of the world must stand together. It is 
essential for the United States to have friends." Nixon then
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returned to his favorite theme flavored with the domino 
theory, equating the importance of both Asia and Europe in the 
struggle against Communist domination. "What happens in Asia 
is just as important as what happens in Europe. If Japan 
falls, he warned, "all of Asia falls. Likewise, if Asia 
falls, Japan falls, too. Japan must work with the free 
nations, maintaining adequate strength."
The vice president then linked Japan's freedom to the 
successful defense of South Korea. Nixon said that if the 
Korean War had not been fought, "Japan today would be under 
the domination of Communist imperialism. You have only to 
look at the map to see that this is true," he added. He also 
pointed out that Korea could not have been defended nor the 
advance of communism stopped if the U.S. and other members of 
the United Nations had not been able to use Japan as a base.
This time around, Nixon's Tokyo remarks drew the support 
of Dulles and the State Department. Dulles told reporters 
back in Washington that he agreed with Nixon's contention that 
the United States "made a mistake in 1946" in seeking Japanese 
disarmament. "As Vice President Nixon said," Dulles observed, 
"those in charge of our own foreign policy at that time seemed 
to have assumed, as was quite natural perhaps to assume— many 
of us did— that we were entering into an era of lasting peace 
and that the Soviet Union would not be a threat." But for 
both Dulles and Nixon, the perceived Communist threat 
emanating from the Kremlin and Peking provided the rationale 
to seek Japanese rearmament in 1953. Nixon disclosed in his
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memoirs that both he and Dulles had agreed that Nixon would 
make these remarks in Tokyo as a trial balloon to try to bring 
about support for the rearming of Japan. Both privately 
agreed, remembered Nixon, that it was necessary to strengthen 
Japan militarily in order to face down Communist pressure to 
dominate the Pacific. The feeling was that it was simply too 
volatile a political issue to raise on American soil. Nixon 
says that the speech had just precisely the effect he and 
Dulles wanted it to have: namely, for the press to think that 
Nixon had merely ventured out on a limb by himself to express 
these sentiments as well as providing encouragement to the 
anticommunist leaders in Japan. Could the secretary of state 
have been trying to set up Drew Pearson all along? Nixon also 
commented that the Japanese were particularly impressed that 
the United States should have admitted making a mistake.23
In Burma, Nixon confronted pro-Communist demonstrators and 
made headlines at home when he walked through the crowd of 
protesters, introduced himself (as if they did not already 
know who he was) and challenged one man as to whether or not 
he thought Communist aggression in Indochina was right. The 
crowd soon dispersed and the lesson that Nixon took from the 
inicident was that Communists were a lot like bullies in a 
schoolyard. They had to be stood up to, their bluff had to be 
called. This was a bit of a prelude to Caracas nearly five 
years later.
The major issue of discussion on this stop was the 
presence of Chinese Nationalist troops on Burmese soil. The
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vice president candidly acknowledged that Chiang's forces in 
Burma were a "a major point of irritation in United States 
relations with Burma." Nixon also recognized that the Burmese 
held the United States responsibile for the failure of the 
Nationalist Chinese troops to withdraw since Burma considered 
America to be the main power behind Chiang. But Nixon 
certainly did not leave the impression American
government was going to immediately try to erase the Chinese 
Nationalist presence in their country, despite his recognition 
that it was a source of contention between the two nations.
Yet, Nixon's appearance in Rangoon seemed to disappoint 
some Burmese observers. Maung Maung, in a letter to The New 
Republic, cited several local newspapers which suggested that 
Nixon's stopover in the country was a "disappointment." Maung 
objected to Nixon's campaign style politicking in Burma, 
deeming it inappropriate behavior for an American vice 
president abroad. But the major controversy concerned the 
presence of Chiang's troops and Burmese resentment that they 
were allying themselves with local bandits and rebels, an 
issue which the writer thought Nixon had side-stepped. Maung 
unfairly, and inaccurately, charged that Nixon had said in 
Taiwan that Chiang would soon be returning to the mainland, 
something which the record shows he did not say. Yet, even 
this Asian critic had to concede that Nixon exhibited skill 
"in handling difficult situations" such as the anti-Nixon 
demonstration, and remarked that "his ruthless efficiency and 
determination to be successful...are assets that should carry
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Mr. Nixon far in his political ambitions."24
One of the few blemishes on an otherwise successful 
journey was Nixon's meetings with Nehru in India. Nehru had 
been a thorn in the side of American policy in Asia since he 
had been an early proponent of Communist Chinese admission to 
the United Nations as well as criticizing the Eisenhower 
administration's talk of the possibility of instituting a 
blockade against China. Washington was also concerned that 
Nehru was drawing too close to Moscow. The Indian leader 
ultimately emerged as the primary spokesman for the so-called 
"non-aligned" movement, the "neutrals" who many American 
policymakers generally deemed to be actually more inclined 
towards supporting the Kremlin than the West. In his memoirs, 
Nixon later described Nehru as the "least friendly leader" he 
met on the trip and was alienated by the prime minister 
speaking "obsessively and interminably about India's 
relationship with Pakistan." The vice president was 
apparently dumbfounded that Nehru should devote so much energy 
and time to "railing against" Pakistan rather than discussing 
U.S.-Indian relations or other Asian issues. Nixon suspected 
that Nehru's main goal was his own "thirst for influence" in 
the region and among the nations emerging newly independent 
from colonialism, what we now call the Third World. Nixon 
snidely wrote that if only Nehru had devoted as much of his 
ability to solving India's own domestic problems, then Indian 
democracy might be stronger today. Nehru's daughter, Indira 
Gandhi, served as the official hostess, and Nixon apparently
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did not care for her either, calling her "in every way her 
father's daughter."
Nehru was angry that the United States was thought to be 
on the verge of offering Pakistan considerable military aid 
which, naturally, he thought could only endanger India's own 
strategic position in South Asia and even in its northern-most 
state of Kashmir, which was a source of contention between the 
two Asian governments. The so-called American "tilt to 
Pakistan" can rightly be said to have begun in this period of 
growing distrust between New Dehli and Washington. As 
president, Nixon was considered to side with Pakistan again 
over its seemingly eternal disputes with India. And it should 
be remembered that when Nixon secretly dispatched Henry 
Kissinger to China, he went through Pakistan. The bottom line 
was that Nixon always viewed the Pakistanis as consistently 
and staunchly anti-Soviet allies in Asia while he was often 
suspect of the Indian leadership. The issue of how American 
diplomacy should handle "neutralism" popped up again later in 
Nixon's vice presidency when he returned to Asia in 1956.
On arrival in Karachi, Nixon had reportedly lauded 
Pakistan for its "readiness to fight the new Communist 
colonialism." (Again, Nixon, in the true Wilsonian spirit, 
saw the Asian nations as having been either victims of past 
European or current Communist colonialism.) Nixon was far 
more at ease in Pakistan where he met with Ayub Khan, who at 
that time headed the nation's military but had not yet risen 
to political power there. Nixon was pleased to see that
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although Khan made clear his hatred of the Hindus and distrust 
of the Indians, he was concerned with other issues than 
Pakistani-Indian friction. Khan impressed Nixon as being 
decidedly anticommunist and a willing and eager ally of the 
United States who was particularly worried that as Nixon 
recalled, "the Soviets would use India as a cat's paw for 
establishing a major presence in South Asia." But Khan must 
have been equally concerned about what he must have considered 
as Nehru's pernicious influence in the region. The 
Pakistani-U.S. entente was a relationship in which several 
interests were served, not only the American desire to contain 
the Soviets but the additional goal of "containing" the 
influence of Mr. Nehru.
Looking back on this trip in 1956, Selig S. Harrison wrote 
in The New Republic that when a Karachi newspaper ran a 
headline on the second day of the Nixon visit proclaiming a 
United States pledge on military aid for Pakistan, the 
"Indians decided that Nixon had been less than honest with 
them. His visit had left a bad taste." A year later, Nehru 
called Nixon "an unprincipled cad." Harrison believed that 
the vice president's support for an arms pact "tipped the 
scales" in Pakistan's favor back in Washington. William 
Costello, in his critical The Facts About Nixon (originally 
serialized in The New Republic in late 1959) also criticized 
Nixon's early attack on neutralism and charged that the vice 
president's "dogmatism" on the issue "seemed to contradict 
Eisenhower's generous views on the subject."25 The question
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remains, however, that if the president's views were indeed so 
"generous," why did he end up backing military aid to 
Pakistan? In defense of Nixon, it can hardly be said that 
Nehru's espousal of "neutralism" was in the interests of the 
United States, and Nehru himself had been a seering critic of 
American policy in Asia. If the old creed of politics is 
reward your friends and punish your enemies, why should not 
the United States at that time have sought to enhance its own 
interests and influence in South Asia? Nehru chose to chart 
his own course which was rightly understood as inimical to 
American interests, so why should he have been signalled any 
sign of encouragement? Today, of course, with the end of the 
threat of-Communist advance in Asia, this policy towards India 
would be outdated, despite the enmity that will always remain 
between Pakistan and India. But the 1950s was an entirely 
different period and although Nixon's dislike of neutralism 
may well have indeed fueled the non-aligned movement's 
anti-Americanism at the time, in the "long run", it was the 
right choice. In foreign affairs, Nixon was never one with 
his eye on only the expedient course for the present.
Despite the tension engendered by the Nehru meetings, the 
Asian trip was a triumph for Nixon. He and Pat returned to an 
effusive welcome in Washington December 14 and were praised by 
both Eisenhower and the press.26 Upon arrival back home,
Nixon said Asians wanted peace and if the Communist leaders 
rejected Eisenhower's proposal before the United Nations that 
the world's nuclear power be used for peaceful rather than
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military purposes, the Communists would lose ground 
"tremendously" in the vast continent.27
Nixon's grand tour of Asia succeeded in enhancing his 
prestige within the administration. The New York Times 
editorialized that "the consensus was that in general he had 
done much to improve U.S.-Asian understanding," and the paper 
praised the vice president's "penchant for mixing with 
ordinary citizens and avoiding the customary pomp of a state 
visit." (Nixon may not have known how to please the American 
diplomatic corps abroad but he certainly knew what would make 
good copy back home and how to play to the American people.) 
The Times also observed that Nixon appears to have gained 
esteem at the White House where President Eisenhower cordially 
commended him for the generally good impression he has made in 
many countries." In a separate article, the nation's premiere 
newspaper predicted that as a result of his trip, Nixon would 
"be able to influence foreign policy as has perhaps no other 
Vice President." The Times noted in particular that Nixon was 
likely to use his new-found influence to try to bring about 
Japanese rearmament, overcome delays in South Korea's 
reconstruction, and last, but hardly least important, to 
bolster the French and the native governments of Indochina in 
their fight against the Communists.28
Don Irwin, writing for that resounding voice of Eastern 
Establishment Republicanism, the New York Herald Tribune, said 
that the trip might even possibly have made Nixon a "contender 
for the Presidency in his own right." Irwin lauded Nixon's
r
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"not inconsiderable attainment in winning popular praise in 
the Orient, in the face of Communist efforts to pain all 
Americans as 'imperialists' callous toward non-Western 
peoples.
Despite having been so critical of Nixon just a few weeks 
before, that old Nixon nemesis, Drew Pearson seemed to have 
had a change of heart. Even Pearson had to concede that 
"Nixon handled himself well and won a lot of good will for the 
U.S.A." Pearson had a lot to say about what he read as 
Nixon's apparent open-mindedness on the China issue, although 
he did not reveal any of his sources for the controversial 
claims he made in his column. The Washington journalist wrote 
that Nixon had told Nehru that the United States "would 
recognize Red China, if China, in turn, took a more reasonable 
attitude toward the West. Red China, he [Nixon] said was 
probably here to stay and if the Reds would bring about a 
permanent peace in Korea, we would be willing to revise our 
present diplomatic boycott." Pearson then said that Nehru was 
so "impressed" that he immediately contacted his ambassador to 
Peking and urged him to use the news to "promote peace in 
Korea." Without knowing Pearson's sources, one would have to 
conclude that this was rather doubtful reasoning on his part.
Pearson believed that Nixon had drifted away from the 
Congressional China Bloc's intractable position against 
recognizing Communist China. He further claimed that in 
discussions with Burmese and Indonesian leaders, Nixon "held 
out the same vitual promise of recognizing Red China in return
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for Korean peace." Now, the columnist claimed that Nixon had 
been speaking with the "complete approval of the State 
Department, which made this fact all too clear when Nixon was 
in Formosa." As for the apparent flap with Dulles over 
recognition of China, Pearson said that while visiting Chiang, 
the vice president said publicly that America would never 
desert the Nationalist Chinese leader and never recognize Red 
China, but once he heard the Dulles remarks in Washington, he 
changed his tune.30 For one thing, Nixon visited Indonesia 
before Taiwan or Burma and it was highly unlikely that he 
would tell Sukarno that the United States would be prepared to 
recognize Communist China.
As Nixon and Dulles had both made clear, "China" was a 
great nation that was already accepted into the United 
Nations. Now, if Pearson had closely examined the text of 
what Nixon actually said in Taiwan, he would have understood 
that Nixon was not talking about recognition of the Communist 
government as it was, but was speaking hopefully of a day when 
conditions might change the government in Peking without 
elaborating on how that would be brought about. The Communist 
Chinese government, to Nixon, acted in violation of the United 
Nations charter and until Chinese aggressive behavior changed 
there could be absolutely no such consideration of recognition 
or Peking's admission to the United Nations. Also, Pearson 
clearly misinterpreted the Dulles statement. The secretary 
never said that the United States would keep an "open mind 
regarding Red China" or that Washington might "some day
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recognize her." Dulles merely observed that the Eisenhower 
administration never said it would be forever opposed to the 
recognition of Communist China. That is hardly tantamount to 
recognition. And remember, that privately, Nixon had 
indicated to Chiang that Washington would offer no support 
should he try to militarily regain the mainland. The idea of 
Nixon directly telling Nehru that the United States might 
recognize Communist China is absolutely ludicrous. If he was 
going to impart that message to anyone, the last leader it 
would have been would be Nehru. The language and nuance of 
diplomacy is a far subtler matter than Pearson seemed capable 
of discerning at that time.
The vice president gave his own version of the trip in a 
nationally televised address from Washington on December 23. 
Nixon asserted that the Eisenhower administration's foreign 
policy had succeeded in putting the Communists "for the first 
time...on the defensive all over the world." He added that 
the Communists "lost their chance" to control Asia when the 
United States stopped their aggression on that continent (the 
inference, of course, being to Korea but not surprisingly, no 
credit was given to Truman for the intervention.) But Nixon 
was not about to let down his or the nation's guard and he 
warned that Asians were still endangered by "internal 
subversion and revolution" if not "armed overt 
aggression."31
For Nixon, Communist China was still the devil incarnate 
in Asia, the "basic cause of all our troubles" on the
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continent and the ultimate reason for the war in Korea, 
Indochina and Malaya (where indigenous guerrillas had been 
waging an unsuccessful battle against the British since 1948. 
In fact, the British use of Malayan forces to fight the 
Communists there was to inspire John F. Kennedy's strategy of 
counter-insurgency in Vietnam. To Nixon's credit as well, the 
British idea of using Malaysian troops to fight their own 
battle did not radically differ from what he had proposed for 
Indochina at the time or in his own presidential program of 
Vietnamization of the war. The Nixon Doctrine enunciated in 
1969, in which native forces were to carry their own military 
burdens, might even be said to have been influenced in part by 
the successful British experience in Malaysia.). Nixon told 
the American people that Taiwan's military and economic 
strength was growing and, in what he thought of as a potential 
propaganda coup, he added that the Overseas Chinese in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia were 
turning against the Peking government. However, he avoided 
the subj ect of how this development might ultimately affect 
the Communist Chinese regime.
Instead, Nixon resorted to the rhetorical device of 
several anecdotes which graphically illustrated Communist 
cruelty and barbarity. He was not too subtly suggesting that 
the Communist Chinese were sowing the seeds of their own 
destruction. Nixon portrayed this barbarism and its 
perception among the Chinese within and without China as why 
the Peking government was losing support in its own country
-84-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and throughout Asia. No one can dispute the viciousness of 
the early years of Mao's reign, but Nixon here was also 
engaging in unrealistic hopes. If anything, Mao and the 
Communist Chinese were becoming all the more entrenched in 
power.
Nixon then tried to rally public support for American 
assistance to the French in Indochina. He again invoked the 
"Domino Theory" to claim that if Indochina fell, Thailand 
could be next and Malaysia, with its rubber and tin, would be 
threatened as well as Indonesia. Ultimately, in this 
scenario, Japan could be "endangered." He reiterated what he 
had said in Vietnam, namely that the United States supported 
independence for the Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos) but that he feared that "the day the French 
leave, the Communists will take over." He exhorted the French 
to fight alongside their "partners in the French Union against 
the forces of Communist colonialism which would enslave them." 
There were two types of colonialism at war, or so it seemed. 
Nixon had to veil his distaste for French colonialism in the 
wake of what he considered the greater danger: Communist 
aggression.
The vice president remained all too aware of lingering 
isolationist sentiment within the Republican Party and across 
the nation and he wanted to persuade his audience that America 
needed to play a vital role in international affairs. He made 
a particular effort to convince his American audience that 
what happened in Asia was of vital importance to the United
-85-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
States. "Why should Americans care what happens one-half way 
around the world?", Nixon rhetorically asked. His fundamental 
rationale was standard by now: that the United States needed 
to devote as much of its diplomacy to Asia as Europe and that 
the thousands of American casualties in Korea were proof 
enough that what happened in Asia effected Americans. Nixon 
also realized the tremendous size of the population in Asia 
and the need, as he saw it, to battle the Communists to 
prevent them from exercising influence over the Asian masses.
Then in what was a fairly bold ploy for 1953, Nixon warned 
of the danger that Communist propaganda was trying to portray 
Americans as "prejudiced", "arrogant" and "bent on war rather 
than a program that will lead to peace." In a very homey, 
trite way, Nixon went on to speak of the similarities he 
sensed between Americans and Asians rather than the great 
cultural and often political differences. (But just as there 
was the realist in Nixon, there was also much of the American 
optimist in his worldview.) He advised the nation that Asians 
wanted dignity and independence and predicted that the Asian 
peoples would be a decisive force in setting the future of the 
world. The vice president particularly warned against the 
damage done to America's international image by racial 
discrimination at home. "By deed and word and thought," he 
said, "it is essential that we prove that American ideals of 
tolerance and equal rights for all do in fact exist and that 
we are dedicated to them." These comments were made several 
months in advance of the 1954 landmark Brown v. Board of
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Education Supreme Court decision. Nixon, sounding like a 
latter-day Lincoln Republican, was talking about racial 
tolerance before civil rights had taken off as a prominent 
national political issue. His fear was that American racial 
prejudice would fall right into the hands of Communist 
propagandists who wished to portray America as racist and 
imperialist. "Every American citizen," the vice president 
said, "can contribute toward creating a better understanding 
of American ideals abroad by practicing and thinking tolerance 
and respect for human beings every day of the year." Race 
relations in the United States is certainly a paramount 
example of how an American domestic issue can have 
repercussions on the nation's foreign policy. Nixon exhibited 
keen insight and tremendous shrewdness, as well as a sense of 
the need for racial justice, by declaring that racial 
discrimination at home could undercut America's position 
abroad. This was especially important in Asia and Africa 
where people of color were sensitive to any racial slight or 
vestiges of the condescending attitudes that had been part and 
parcel of European colonialism. Nixon rightly feared that the 
people of the developing world also associated these racist 
sentiments with the United States, but he at least proposed 
the beginning of a remedy to the extremely serious problem.
In the speech, Nixon drew a picture of the world where in 
recent years millions had been afraid of America due to the 
effectiveness of Communist propaganda but he was optimistic 
that the United States, under Eisenhower's skillful
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leadership, would be able to turn the tide and keep the 
Communists on the defensive.32
This is what Nixon said publicly. What is even more 
important in understanding his position on China and the 
evolution of his Pacific strategy was what he said in private
to the National Security Council. On December 15, Nixon
briefed the Council on his meetings with Rhee in which he had 
given the Korean leader a letter from Eisenhower seeking 
Rhee's assurance that he would not take unilateral military
action to try to reunify his country. (Nixon gave an
extensive overview of his impressions of the entire journey to 
the group the following week). The account in the NSC minutes 
of the encounter with Rhee actually closely follows Nixon's 
version in his memoirs. Nixon reported that Rhee thought it 
essential in fighting communism that a "good bargaining 
position" must always be retained, just as the Communists 
themselves always wanted that position. But Rhee believed the 
key was that the Communists must always fear what he might do. 
So, if he were to make any public announcement that he would 
go along with Eisenhower's request not to take unilateral 
military action, he would actually be weakening the position 
of South Korea and the United States. Rhee had asked Nixon 
why Eisenhower did not seem to want to use South Korea as the 
Soviets used their satellites— "to take positions which 
subsequently the USSR itself might or might not stand by, 
depending on the circumstances?" Nixon then commented that 
Ambassador Arthur Dean agreed that Rhee's argument had merit
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and "that it was indeed unwise to pull all of Rhee's teeth."
Nixon summarized his understanding of Rhee's position by 
saying he did not think Rhee would take "any of the action of 
the sort we fear without prior notification to the President." 
Nixon also assured the Council that Rhee would not take any 
action unless he knew that the United States would back him, 
but that he would in all likelihood, continue to make threats 
even though Rhee, himself, knew that he could "never get away 
with any course of action which would forfeit U.S. support." 
Nixon also said that he had disabused Rhee of the notion that 
the Korean leader had heard from some friends in America that 
he would have U.S. backing if he "goes it alone." The vice 
president also pointed out that not only would Rhee oppose a 
Soviet presence at a political conference to determine the 
fate of Korea, but the leader was also adamantly against 
India's inclusion in such discussions, since he considered 
India "as no more than a communist satellite." Nixon 
concluded with a swipe at the American diplomatic corps who 
Nixon said made charges, when irritated with Rhee's conduct, 
that he did not have the support of his people. The vice 
president stated that he found just the contrary to be true, 
that Rhee had the complete support of his nation and that 
there was a "strong popular desire" for reunification of the 
country.33
The next day, December 16, the NSC convened again, and 
Nixon made some acerbic observations about Nehru. The vice 
president reported to the group that Nehru was vehemently
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against the United States granting military assistance to 
Pakistan but Nixon made clear that it would be a "fatal 
mistake to back down on this program solely because of Nehru's 
objections." Nixon feared that "such a retreat would cost us 
our hold on Pakistan and on many other areas in the Near East 
and Africa." Nixon showed incisive perception into Nehru's 
political character when he told the council that Nehru was 
"one sort of a character in his domestic position in India and 
quite a different character in the realm of international 
relations." (American politicians are not the only ones who 
must take domestic political considerations in setting their 
foreign policy. Nehru, ever mindful of India's all too recent 
colonial past under the British Raj, undoubtedly felt obliged 
to oppose all Western foreign influence, especially the United 
States, since the torch of leadership of the West had been 
passed from London to Washington.) But on the question of 
military aid to Pakistan, Nixon suggested sending a special 
envoy to New Delhi to explain "firmly and forthrightly" why 
the United States wanted to assist Pakistan and, to try to 
reassure him of American intentions vis-a-vis India. Nixon 
claimed he wanted to "make the medicine easier for Nehru to 
take."
Nixon pointed out that Nehru had indicated that he feared 
American aid to Pakistan because he thought the Pakistanis 
might use it against India in the dispute over the sovereignty 
of Kashmir. But the vice president thought Nehru's real 
objection was that if Pakistan were to be built up, then his
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own leadership in Asia and parts of Africa would be 
challenged. Nixon warned that if the United States backed 
down on Pakistani aid, "we can count on losing most of the 
Asian-Arab countries to the neutralist bloc."34
Nixon's big day before the NSC occurred December 23 when 
most of the meeting was devoted to his official report on the 
Asian trip. Nixon had proved himself more than just a quick 
study and he was emerging with an incisive understanding of 
Asia that could intellectually match many of the regional 
"experts." Nixon expressed a cogent appraisal of the 
complicated politics throughout Asia and the western Pacific 
and reported on country by country in the order that he had 
visited them. He started with Australia and New Zealand and 
urged that better use be made of those nations in "high 
councils" concerning international relations. He thought the 
two nations felt somewhat out of the stream of things within 
the British Commonwealth, and believed they would appreciate 
more of a role in world affairs. Nixon was in essence 
anticipating the ANZUS defense pact between the three 
countries signed later in the decade.
Speaking of Indonesia, Nixon observed that its leader, 
Sukarno, was quite powerful and although not a Communist, he 
was "naive" about communism. Nixon was optimistic that 
Sukarno would prevent Indonesia from going Communist and would 
keep the former Dutch colony on the side of the West. But 
Nixon noted that Communists controlled what little labor 
organization there was in Indonesia and more significantly,
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they were making gains in winning students and the young to 
their side. Nixon claimed that some 10,000 students, 
including Chinese and Indonesians, would be studying in 
Communist China and "less than one plane-load" of students 
were planning to come to America. Nixon criticized the Dutch 
colonial policy of having only trained people at the highest 
levels while neglecting the development of a civil service and 
competent technicians. He urged that the United States "beef 
up" its educational attache division to better compete with 
Communist influence, and he presciently pointed out that 
Indonesia is "potential dynamite" unless the United States 
performed better than at that time. (There was unrest in the 
country in 1957 and in 1965, a pro-Communist coup was aborted, 
leading eventually to Sukarno's ouster. Interestingly enough, 
in the years following Nixon's visit, Sukarno was often deemed 
to be anti-Western.)
On Malaya, Nixon applauded the British for having 
militarily cut the Communist threat there to a matter of 
"mopping up." Nixon called the problem in that country "25 
percent military and 75 percent ideological" and he was 
particularly impressed with the imaginative methods employed 
by the British troops, such as having each company "adopt" a 
village and help the people solve sanitation problems and the 
like. The usually anglophobic Nixon praised British rule in 
Malaya and said its people did not have a strong drive for 
independence largely because the population was split between 
Chinese and Malay, and they had their own disputes. This is
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one case where Nixon left his Wilsonian idealism behind. But 
Nixon, ever looking to the geopolitics of the entire region, 
said keeping Malaya free would be "ten times as hard" if 
Indochina went Communist.
Nixon was also optimistic about Thailand and felt that the 
"danger within increases in direct proportion to developments 
without." He also cautioned that if Indochina fell, Thailand 
would follow, but he pointed to the Thai's prosperity as one 
reason why the Communists had not been able to gain a foothold 
there as well the fact that the Thai people do not like the 
Chinese, despite the presence then of some three million 
overseas Chinese in the country.
The vice president was far less sanguine on the Indochina 
situation. He insisted that publicly, the United States speak 
optimistically and "stick by" it. "The Communists have a 
sense of history, and time is on their side," he observed. He 
said even if the Communist forces suffered defeat by the 
spring of 1955 (in fact, they would be victorious over the 
French by May 1954), the U.S. should never assume that the 
Communist movement and the need for America to spend vast 
amounts of money to fight it, will have diminished by that 
time. Nixon early on understood the extraordinarily tenacious 
nature of the Communist rebellion in Indochina. For the vice 
president, "the key to Indochina is China" just as China was 
really the major issue throughout Asia. Nixon theorized that 
if the Chinese stopped backing the. Vietminh, the latter "would 
not last three months." However, Nixon offered the caveat
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that a military defeat of the Communists does not mean that 
the Chinese cannot stir up trouble at a future time in 
Indochina.
The vice president frankly criticized the French training 
program of the Vietnamese forces, saying that the French had 
no confidence in them. He also was distressed that there were 
"no real leaders" in Vietnam. But on the positive side, Nixon 
said that the Navarre Plan (named for the French commander, 
General Henri Navarre) instituted that fall was a "tremendous 
improvement." The Navarre Plan provided for more American 
military aid, the introduction of additional French troops and 
the incorporation of more indigenous forces under Navarre's 
command.
Nixon was quite conscious of the wider geopolitical 
picture in Europe and of the "need to stiffen the French at 
home" and he discerned that what happened in Indochina was 
more significant from the perspective of European strategic 
interests than what happened in Korea. He strongly advocated 
continued military and economic aid to the French effort in 
Indochina. Nixon said that Navarre believed he had enough 
equipment; his problem was not having enough men. Nixon 
understood Gallic pride well enough to realize how much the 
French resented suggestions that their training of the 
Vietnamese could be improved. Nixon recommended that the 
United States should "try to convince the Vietnamese, 
Cambodians and Laotians that they will have and can have 
independence within the French Union." He said the people of
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the Associated States understood that the Communists would 
take over if the French withdrew, that they wanted to stay 
within the French Union (the Union being something tantamount 
to the British Commonwealth), but that they believed the 
French had not offered them independence (Nixon was certainly 
right on that last point). Nixon proposed that an "offer of 
independence within the Union" could be helpful in selling the 
idea of the indigenous peoples fighting with the French.
Nixon then recounted his conversation with Bao Dai in 
which the emperor warned against negotiations with the 
Vietminh since he feared that either division of the country 
or some sort of coalition government could only lead to 
Communist domination. Nixon further advised that there was 
currently no capable anticommunist leadership in Vietnam to 
fill the gap if the French got out, and that the Communists 
were stronger militarily. He pointedly told the NSC that any 
negotiation with the Communists at that time would be 
"disastrous."
From there, Nixon moved on to the central focus of his 
attention, the China issue. He commented that he believed the 
Chinese in Formosa were "no longer corrupt" (could he have 
been really serious?) and that American financial assistance 
was being put to good use economically and militarily. He 
found morale among Chiang's troops to be "tops" and far better 
than he had expected. He added that those forces were being 
"sustained...by the hope of a return to the mainland in a 
military action." He mentioned that in Hong Kong, the most
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important thing was the "dramatic shift" away from support of 
Peking by the overseas Chinese in the Crown Colony, Taiwan and 
Indonesia. But Nixon drastically overestimated the impact 
that overseas Chinese could have on events and the government 
in the interior of China. Any Anglophobes sitting around the 
NSC table must have been pleased when the vice president 
reported that the people in the colony hated the British and 
claimed that he had been told that if given the choice, the 
people would vote against the colonial government in favor of 
independence ten to one. Nixon postulated that there had been 
a shift among the Chinese in Hong Kong away from the 
Communists largely because of reports from relatives on the 
mainland, cruelties of the communists, and the sense that 
although the Commmunists were gaining in the cities on the 
mainland, they were losing support of the peasants in the last 
two or three years. But Nixon pointed out on the negative 
side that Chinese prestige had been enhanced by the Korean War 
and this had resulted in giving them "a good boost throughout 
Asia."
The vice president then asked the pivotal question of what 
America should do vis-a-vis the China issue? Nixon pointed 
out that the United States had already rejected an attempt by 
Chiang to overthrow the Communist regime militarily. On the 
other extreme, Nixon described what he called the thinking of 
the "British career diplomat" which still held out the 
possibility that China in the future could "do a Tito." Just 
as he had in 1949, Nixon rejected this out of hand as any type
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of realitic possibility and as if to underscore his own 
opinion, he pointed out that no leader he had spoken to on his 
trip, save Nehru, had held out the possibility of a Titoist 
resolution in China. The British argument, Nixon continued, 
accepts that Communist China "is here to stay" and that 
implied that China must slowly be admitted to the 
international community of nations. According to this view, 
Communist China would have to be admitted to the United 
Nations, trade gradually built up depending, of course, on a 
Korean settlement. The result of that, Nixon said, would be 
that Taiwan would revert to China, Indochina would come under 
Chinese influence as would Indonesia, and even Japan, the 
linchpin of American policy in Asia, would fall into the 
Communist sphere of influence. The vice president stressed 
that these developments, including Malaya falling under 
China's domain, would all come about as a result of a policy 
of accepting China into the U.N. As for the end result of all 
of this, Nixon described the British view as concluding that 
China would then emerge as a "great world power" and that its 
relationship with the West would be "cold and 
correct...probably just as it would be with the Soviet Union."
Nixon was hardly keen on this approach. He dismissed 
another alternative, a containment policy and economic 
blockade based on the hope that the Communists could be 
overthrown from within rather than from without. The vice 
president considered this idea as having "very little chance." 
But he did hold open the door to trade. A pragmatic Nixon
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with his eyes on the economic interests of American business 
posed the question of whether or not the United States could 
afford an economic blockade after a Korean settlement. He 
wondered whether the U.S. could continue to withstand 
pressures from the allies and neutral nations for trade with 
Communist China. The vice president suggested that the United 
States should consider to carry on with "a policy of 
containment and isolation, but to allow for trade." Nixon was 
beginning to make concessions to the reality of Communist 
China's existence, although he was not prepared to go as far 
as the British view. "We must recognize that trade is 
inevitable," he said. "Trade is a good cover and we can trade 
with China without recognizing her." Aye, recognition, that 
was still the rub.
Nixon understood that to recognize China and not oppose 
its admission to the U.N. would give the Communist regime the 
"respectablity" it so strongly desired. Ever concerned with 
the overseas Chinese, he postulated that "there would then be 
no place for the 22 millions of overseas Chinese to go except 
to the Communist side." After all, he pointed out, the 
overseas Chinese "have a love of country and they want to 
belong someplace." That still left Formosa up in the air. 
Nixon said that the U.S. had to tell the Nationalists that 
they could not return to the mainland (he had in effect 
already done that in his meeting with Chiang) and that what 
was important now was to keep Taiwan as a symbol and as a 
bastion of overseas Chinese culture.
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But Nixon knew in his ever politically attuned heart, mind 
and soul that any move towards recognition of Peking would be 
unacceptable to the Republican constituency, not to mention 
the numerous Democrats who also opposed recognition. Remember 
that 1953 was the year that saw the formation of the Committee 
of One Million, a bipartisan group created to fight American 
recognition of Communist China and its admission to the U.N. 
Its membership went far beyond the more narrow confines of the 
China Lobby, including on its diverse roster such liberals as 
Hubert H. Humphrey and Jacob Javits. Statesmanship is a grand 
thing, but in order to be a statesman, one has to be a 
successful politician, and one cannot be a successful 
politician in a democracy unless one retains the support of 
the voters to hold on to high office.
Nixon then focused his realistic vision on Korea and 
remarked that a "united, independent Korea...is simply not 
possible." It is not that he did not want a united Korea 
under Rhee's rule, liberated from Communist domination. It is 
that he recognized this was not going to be possible in the 
real world of international politics. "North Korea will go to 
the Chinese," he said, and "we must settle for a divided 
Korea." Furthermore, he commented that any idea that a 
political conference could unite Korea "must be shelved." How 
quickly holding power can change perceptions in foreign 
affairs. It had literally been only months before when the 
Republicans were in opposition to the Truman policy in Korea 
and now they were faced with the same dilemma that beleaguered
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the old Democratic administration. This Nixon is a far cry 
from the young Senator who barnstormed the country in 1951 in 
behalf of MacArthur's proposals to fight on to total victory 
in Korea.
The vice president also conceded that "we can't stay in 
Korea indefinitely." He suggested that as soon as possible, 
the United States bite the bullet and "pay the price 
necessary, in the loss of prestige, to settle for a divided 
Korea." He remarked that he was disturbed to learn that the 
British, Sukarno and Nehru all seemed to agree that the Korean 
War had harmed the U.S. and helped the Chinese. "We've 
already lost prestige," Nixon told the cold warriors assembled 
around the NSC table that day, so "now we should take our loss 
and get out of Korea, losing as little face in the process as 
possible." It was a situation that had to be faced up to, 
Nixon added. This was certainly a surprising argument from 
the future president who would later insist on an honorable 
peace in Vietnam at the cost of thousands of American lives.
On the subject of the recent enemy, Japan, Nixon told the 
group that "the greatest danger in Asia today is the danger of 
internal subversion" there. What particularly disturbed the 
vice president, was that he did not think that either the 
Americans or Japanese recognized that threat. He feared that 
the Commmunists would make inroads in Japanese labor 
organizations. From Nixon's perspective, the spectre of 
Communist China lurked over Japan as it did all the other free 
countries of Asia. Again, he was alarmed that 3,000 Japanese
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students were going to Communist China to study the following 
year, with all expenses paid by Peking. He pointed once more 
to the "great sense of history" that the Chinese Communists 
had and he saw this as a great advantage for them. They were 
not thinking about what was going to happen now in Japan but 
of who would control that country 50 years in the future. To 
counter the possibility of enhanced Communist influence, Nixon 
thought Japan needed a stronger government but held out some 
hope that Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida could "strengthen 
the alliance."
While in Congress, Nixon had proposed the Nixon-Mundt bill 
which would have required Communists in America to register 
with the government. He always claimed that the legislation 
would have allowed the Communist Party to continue to exist in 
the United States, although his critics frequently portrayed 
the bill as prohibiting the party's very being in America. 
Nixon, however, was even more militant on the issue of 
Communists in Japan. He suggested to the NSC that the 
Communist Party be outlawed altogether in that country. "In 
all places where the Communist Party has been outlawed, the 
problem has been dealt with successfully," he argued. "Where 
it is not outlawed, the Party is gaining tremendously." Nixon 
pinned the blame for the Communist Party's continued life in 
Japan on none other than his old hero. General MacArthur. The 
vice president said that MacArthur's policy after the war had 
been to not outlaw the Communist Party in Japan because 
"everybody was free."
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The vice president urged that effective propaganda be 
mounted in Japan, especially in the labor unions. "The unions 
in Japan must be controlled," he said, getting right to the 
point. And he wanted to see student exchange programs built 
up as well as the expansion of trade between Japan and 
Southeast Asia. He ascertained, surprisingly in hindsight, 
that there was no pressure in Japan to trade with Communist 
China because they understood that in the economic field, 
trade with the United States and Latin America was more 
important to them. However, he claimed the Communists were 
trying to stir up the issue of initiating trade with China.
The vice president spoke disparagingly of Burma saying it 
was "in a race with Indonesia as to which is the weakest and 
most liable to go Communist." He cited the same situation he 
had encountered in Indonesia, namely Communist infiltration of 
labor as well as what he referred to as a "terrible guerrilla 
problem." He did not elaborate on the latter but it appeared 
that in reality the problem was two-edged, stemming from the 
continued presence of Chinese Nationalist guerrillas as much 
as any indigenous rebels against the Burmese government.
When the topic of India arose in this meeting, Nixon's 
dislike of Nehru was again readily apparent as he told the 
council that "Nehru likes nobody but Nehru" and the Indian 
leader's prime concern was that a U.S.-Pakistan pact would 
threaten "neutralist theory" and Nehru's "own thirst for power 
power over Southeast Asia, the Near East, and Africa." He 
emphasized that the United States not try to flatter the
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Indian leader. If the U.S. should back down from giving aid 
to Pakistan, Nixon warned, it has to be done in such a way 
without making it appear as a victory for Nehru. It certainly 
appeared that Nehru had taken on a virtual Achesonian role as 
the butt of all Nixon opposed among foreign leaders, just as 
the former secretary of state was the receptacle for Nixon's 
vitriolic attacks on the Democratic foreign policy at home 
throughout the 1950s, even years after he was out of office.
He then glossed over Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) saying that 
rice and rubber were the major components of the economy and 
that he perceived little danger there from the Communists. He 
proceeded to gush over Pakistan saying it was a country he 
"would like to do everything for." He said it would be 
"disastrous" if the U.S. did not grant Pakistan aid since such 
a step could eventually force out the current political 
leadership in that nation. Interestingly, Nixon did not 
appear afraid that such a change would drive the Pakistanis 
closer to the Communists. His biggest nightmare was that it 
would provide the potential for a "closer relationship with 
the Indians." However, it certainly seems that Nixon was 
merely trying to scare the National Security Council into 
backing military aid for Pakistan, because even at this early 
stage of his exposure to South Asia, he must have known that 
absolutely nothing could bring Pakistan and India together. 
That would never be the theme or great aim of any government 
in the subcontinent. The enmity between the Muslims and 
Hindus was simply too ancient and ran far too deep, and Nixon
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must have known better. But what mattered most to Nixon was 
that Nehru and the neutralism he espoused be reined in. He 
believed Nehru's influence could only be enhanced if the U.S. 
did not conclude a military assistance pact with Pakistan.
On Afghanistan, which would become the focus of 
Soviet-American tensions more than 25 years later, Nixon told 
the Council that he was confident that the Afghanis would 
"stand up against the Communists." He recounted that he had 
discussed the Pakistan aid issue with Afghanistan's leaders 
who had in turn suggested that Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, 
Iraq, and Turkey enter into their own regional version of the 
"Atlantic alliance" with aid going to these countries jointly 
rather than on an individual basis, where the various nations 
could conceivably threaten each other. However, Nixon pointed 
out that the Pakistanis did not share that view. Apparently, 
Pakistan wanted to be assured of its very own military 
assistance from the United States. Nixon was referring to 
what eventually became known as CENTO, which the United States 
never formally joined, leaving Britain as the chief Western 
power leading that alliance.
Discussing the former American colony, the Philippines, 
the vice president advised that the biggest danger there was 
"not overt aggression." Trying to put a positive spin on the 
Korean War, Nixon asserted that it had lessened the chances of 
such blatant aggression in the Philippines. But as in so many 
other Asian countries, just as within the United States, Nixon 
feared that internal subversion could unravel American
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influence and the anti-Communist position of the various 
governments there. But in his concluding remarks before the 
NSC that day, speaking of all of Asia, Nixon cited America's 
greatest weakness in the continent as not "getting our ideas 
across." He recounted how he had been frequently told on his 
travels that Russia and the U.S. both posed "equal threats" to 
international peace. The Wilsonian in Nixon reemerged as he 
reminded the group that Asians want independence and peace and 
that "unfortunately, we have got ourselves in the position of 
being 'against peace' and 'against independence.'" The vice 
president then scored the United States Information Service 
and the public relations people in the State Department. He 
pointed out that "sometimes an anticommunist line isn't the 
best line" and that what these officials often said in Asia 
was wrong "because it was so patently U.S. propaganda." Nixon 
was obviously recognizing the complexities and subtleties of 
Asian politics and that the United States not only had to 
address the perceived threat of communism but had to take into 
account the legitimate nationalistic aspirations of so many 
Asian peoples for both independence and a respected role among 
the family of nations. The vice president suggested movies 
and radio were not particularly good instruments for getting 
across the U.S. view. This is one of the few proposals he 
made that had a certain naivete to it. He misread the power 
of the visual media in 1953 just as he would arguably lose the 
presidential election in 1960 because of his lack of 
understanding of the emerging influence of television in
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American politics. Nixon preferred that the U.S. build up its 
library program and his pet project, student exchange, as well 
as having the country devote more energy to "building 
institutions and supporting them" in Asia.
He cited the need for recognition of the people of Asia 
and said they were "hungry for attention." Trying to leave 
the Council with an optimistic assessment, the vice president 
said that the low point in Southeast Asia and the rest of the 
continent was reached about a year and a half ago (clearly 
placing that low point within the time frame of the Truman 
administration). Nixon then lauded the new Eisenhower 
administration for having brought about great improvement in 
American relations with this vital part of the globe.
Nixon continued to get favorable press on the aftermath of 
the trip when Newsweek ran a story on the Nixon briefing of 
the NSC headlined "Nixon's Secret Report Warns: Don't 
Recognize Red Chinese." The magazine claimed that Nixon had 
"impressed the council" and his "broad proposals received 
sympathetic attention." The article shot down any rumors or 
doubts about U.S. refusal to recognize Red China when it said 
"Despite press reports to the contrary, the Vice President was 
categorical in his opposition to recognition of Red China" and 
that any efforts to bring an "aggressive Communist China into 
the family of nations...must be stopped by all means at 
American disposal." Newsweek got the gist of it, but they did 
not discern the complexity of the issue that Nixon did, nor 
his advocacy of eventually resuming trade with the Chinese (or
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perhaps this was not leaked to them or if they knew that, they 
discreetly omitted it from the article. After all, Nixon did 
have an image to keep up). The story further claimed that 
Nixon backed a "military crescent" including Turkey, Iran, 
Pakistan, Indochina, Taiwan and Japan— "which would help close 
the ring around the Communist empires of China and Russia."
The minutes of the NSC meeting indicate that Nixon said this 
was suggested by Afghani leaders, although the "high 
government source" who spoke to Newsweek may have indeed said 
otherwise. Having been a proponent of NATO and an eventual 
ardent supporter of Dulles's 1954 creation of SEATO and the 
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, there would be nothing 
surprising in Nixon supporting such a "military crescent."
Newsweek certainly picked up on Nixon's deep displeasure 
over Nehru, seeing the vice president's support of Pakistani 
aid as a "counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Nehru's 
India" and his conclusion that U.S. policy "should be based on 
what is best for the United States, not on any fear of 
angering Nehru." The magazine accurately portrayed Nixon's 
notion of the domino theory applied to the potential of the 
fall of Indochina and his concern that the anticommunist 
effort there was harmed by French insistence that Vietnamese 
forces be under the command of French soldiers. On Korea, 
Nixon was reportedly "reasonably sure that Rhee will continue 
to play with the U.N. forces— at least until and unless the 
Reds break the truce." The lid was kept on Eisenhower's 
request (and Rhee's apparent submission to it) that Rhee
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refrain from using unilateral force to try to unify the Korean 
peninsula.
The Newsweek article also discussed Nixon's perceptions of 
Africa, which were given scant, if any, attention in the NSC 
minutes. Nixon was said to think the situation was "touchy", 
especially in South Africa and Rhodesia and he believed that 
the Indian foreign service "connives" in Africa against the 
West, as he thought it did in Asia. Nixon also warned, the 
weekly said, that the Communists were setting their "sights" 
on Africa and that as the world's natural resources became 
more scarce, Africa would emerge as "decisive" in the 
East-West struggle.36 Apparently Nixon's Willkiesque 
"one-worldism" was by no means limited to Asia and Europe.
All things considered, the trip had been a resounding 
success not only in improving Nixon's image and standing at 
home but in contributing to his education in foreign affairs. 
This was to prove only the beginning of what would be a 
lifelong course on Asia as the world's attention would 
continue to focus on that continent in 1954 with the French 
defeat at Dienbienphu in Vietnam. And on the domestic 
political front, Asian politics and Hr. Nixon were to play no 
small role in the off-year congressional election campaign 
that November.
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CHAPTER 3: THE INDOCHINA CRISIS AND 1954 ELECTIONS
As 1954 began, Vice President Richard M. Nixon had already 
achieved the first of what would be several comebacks in his 
long and controversial political career. Nixon had weathered 
the storm caused by allegations that he was the recipient of a 
"slush fund" while a senator from California. He had almost 
been forced off the Republican Party ticket in 1952, but 
Nixon, at least then, was not a quitter. He had survived the 
charges by delivering the renowned "Checkers" speech, and had 
managed to stay on the ticket, with Eisenhower finally telling 
him that he was still the general's "boy." His political 
capital within the new administration had been vastly 
increased by his Grand Tour of Asia in late 1953.
As the new year unfolded, American attention not 
surprisingly shifted from Communist China and Korea to 
Indochina as the French position continued to deteriorate and 
Dien Bien Phu was on the verge of falling to the Vietroinh (The 
French outpost eventually fell in May.). Nixon, and most 
American politicians of both major parties, considered the 
Communist Chinese to be the principal suppliers of materiel as 
well as the instigators of the Vietminh rebellion against the 
French.
The National Security Council again turned to Indochina 
when it convened January 8. Eisenhower firmly stated his 
opposition to dispatching American forces to replace the 
French in that war-torn part of the world, warning that if we 
did, the Vietnamese would "transfer their hatred of the French
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to us" and he feared that such a move would "absorb our troops 
by divisions." These were the words of a most perspicacious 
old general.
Nixon displayed his own keen perception of the French 
position by then pointing out that as far as building up the 
indigenous forces there, the French "talk one way but feel 
another." He criticized the French command for their belief 
that the Vietnamese could not fight unless led by French 
soldiers while the Vietnamese doubted French sincerity in 
wanting to train great numbers of them. (This was in stark 
contrast to what Nixon tried to change as president when he 
instituted "Vietnamization" in which the goal was for the 
Vietnamese to take over the major responsibility of fighting 
the war. The French view of 1954 is also sharply different 
from what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, when in 1969, 
Nixon recognized the reality that America could no longer 
police the world but had to support the development and 
maintainence of armed forces among our allies in the Third 
World). Nixon understood only too well that French and 
Vietnamese objectives were "incompatible" since the French 
wanted to keep Vietnam in the French Union while the 
Vietnamese yearned for complete independence. The vice 
president noted that General Henri Navarre had little 
confidence in the program to train the Vietnamese, but Nixon 
shrewdly stated that the "indigenous forces are the key to 
success or failure." To Nixon, the situation boiled down to a 
political problem since the French wanted to win but without
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building up the Vietnamese to the extent where they could win 
on their own. In a rather caustic Francophobic tone, 
Eisenhower rejoined that if the French were "smart they would 
have long since offered the Associated States independence on 
the latters' own terms." Nixon, sensing what his 
commander-in-chief wanted to hear, added that the Vietnamese 
lacked the all important "cause" to fight for and he backed 
the president's idea of a large U.S. training mission. But in 
all fairness to Nixon, he was not just simply playing to 
Eisenhower, for he had previously elaborated on the subject of 
the necessity for the Vietnamese to have a raison d'etre in 
the fighting.1
China was hardly forgotten as the fighting continued to 
rage on in Vietnam. Throughout the Eisenhower years, Asia 
Firsters and members of the "China Bloc" in Congress, those 
staunch proponents of Chiang like William Knowland, the Senate 
Majority Leader from Nixon's native state of California, and 
Minnesota Republican Congressman Walter Judd, kept the 
political pressure on the White House not to even suggest the 
possibility of any change in the U.S. policy of nonrecognition 
of Peking and opposition to its admission to the U.N. This 
stand by the "China Lobby" proved to be quite an irritant to 
Eisenhower. The president was opposed to recognition as long 
as China continued to be what he termed an aggressor (this was 
Nixon's position as well). But Eisenhower was said to object 
to the fact that mere discussion of Chinese recognition was 
somehow deemed to be un-American and he rued the day when
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Woodrow Wilson refused, for moral reasons, to recognize 
Victoriano Huerta's revolutionary government in Mexico in 
1913. (The U.S. had generally followed the practice of de 
facto recognition of new governments prior to Wilson). Also, 
in 1953, Eisenhower had forcefully stated his opposition to 
Republican senators who wanted to discontinue funding to the 
United Nations should that body ever admit Red China. The 
president had written Nixon a forceful letter at the time 
saying that such a move would only undermine America's 
position in the world for it would take away an international 
forum where the United States along with its allies was able 
to oppose totalitarianism.2
On this ever politically persistent question of 
recognition of Peking, The New York Times reported on January 
10 that Nixon had met with about 40 officials of the State 
Department to emphasize to them that the United States was 
against any change in its policy concerning Communist China; 
i.e., that there would be no recognition or acceptance of that 
country joining the United Nations. The Times article noted 
that Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 
Walter Robertson, Chiang's most vociferous supporter at Foggy 
Bottom, had already denied that the government was looking at 
the possibility of recognition and that Eisenhower's recent 
State of the Union message had also "made it clear that United 
States diplomatic relations would continue with the 
Nationalist Chinese Government on Formosa."3 Nevertheless, 
the China Lobby would never cease questioning the
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administration on its stand on Peking, as if any deviation 
from the hard-line policy they supported would raise questions 
as to the manhood of the general turned president and the team 
around him. But recognition of Communist China by the United 
States at this point was so far removed from reality that its 
persistence as an issue must ultimately be attributed to the 
political posturing of Old Guard, Asia Firster, China Lobby 
Republicans who saw everything to gain and nothing to lose 
from continuing to make nonrecognition an issue. After all, 
the Old Guard's candidate had been Bob Taft, and Eisenhower 
would forever have to prove he was a "true believer" to the 
right wing of the Republican Party which was something he 
would never fully succeed in doing.
Eisenhower got so fed up with the Old Guard's isolationist 
tendencies, its dedication to unreality in Asia (that Chiang 
could somehow miraculously militarily regain the mainland), 
and its unreconstructed domestic Hooverism that he wanted to 
start a third party which would shut out the right wingers and 
bring about what the president liked to call "Modern 
Republicanism." He was to ultimately fail in this quest.
Stuck right in the middle of this morass within the GOP for 
eight years was Nixon who faithfully served as the go-between 
for the Eisenhower forces and the Old Guard. It is to Nixon's 
credit as an effective politician that he was personally able 
to balance support from both wings of the Republican Party.
But the spectre of Communist China aside, the Eisenhower 
administration was more immediately concerned with the
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developments in Indochina. The war came up again during the 
NSC meeting of January 14. The vice president actually seemed 
to be contemplating the advantages of French withdrawal when 
he remarked that a French exit "might just provide what was 
lacking to the Vietnamese by way of the will to fight." Nixon 
hoped that the Vietnamese might allow the U.S. to come in and 
train their forces and "do for them what the French had thus 
far failed to do." But he was sure to qualify quickly his 
comment by saying that this did not mean sending American 
combat forces to Vietnam. To Nixon, United States leadership 
might well succeed where the French seemed doomed to 
failure.4 But did the thought ever cross his mind that the 
Vietnamese, themselves, might simply look upon American aid of 
this type as another manifestation of neocolonialist efforts 
to control the region and its people, denying them their 
nationalist aspirations? Eisenhower seemed even more aware of 
Vietnamese sensibilities when he remarked in the preceding 
meeting that the Vietnamese would hate Americans as they did 
the French if the United States were to move in with combat 
forces, although Nixon was just arguing for American-led 
training, not the introduction of ground troops (However, 
"hypothetical" comments he made on that very subject in April 
were to embroil him in controversy once again.).
The vice president turned again to the unraveling
situation in Indochina when he gave a major speech in
Philadelphia on March 9, before the annual forum of The
Philadelphia Bulletin. Nixon again pegged his appeal for the
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strategic importance of Vietnam based on the domino theory 
that if one nation fell to the Communists in Southeast Asia, 
then others would follow suit. He again observed that Japan 
was dependent on trade with Southeast Asia, and he warned that 
if Japan were denied those markets, then it would inevitably 
become an "economic satellite in the Soviet orbit."
Predictably enough, Nixon praised the Eisenhower 
administration for putting an end to the war in Korea. Nixon 
explained to the Philadelphians that the administration had 
also made a major decision on how to combat Communist military 
agression— namely that the United States "rather than allowing 
ourselves to be nibbled away...[by wars like the one fought in 
Korea, in which Nixon noted that there were some 125,000 
American casualties and, according to Nixon, not one Soviet 
casualty]...rather than to allow ourselves to be destroyed 
economically, should rely primarily on the massive retaliatory 
power of our atomic weapons and of our Air Force." Nixon, of 
course, was referring to the "New Look," the heart of the 
Eisenhower defense policy which called for cuts in 
conventional forces and reliance instead on nuclear deterrence 
to prevent war and further Communist aggression. The doctrine 
rested upon the United States threat to retaliate against 
Moscow and/or Peking should their proxies gain in their 
efforts to overthrow governments aligned with the West.
Nixon reiterated that from a strategical standpoint, 
Indochina was even more important to the United States than 
Korea. It was Indochina's geographic position that made it so
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significant because it was just to the east of Malaya, where 
the British were already involved in putting down a Communist 
rebellion in that Crown Colony. The vice president also 
mentioned Thailand, which he categorized as the "rice bowl" of 
Asia. Nixon argued that a Communist victory in Indochina 
could only help to spur on Communist rebellion throughout 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, which was rich in oil.
The vice president again underscored his fear about Japan 
going Communist if that war-torn nation lost its markets in 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, which was rich in oil.
He summed up his arguments with what had by now become his 
adage, saying "The loss of China led to Korea and to 
Indo-China, and the loss of Indochina may lead to the loss of 
Asia." In a rhetorical twist, he rationalized American aid 
for France in Indochina as a means for the United States to 
stay out of Asia. "We aid the French and the associated 
states in Indochina not because we want to get into war 
there," he declared, "but because we want to keep out."
He concluded with an overview of United States policy in 
Indochina and around the world. "We want peace," he said. "We 
want it in Indochina as well as every place else. But it must 
be peace without surrender," he emphasized. "We will not 
bargain our friends into Communist slavery at the conference 
table," Nixon concluded undoubtedly with an eye looking toward 
Geneva and remembering his conversation just a few months 
before with Bao Dai.5
Among Nixon's Pre-Presidential Papers, there is a typed
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draft of a speech found in the file for this appearance that 
differs somewhat from the remarks recorded in the Philadelphia 
Bulletin. There is substantial material dealing with 
Communist China and the crisis in Indochina. In these notes, 
Nixon makes much of the geopolitical importance of Asia and 
the fact that of the 600 million people in the world who were 
neither committed to communism or the free world, most of them 
were in Asia (Where Nixon exactly got these figures, no one 
can guess. The lawyer in Nixon always had an affinity for 
numbers in any argument.). Nixon said that this substantial 
number of people held the "balance of power— in terms of 
population and natural resources— between the forces of 
Communism and the forces of freedom." This served to further 
demonstrate to him the vital significance of Asia. In this 
text, Nixon declares that "Korea taught the Communists a 
lesson— that armed, overt aggression would be met by 
force."6 Nixon believed adamantly in the use of military 
force to quell Communist aggression. He was soon to privately 
advocate the use of American air power to try to subdue the 
Vietminh rebellion.
But a brief respite from the ensuing crisis in Indochina 
resulted when Adlai Stevenson, the titular head of the 
Democratic Party, made a speech castigating the Eisenhower 
administration over the tactics employed by Senator Joseph 
McCarthy and its defense policy embodied in the much 
ballyhooed "New Look." In essence, it was the first shot of 
the bloody war also known as the campaign of 1954, which would
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end with much of Nixon's enhanced status resulting from the 
Asia trip eviscerated over charges from the Democrats that he 
was still the same old dirty, tricky politician who when given 
the choice, always preferred taking the low road.
In a Miami Beach speech on March 6, Stevenson charged that 
Eisenhower had accepted "McCarthyism" as the Republican 
Party's "best formula for political success." Stevenson was 
doing his best to tarnish the president through his party 
affiliation with the Wisconsin demagogue* He argued that 
"McCarthyism" was actually responsible for much of the 
problems in the government and cited a "demoralized" State 
Department, an "enfeebled" American voice abroad, a threatened 
press, an educational system under attack, and a "confused" 
foreign policy.
Stevenson then lashed into the much vaunted "New Look" 
that Eisenhower had given to the American defense posture, 
which emphasized the doctrine of deterrent by "Massive 
Retaliation" with nuclear weapons rather than having the 
nation expend its financial resources on maintaining armed 
conventional forces to fight Communist aggression "anywhere 
and everywhere" around the globe. As pointed out above, the 
idea behind the "New Look" was that the threat of "Massive 
Retaliation" would be held over the head of Moscow and Peking, 
much as the sword of Damocles, since the Communist giants, 
themselves, would be the target should the United States 
resort to such drastic measures to fight the other side. 
Stevenson showed some political courage when he dared to take
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on America's greatest war hero as he criticized the Eisenhower 
program for being "without benefit of bipartisanship." The 
man from Illinois took the ostensibly hawkish line as he spoke 
out harshly against what he called impulsive military budget 
cuts. Stevenson further charged that the policy had created 
confusion among American allies as well as stating his doubts 
about the efficacy of the administration policy.7
Stevenson had challenged not just the demagogue McCarthy 
but America's national treasure, war hero and 
commander-in-chief, Dwight D. Eisenhower. The president 
usually prided himself on being above politics but the arrows 
Stevenson shot his way harmed the general's pride. It was bad 
enough to try to tinge the president with "McCarthyism" since 
Eisenhower personally detested the Wisconsin senator and his 
irresponsible witch hunt aimed in no small part at the 
general's very own U.S. Army, the pride and joy of his life. 
But to denigrate the "Mew Look," which happened to be designed 
by the greatest general-politician of the 20th Century was 
tantamount to crossing the line in the sand. After all, it 
was Eisenhower who had commanded five million troops in the 
masterful and gallant crusade that liberated Europe, not the 
egghead to the manner born with the holes in the soles of his 
shoes. Eisenhower was furious but he had an image to 
maintain. He wanted to respond in kind to the Stevenson 
attack but did not want to get his own feet muddied. There 
was only one way to defend the administration and the honor of 
its commander-in-chief. Eisenhower reached down into the
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chain of command and asked his point man, Nixon, to reply to 
Stevenson's attack in a nationally televised address the next 
weekend. The vice president, Eisenhower reasoned, could 
handle the McCarthyism charges without alienating the right 
since Nixon, himself, had such a solid reputation as an 
anticommunist stemming from the Hiss case. Also, Eisenhower 
clearly realized that Nixon could simply be more blatantly 
political than the president cared to be or would ever allow 
himself to be.
In his memoirs, Nixon describes his intense preparation 
for the speech. He went into solitude at the Statler Hotel, 
just a short walk from the White House, scribbling his ideas 
and drafts on his beloved yellow legal pads. He was always 
the debater, the lawyer hard at work. The "Iron Butt" (his 
nickname at the Duke Law School) might be considered his 
greatest political asset. This entire episode very well could 
have been his seventh crisis had he chosen to expand his first 
book to include it. This was Nixon preparing for battle in 
the heat of crisis; working in seclusion around the clock, 
preparing himself like a Roman gladiator for the fight in the 
arena. Nixon truly thrived on situations like this and needed 
that heightened sense of melodrama to get his adrenalin going 
to face the challenge, whatever it might be.
In the speech, Nixon tried to distance the administration 
from McCarthy by emphasizing that Eisenhower was the one and 
only true leader of the GOP (Stevenson, true to his political 
roots in the Illinois prairies, had invoked the greatest son
-124-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of Illinois, Lincoln, when he said the preceding week that the 
Republican Party was "half McCarthy and half Eisenhower" as if 
to imply that a party divided against itself could not 
stand— although precisely just such disunion was a 
consummation devoutly to be wished by any dedicated 
Democrat.)* The vice president did not attack McCarthy by 
name. If anything, he lent his support to the importance of 
fighting Communist subversion within the government, but his 
oft quoted point was that when you are fighting rats, you must 
be sure tc shoot straight, lest the fight lack effect since a 
bad shot will just enable those rats to scurry about and 
survive. In his heart, Nixon certainly seemed to be 
suggesting that he knew McCarthy was right. It was the 
Wisconsin senator's manner and methods which hindered what 
Nixon considered a truly noble cause. Nixon was concerned 
that McCarthy would potentially harm the reputation of the 
president as well as endangering administration programs on 
The Hill (This latter point was one of Eisenhower's chief 
worries.).
Nixon also defended the "New Look" but he did so in a 
partisan way that further inflamed the Democrats, but no doubt 
galvanized the vast majority of Republicans who supported not 
only the administration, but the young vice president as well. 
After all, the 1950s could hardly be categorized as a 
latter-day "era of good feelings" and American politics is not 
a profession limited to gentlemen. Nixon, traveling yet again 
down the low road, stirred up the ashes of his past fiery
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criticism of the Truman-Acheson policy in which "600,000,000 
people had been lost to the Communists and not a single 
Russian soldier had been lost in combat." He further 
countered Stevenson by saying that when the new administration 
had come into office, it had "found that despite record 
spending for military purposes that in our efforts to be 
strong everywhere we weren't strong enough anywhere." Nixon 
rationalized the "New Look" by suggesting, as he had in 
Philadelphia, that the Kremlin's strategy was to draw the 
United States into "little wars all over the world with their 
satellites, however, where they, themselves, were not 
involved." He added that they were attempting to destroy 
American freedom by forcing the United States to "stay armed 
to the teeth" in order to defend that very freedom. The vice 
president argued that the new policy rested on the premise of 
not letting the Communists "nibble us to death all over the 
world in little wars." Rather, he said, the United States 
would "rely in the future primarily on massive mobile 
retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against 
the major source of aggression at times and places that we 
chose." (This last portion of the phrase was an echo of 
Dulles's position taken in a 1952 Life interview.) Nixon 
claimed the policy had succeeded because the Korean War was 
now over and the nation was approaching that much sacred icon 
of the Republican Party of that era, a balanced budget. But 
the most important result of the New Look to Nixon was that it 
had contributed to the United States being able to take the
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ideological offensive away from the Communists. And in words 
that would soon embarrass him by the onrush of events in the 
next two months in Indochina, he mentioned that the Communists 
had made no gains since Eisenhower had taken the helm (Of 
course, this was before the fall of Dien Bien Phu.). He 
further argued that the New Look held the Kremlin and Peking 
responsible for Communist aggression by their satellites and 
that the policy served as a warning to them. But in reality, 
even though Communist China instigated the Vietminh, after 
Dien Bien Phu fell, the Chinese were not to be the target of 
any massive retaliation by the United States. Despite the New 
Look, the politician who knew war better than any other, 
Eisenhower, allowed his cooler head to prevail over American 
policy since the last thing he wanted on his watch was World 
War III.8
Republicans may well have been pleased with the vice 
president's speech but it was all the more fodder to feed to 
the ever-growing contingent of rabid Nixon haters in the 
Democratic Party. The usually liberal Democratic leaning TRB 
(the nom de plume of Richard Strout) of The New Republic 
rendered a biting critique of the Nixon speech and the 
administration's New Look defense policy vis-a-vis the 
continuing deterioriation in Indochina. The columnist 
admitted that Nixon was a power in his own right in 
Washington. "Let nobody underestimate Richard Nixon," TRB 
wrote. "His oratory is a bit indigestible for our stomach, 
like rich fruitcake, but it is effective for all that." He
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added that Eisenhower "seems to consider him heir apparent; 
for all we know he will be president some day." But "Cheer 
up," the journalist wittily wrote, "he will doubtless have 
matured somewhat by then."
Yet, TRB raised some very serious questions about the New 
Look, not unlike Stevenson's. He noted that regarding 
Indochina, the "one shooting war today in the world," 
Eisenhower had backed off from the view of "instant 
retaliation" in a press conference days after the Stevenson 
speech. TRB observed that Ike appeared "vexed" in responding 
to questions from the press on the Democrat's speech. The 
president seemed to pull the rug somewhat out from under his 
own New Look when he told the newsmen that he would not make 
war until Congress had granted him the authority to declare it 
(Eisenhower was, to his credit, usually quite meticulous, if 
not always, about the Constitutional separation of powers in 
the American system and the need for the president to have the 
cooperation of Congress, especially in matters of war and 
peace. This was made clear later in the Formosa Resolution of 
1955 and the Congressional resolution that legitimized the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.). It was now TRB's turn to ring the 
alarm about American vulnerability to Communist attack. 
"America could be blown off the map by that time," he warned. 
He pointed out that Republicans had mercilessly scored Acheson 
for "allegedly giving China the notion we wouldn't intervene 
in Korea." Strout, who hailed from New England and had 
covered every American president since warren G. Harding,
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feared that "Ike is repeatedly giving the notion that we won't 
intervene in Indo-China, or indeed, almost anywhere." TRB 
cleverly turned the argument in favor of a balanced budget on 
its head. He scored Nixon in his column when he wrote "that 
with a candor which even enemies would not have supposed he 
would employ, Nixon offers as one of the...proofs that the new 
policy is 'working' that 'our budget is approaching a 
balance.' Yes," TRB caustically commented, "it's saving money 
all right; and we'll hit Ho Chi Minh with a balanced budget 
any day now." Strikingly, the premier columnist of the 
decisively left-liberal New Republic ended up attacking Nixon 
and Eisenhower from the right over Indochina and the New 
Look.9
On March 29, Dulles gave a major speech in which he called 
for "United Action" on the part of the allies to keep Vietnam 
out of the hands of the Communists. It was more or less a 
pretext to find a way to defeat the Vietminh without 
unilateral action by the United States, which had grown weary 
of the limited war in Korea and had been at peace there for 
only less than a year. However, the British were to prove 
recalcitrant (they certainly were not going to fight to 
preserve the vestiges of the crumbling French Empire since 
they had so recently lost India to independence) and friction 
between the Americans and French made "United Action" 
difficult, if not impossible. Nixon and Admiral Arthur 
Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised the 
ante when they soon privately advocated American air strikes
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on Vietminh positions. (Radford actually favored the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons in what was planned as "Operation 
Vulture." Historians Fawn Brodie and Stephen Ambrose say 
Nixon supported Radford on that, although Nixon only admits in 
his memoirs to wanting to take a stronger line than Eisenhower 
was willing to follow). In the end, as Dien Bien Phu fell, 
Eisenhower opted to keeping Americans from actively engaging 
in the fighting, even though it meant the division of Vietnam 
at Geneva despite the American refusal to sign the accords.
At an NSC meeting April 6, Nixon again harped on the 
political dangers of the U.S. appearing to side with the 
European colonial powers, particularly Britain, and he called 
British policy in Asia a "millstone...around the neck of the 
United States." Despite his previous praise of the British 
squelching the Communist rebellion in Malaya, he now said that 
the U.S. should insist on granting Malaya independence in the 
future and that America should make clear its opposition to 
colonialism.10
At the following week's meeting of the NSC on April 13, 
the subject of discussion included Communist China as well as 
the continuing crisis in Indochina. Nixon displayed more of 
the growing sense of realpolitik that he had exhibited 
privately before when he again supported trading at some point 
in the future with Communist China. He pointed out to the 
group that the U.S. had not recognized the Soviet Union until 
the 1930s but had traded with that country prior to 
recognition. Nixon said that although it was impossible for
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the U.S. to recognize China at that time, he thought that 
trade could be expanded as a "negotiating point." He 
certainly seemed to imply that future recognition would not be 
ruled out. The vice president then made the point that it was 
"necessary to be calculating and hard boiled." Nixon asked 
the poignant question that if trade was not used as a 
bargaining chip with the Chinese Communists, what else could 
be used? Nixon hardly sounded like he was under the control 
of the China Lobby when he suggested that "if and when
Communist China clearly abandons her present aggressive
policies, a hard-headed study should be made as to whether or
not trade should be opened up." (No one who knew the inner
thoughts of Nixon on this most sensitive of issues could have 
ever called him the vice president from Formosa, as 
unreconstructed Chiang loyalist William Knowland was known as 
the senator from Formosa. The bottom line for Nixon the 
realist was the interests of the United States, first and 
foremost.) He concluded his remarks to the NSC by saying that 
the "time had come...to determine under what conditions, what 
level of trade, would best serve the interests of the United 
States vis-a-vis Communist China." Nixon had again displayed 
a shrewd calculation of what Eisenhower would deem worthy of 
consideration. The president said that the best way to 
influence the Chinese against their Communist government was 
to allow Chinese junks to sail to Japan and "fill up with 
everything they could buy."11 The president and vice 
president clearly would have liked to pursue trade with China,
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but they wece all too cognizant of the domestic political 
realities that prevented taking such action then. However, 
they wanted to be prepared to follow that avenue should 
conditions allow for change. Neither Nixon or Eisenhower's 
position at this point was cast in stone.
Things really got fired up for the vice president over 
Indochina after Nixon made some controversial remarks at a 
meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 
16 in Washington. Nixon, who had been speaking "off the 
record" to the prestigious group of newsmen, had been asked 
whether or not the United States would send troops to 
Indochina should the French abandon their fight there. Nixon 
responded that on the basis of the question being 
"hypothetical," he would have to say that hypothetically 
speaking, if the only way for Indochina to be saved required 
the deployment of American ground troops, then the United 
States would need to send the troops there.
Now, much was made at the time of Nixon's statement since 
no seasoned Washington politician could possibly think that 
such a controversial comment could be made without its being 
reported to the public (The remarks were revealed by foreign 
journalists who Nixon claims in his memoirs were not present 
at the meeting but heard the vice president's comments second 
hand. Specifically, The Times of London and France-Soir 
disclosed that Nixon, himself, had made the statements.). It 
was seen in some quarters as a "trial balloon," another 
instance of Nixon taking the hard-line (and the heat) while
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President Eisenhower could be removed from such politically 
unpopular talk.12 Such talk would have also been too 
controversial for even Secretary of State Dulles despite the 
fact that he frequently spoke about the potential use of 
nuclear weapons. But the insertion of ground troops struck a 
particularly raw nerve with the American public in the wake of 
the Korean War.
However, in a 1965 interview Nixon claimed that the speech 
was in no way a "trial balloon" and that he had spoken 
completely on his own rather than at Dulles's or anyone else's 
suggestion. But Nixon remembered that Dulles agreed with him 
that the United States should use its own military forces if 
that was ultimately what it took to stop the Communists in 
Indochina. Yet, when the French and British would not join 
the United States on the secretary's "United Action" proposal, 
Dulles then changed his mind and concluded that America could 
not stand alone in Indochina. Nixon recalled Dulles thinking 
this choice was a mistake but that the U.S. did not have any 
realistic option for intervention without the full support of 
the major European allies. (Of course, one wonders about the 
very term "United Action" since the French were already 
fighting, albeit a losing battle. The problem appeared to be 
that the French, as much as they wanted to hold on to Vietnam, 
simply did not want to yield command of the military operation 
there to the United States.).
After the story broke, Dulles told Nixon that Eisenhower 
was "not disturbed" by the remarks. The secretary of state
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had told reporters that he did not care to answer the question 
itself since it was an off-the-record response to a 
hypothetical question. The vice president later clarified his 
comment by saying his remarks were meant to indicate that "if 
the only way to hold Indochina was to go in, we might have 
to." Nixon also told Dulles that he was going to make 
speeches that week which endorsed the Eisenhower-Dulles Asian 
policy for its firmness, and that he would invoke a reprise of 
his favorite theme: that Korea was caused by vacillation. 
Eisenhower called Nixon to tell him not to be bothered by 
"stories press boys had been cooking up out of his 'perfectly 
innocent* remarks" and that he would have probably said the 
same thing if he had been asked. Yet, it is hard to believe 
that Dulles and Eisenhower were not at least somewhat miffed 
by the young vice president charting his own course in 
American policy in Indochina. After all, Dulles distanced 
himself from the remarks in refusing to answer the question 
when the press asked him about it. He also told Senator H. 
Alexander Smith (R-NJ) that he was strongly against getting 
U.S. troops "bogged down" in Asia and that the Nixon remarks 
were "unfortunate" but "would blow over."13
The New York Times reported a summary of Nixon's 
"off-the-record" remarks two days after the vice president 
delivered them. By that point, obviously, the lid had been 
blown off. Nixon's comment that the United States might 
indeed send combat troops to Indochina was not in his prepared 
text but Nixon had made the statement in response to a
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question from the audience of journalists. According to The 
Times, the vice president maintained that the French should be 
able to stay in Indochina and win their struggle against the 
Vietminh. He cited the French advantage in manpower 
(presumably including the indigenous troops) and perhaps even 
more importantly, the advantage of French airpower. Nixon's 
fear was that the French did not have the will to win, and he 
was concerned that should Dien Bien Phu fall (which it did 
less than a month later), the French would try to attempt to 
salvage their position by making a deal at the upcoming Geneva 
Conference at any cost. Nixon then spoke of the need for 
additional manpower but mentioned that the French had grown 
tired of their war, just as Americans had grown weary of the 
Korean conflict. Nixon firmly believed that additional 
manpower needed to come from Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos— again, this foreshadowed Nixon's policy of 
"Vietnamization" of the war that he was to espouse as 
president.
Despite Nixon's rhetoric about independence for Vietnam 
during his trip there the previous Autumn, he told the newsmen 
that the Vietnamese lacked the ability to fight the war 
themselves or even to govern themselves. The vice president 
went so far as to predict that if the French pulled out, 
Indochina would fall to the Communists within a month.
Nixon then said that as the leader of the free world, the 
United States simply could not tolerate any more of a retreat 
in Asia. The vice president added that although the hope was
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that the United States would not have to send troops to 
Indochina, if the situation deteriorated, the Eisenhower 
administration would have to send American forces there.
Nixon cautioned that the United States needed to go to the 
Geneva Conference, which was to begin in late April, 
committed to obtaining "United Action" on the part of France 
and Britain with the United States. In particular, Nixon 
feared that both the French and the British would be too eager 
to end the fighting and make concessions to the Communist 
forces. Nixon realized that the French, not surprisingly, 
were tired of the war, and their public opinion was galvanized 
against it. As Nixon saw it, the British were reluctant to 
get involved in Indochina since they had already recognized 
the Communist Chinese government and did not want to alienate 
Peking, or far worse for their interests in the region, 
endanger their hold on Hong Kong. (Remember that as a United 
States senator, Nixon had been an unabashed Anglophobe, 
castigating the British over their use of Hong Kong as a 
conduit for trade with the mainland. Also, Eisenhower could 
hardly be termed an Anglophile despite having been Supreme 
Allied Commander during World War II. Even though the 
president was a dedicated internationalist, that old 
midwestern distrust of the British ran very deep in the man 
from Abilene.)
The vice president further said that the United States was 
the only country politically strong enough domestically to 
take a position that would save Asia from Communist
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domination. He warned that any agreement with the Communists 
to divide the territory would only lead to a Communist 
takeover. Nixon hoped that the French and British might take 
a lesson from the Communist intransigence in Korea and form 
ranks with the United States behind Dulles's much touted 
"United Action." Nixon then told the editors what he had told 
so many groups before— that there was a danger that all of 
Southeast Asia would fall to the Communists should the 
Vietminh gain power in Vietnam. He suggested that the United 
States continue to aid the French forces with materiel, 
encourage the French to grant true independence, and finally, 
seek a "United Action" program with our allies.
Nixon shrewdly observed that such an alliance alone would 
not be enough to keep Indochina out of Communist hands. Just 
as he had interpreted danger to America in the form of 
internal subversion, Nixon also believed that internal 
subversion in Asia was the major threat to the stability of 
Indochina. Nixon, always mindful of the ramifications of the 
United States appearing to be a colonial power, told the 
editors that it was absolutely essential for America to be 
associated with the aspirations of the people of the Far East, 
namely the guest for independence, equality and peace.14
The Nixon remarks on the possibility of sending United 
States troops to Indochina were seen, indeed, as a "trial 
balloon," no matter what Nixon's true intentions were. The 
Times reported that the State Department, in the first 
"official" reaction to the Nixon remarks, said that sending
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United States troops to Indochina was "highly unlikely." In 
fact, the State Department, refusing to acknowledge that the 
"high government official" cited in the news reports was 
Nixon, went so far as to say that the comments did not differ 
from policies put forth by Eisenhower and Dulles. All of this 
was based, according to State, on the premise that the remarks 
concerned merely a "hypothetical" situation.
On April 20, Nixon clarified his position in a speech in 
Cincinnati, just as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was 
preparing to embark for the Geneva Conference. The vice 
president addressed a dinner held in honor of the late Senator 
Robert Taft and said that the United States would seek an 
"honorable and peaceful settlement" on Indochina at Geneva but 
that the country would oppose "outright surrender" to the 
communists. Backing away somewhat from his "hypothesizing" a 
few days before, Nixon told his Ohio audience that the 
Eisenhower administration was working to prevent (underlining 
mine) the need to send United States troops to Indochina. But 
once more, Nixon warned that should Indochina fall to the 
Communists, all of Southeast Asia and Japan would be in 
danger. Nixon also used this forum to again laud the 
administration's "New Look" defense policy.
Warming up for the mid-term elections of 1954, Nixon 
harped on what he called the "failures" of the Truman 
administration. (One would think that the Harry Truman was 
still ensconced in the Oval Office by the disparaging way that 
Nixon spoke of him.) Nixon still insisted on attacking it
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for not placing enough emphasis on Asia, and putting too much 
on Europe. The vice president declared that the Eisenhower 
administration had redressed this imbalance. He accused the 
previous administration of being weak and vacillating.
Perhaps even more importantly, Nixon charged it had failed to 
recognize the Communist strategy of "foreign-controlled and 
directed civil wars" for expansion. Actually, this accusation 
was a bit thin for Truman and Acheson were just as convinced 
as the right wing of the Republican Party that Moscow was 
behind tko Korean War. Very few Republicans or Democrats saw 
Korea or Indochina as expressions of pure nascent nationalism.
As for massive retaliation, Nixon described it as a means 
"to let the men in the Kremlin know that in the future they • 
might be held accountable." Nixon added that the result of 
the Eisenhower administration's balancing of Europe and Asia 
was the end of the Korean War and the decreased threat of "new 
overt aggression" by the Communists due to a more effective 
defense for less money— "more bang for the buck" as the 
military doctrine was fondly referred to by its backers.
Nixon saw Indochina as a test for the Eisenhower policy 
and he drove home the point that the struggle in Vietnam was 
not simply a civil war. "This is just not a civil war," Nixon 
said, "this is a war of aggression by the Communist conspiracy 
against all free nations." Then he pointed the finger to 
Peking, when he said, "The Chinese Communist government 
supports, controls, and directs it. It is not a war to 
perpetuate French colonialism but to resist extension of
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Chinese Communism.1,15
Two days later in Phoenix, on April 23, on his way to 
address a Republican gathering in Tucson, Nixon declared that 
the United States could go to the Geneva Conference "with 
strength" if the country continued its present aid to the 
French. He also repeated one of his favorite themes of the 
period, namely that "the mounting of a great ideological 
offensive will make it clear that the United States associates 
itself with the aspirations of all peoples for peace." He 
added that this type of ideological program was "the 
long-range answer to defeating the Communists without a 
war."16 This was not simply rhetoric for Nixon since he 
believed that the struggle between the free world and the 
Communist nations did not merely lie in the military strength 
of each side. An emphasis on ideology, or perhaps one might 
more realistically say propaganda, was required to win the 
non-aligned world to the side of the West, and particularly 
the United States, according to the vice president. This was 
also a faithful rendition of the Eisenhower "party line" on 
the matter.
On April 27, Nixon was back in Washington to address the 
Washington Congress of Governors. The vice president 
emphasized to the governors (in another off-the-record speech) 
the geopolitical importance of Asia with millions of people on 
that continent neutral in the battle between the free world 
and Communist nations. Nixon distinguished between two types 
of tactics employed by Communists in their effort to dominate
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Asia. He portrayed the invasion of Korea as a traditional 
tactic, a "war of aggression" and pointed to the united action 
taken by the United Nations as the means to stop Communist 
aggression on the Korean pensinsula.
Nixon then explained that he thought outright invasion by 
Communist troops of the type employed in Korea was unlikely 
elsewhere in Asia since the Communists would not be eager to 
face United Nations forces again. (Nixon's reasoning must be 
greeted with some skepticism since one can only wonder how a 
full United Nations force could be assembled if Britain,
France and the United States could not even agree on United 
Action in Indochina. Also, in 1951 during the MacArthur 
controversy, Nixon had persistently made the point that it was 
unfair that the United States dominated the U.N. contingent. 
But like any good and shrewd politician, Nixon wanted to have 
it both ways on this issue, using whatever argument would suit 
him before a particular audience.) Even more importantly, 
according to the vice president, the Eisenhower 
administration's New Look of massive retaliation would also 
deter blatant Communist aggression. Nixon spoke quite 
directly about the possible use of nuclear weapons as he 
recognized that Moscow and Peking would prefer to get the 
United States entangled again in a war with one of their 
satellites. Nixon expressed a very real, sobering truth about 
the advent of nuclear weapons, and their possible deployment 
when he said that the New Look allowed the U.S. the option not 
to "limit its reaction to meeting [Communist] aggression with
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the traditional forms of warfare in the area involved." He 
warned that such aggression would not be met "necessarily by 
fighting a satellite of the Kremlin or Peiping [Peking], 
which, of course, is part of their grand master plan." In an 
apocalyptic voice, Nixon said that the United States reserved 
the "right to meet the aggression by massive retaliation 
against the major source of the danger," meaning the Russians 
and the Chinese. Then as if to tone down the threat a bit, he 
said massive retaliation was just a possible option.
To Nixon, the real danger lay not in overt aggression and 
the crossing of borders, but through the second tactic, 
internal subversion. That was what distinguished Indochina 
from Korea. The vice president added that "In Indochina, no 
soldiers marched across the border— at least not openly and 
aggressively. None were landed on the Indochinese shore. It 
was not necessary." Such an overt tactic was not needed 
because in Indochina, the war was "inspired, controlled, and 
supported by the Communist government in Peiping and 
indirectly by the Communist government in the Soviet Union.
But the war is fought as a civil war," Nixon declared.
Nixon told the governors that China was a "classic 
example" of this second, more indirect tactic. "The free 
nations found no way to stop the Chinese civil war from 
developing into Communist domination of that country," the 
vice president said. Nixon reiterated that Indochina was the 
second example in Asia of this modus operandi and he regretted 
the fact that, in his view, the United States had not yet
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"developed in diplomacy a successful or an effective way to 
deal with this phase."
Nixon incisively understood the limitations of a NATO 
style pact for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (In the speech, 
he referred to the possibility of a "PATO" pact.) "At the 
present time," the vice president said, "there is nothing 
specific in the NATO Pact, for example, which allows it to be 
called into play to deal with this new type of aggression— a 
type of aggression which is internal in character, but which 
nevertheless is more effective and more sinister as a means of 
imperialist domination than overt aggression itself." This 
was a keen comment. Nixon was ever conscious of the 
demoralizing effect of European imperialism on the peoples of 
Asia. Here, he was again able to rhetorically link Communist 
imperialism with colonialism as a means of speaking out in 
favor of independence of the colonies as well as the hope that 
they would be free of Communist domination.
Nixon admitted that such a defense pact for Asia, while 
potentially raising morale, would virtually have no effect in 
dealing with what Nixon believed was the greater danger: 
internal subversion inspired by foreign-controlled 
revolutionaries. But this pact was to be realized later in 
1954 with the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO). It was not that Nixon opposed such 
alliances; rather, he understood their limitations in fighting 
communism.
But Nixon saw a far broader problem, namely, not just how
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to cope with the situation in Indochina, but how to avoid 
revolution in other parts of Asia, in particular, Indonesia 
and Japan. Nixon displayed a keen perception in his appraisal 
of the political situation in Asia vis-a-vis the threat of 
Communist revolution. He criticized those who thought the 
answer to all the problems of Asia was a "bowl of rice."
Nixon said such thinking is an "insult to the Asians" and that 
it was also the wrong way to look at the situation.
Nixon explained to the governors that the Asians, of 
course, did want economic progress but that independence was 
their most important aspiration. "To him (the Asian), 
independence means equality— recognition of his dignity as a 
human being." Here again, Nixon's rhetoric is imbued with 
"Wilsonian" notions as he stated his belief in national 
self-determination and his distaste for both British and 
French colonialism. Nixon added that the Communists had been 
able to convince some Asians that Communist rule would lead to 
economic progress and independence. But Nixon said that the 
Asians themselves soon came to realize the "truth" which "is 
that while the Communists talk for all of these aspirations, 
in practice they never produce. The Asians," the vice 
president continued, "have learned that when the Communists 
come into a country and take it over, instead of bringing 
independence, he brings Communist colonialism (underlining 
mine)." Then Nixon elaborated on his view of Communist 
colonialism: "Instead of bringing economic progress, he brings 
economic exploitation for the Soviet Union or Peiping."
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Nixon concluded his address with a clarion call for the 
United States to win the propaganda war by giving "the lie to 
the Communist propaganda" and to "get the truth out concerning 
how the Communists actually perform." But Nixon made the 
governors aware that the problem of Communist aggression did 
not lie in Asia and Europe alone. He exhorted the government 
to begin to pay more attention to the problems of South 
America and Africa which he believed would become ever more 
significant in the future.
He made some very revealing comments in the follow-up 
question and answer period when he emphasized that the United 
States could not "afford a further retreat in Asia" and that 
independence should eventually be granted to the Vietnamese, 
Laotians, and Cambodians. However, he offered the caveat that 
all three countries were not yet prepared to govern 
themselves, let alone fight a Communist insurgency, and that 
the Eisenhower administration should not rule out military 
intervention in Indochina. He felt strongly about this 
because he was convinced that America could deal with 
Communism only from strength. And then, although this was in 
April 1954, Nixon again criticized the remarks made by 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950 which set 
forth the defense perimeter of the United States as running 
through Japan and the Ryukyus down through the Philippines and 
Formosa. After the June 1950 invasion of South Korea by 
Communist troops from the North, Republicans had blamed 
Acheson for the war. The Republican right interpreted
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Acheson's speech as implying that the U.S. would not defend 
Korea. There was no one ever more vehement in his criticism 
of Acheson than Nixon.
Nixon remained obsessed with criticizing Acheson and 
Truman. He would not relent in his attacks on them. He told 
the governors that "In dealing with the Communists, you have 
to deal from strength; and Korea, of course, is the prime 
example. Hr. Acheson said, in effect, in January of 1950, 'We 
will not defend Korea. It is outside the defense zone of the 
United States.' Now," Nixon continued, "lots of people would 
have said under those circumstances, 'This means American boys 
won't be involved in Korea.'— wonderful thing— nobody wanted 
to fight in Korea. What happened?," Nixon asked. "Mr.
Acheson and the American people found that if you tell the 
Communists that the United States and other nations won't do 
anything to save an area, the Communists will come in. In 
June we had to go in. We went in unprepared, with terrible 
casualties," Nixon concluded. He realized that completely 
ruling out any American involvement in a war in Indochina 
would be popular politically, but he felt that it would be a 
major mistake for the U.S. to do so. He argued that even in 
considering the hypothetical case, "you must not rule out the 
possibility of the United States going in because the moment 
you do, you then appear before the Communists in a weak 
position." Nixon repeated an axiom he would often use in his 
own presidency in discussing the Vietnam War: that it was 
imperative for the United States to negotiate from a position
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of strength. As president, he would often refer to his 
efforts to achieve "peace through strength."
The vice president also stressed that America stood 
solidly for independence for the Associated States and that 
the French had finally come to that conclusion as well, but 
that they arrived too late at that realization. He recognized 
that freedom would be slow in coming but that it was possible 
for the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to eventually 
govern themselves, just as the Philippines ultimately had 
achieved independence and the ability to govern itself.
Just to be sure that he had not led his audience astray, 
Nixon drove home the point that the United States was not 
presently planning to intervene directly in Indochina. In 
fact, Nixon claimed that this very policy of leaving the 
United States's options open was designed with the explicit 
hope that the policy of strength without giving away America's 
hand would keep the country out of the war in Asia.17
On April 29 at another NSC meeting, Nixon took a different 
tack when he advocated consideration of U.S. air strikes 
against Communist positions at Dien Bien Phu. He realized 
they might not be militarily decisive but he argued that such 
action could effect opinion throughout the free world since it 
would amount to the U.S. standing firmly against the 
Communists. Nixon said the U.S. would be in the worst 
possible position if it just stood where it was at the moment 
for he especially feared that to do no more would, in essence, 
give Britain a veto over American policy in Southeast Asia.
-147-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Anglophobic Nixon still considered the British a "painful 
liability" for the U.S. in the region and he was frustrated 
that the British, by refusing to engage in "United Action," 
were in effect, obstructing American interests and "freedom of 
action" in Southeast Asia. He suggested that the U.S. look to 
nations other than the British to join a coalition against the 
Vietminh, and he was certain Thailand and the Philippines 
would join such a group along with Australia. He again spoke 
out in favor of independence for the Associated States. Nixon 
certainly was ready for some form of American armed 
intervention and, he stressed that it was wrong to think of 
such intervention in terms of the deployment of ground forces 
only rather than also considering air power.18
The NSC reconvened May 6, the day before Dien Bien Phu 
fell. Eisenhower, far less hawkish than his vice president, 
stressed that there could be no U.S. intervention in Indochina 
without congressional approval. Nixon, fully aware of the 
danger of the United States appearing to be imperialist or 
racist spoke strongly against the idea of intervention by just 
the white, imperial European powers. He argued that such 
intervention would be "almost as bad" for the U.S. as 
unilateral intervention, since the Asians would interpret it 
as "sheer colonialism."19
In the wake of the French defeat, Nixon appeared to be 
somewhat more moderate than his public image when on May 13, 
the NSC discussed legislation restricting Communists 
publishing propaganda in the U.S. and sending it through the
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mail. Nixon expressed doubt about such legislation and 
distinguished between mere Communist propaganda and criminal 
and conspiratorial acts by Communists against the government, 
where it would be more appropriate for the goverment to take 
action against them. The vice president advised the council 
that the best way to fight Communist propaganda in the U.S. 
was with the "weapons of truth and information."20
Over twenty years later, when Nixon wrote his memoirs, RN. 
he, not surprisingly, put himself in the best possible light 
in recounting the Indochina crisis. Nixon goes to some length 
to separate himself from Admiral Arthur Radford, then chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had advocated the use of 
three small tactical nuclear weapons to destroy the Vietnminh 
positions around Dien Bien Phu. Some historians, such as Fawn 
Brodie, have associated Nixon with Operation Vulture, as the 
Radford proposal to use nuclear weapons was called. Nixon 
counters that both Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles 
"felt that nothing less than overt Chinese Communist 
aggression would be sufficient provocation for our going into 
Vietnam in any such a direct and unilateral way." Nixon had 
claimed, and there is little reason to dispute this, that the. 
Communist Chinese supported the Vietminh with military 
supplies. What is interesting is that Nixon maintains that as 
early as the end of March, Eisenhower told a congressional 
leadership meeting that if the French lost their hold on Dien 
Bien Phu, the president would consider engineering some kind 
of diversion, such as allowing Chiang's Nationalist forces to
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attack China's Hainan Island or to put a naval blockade of the 
Chinese mainland into effect. But this might have been just 
another case of the president telling Old Guard, Asia Firster 
congressmen what they wanted to hear.
In RN. Nixon included a diary entry on the NSC meeting of 
April 6 which supports the position he had been taking 
publicly of acknowledging that any "united action" taken 
against overt Communist aggression "would not meet the real 
future danger in Asia" which Nixon believed was the 
"subversive aggression of the Indochina and Chinese Civil War 
type." At this particular NSC meeting, Nixon claims that he 
had suggested that Eisenhower send more than the 200 military 
technicians that had already been dispatched to Indochina. 
Nixon clearly believed that Congress and the nation would back 
such a move by Eisenhower. But Nixon ends this diary note 
with the sense that Eisenhower had already begun to back down 
from the relatively hard-line position he had enunciated to 
the congressional leadership group the week before. Nixon was 
not in agreement with his commander-in-chief but he dare not 
be insubordinate— although in effect, he went AWOL in his 
controversial remarks the following week before the editors.
Nixon recognized that the main problem on the domestic 
political scene would be in convincing the American people of 
the significance of Dien Bien Phu— that as he later wrote, 
"more was at stake than the defense of some French troops 
besieged at a colonial outpost." Nixon says that no one, 
except possibly, Radford wanted military intervention. But
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this is a bit removed from the truth for NSC minutes reveal 
that Nixon was advocating at the very least, conventional air 
strikes at the Vietminh positions surrounding the French at 
Dien Bien Phu.21
Nixon linked the crisis in Indochina to what he perceived 
as the Communist threat internationally. On the question of 
military intervention, Nixon remembered that "We were all 
convinced, however, that unless the Communists knew that their 
so-called wars of liberation would be resisted by military 
means if necessary, they would not stop until they had taken 
over Southeast Asia, just as they had Eastern Europe."
As pointed out above, Dulles failed to gain the support of 
Britain to join together to resist communism militarily with 
French and American forces in Indochina. In his memoirs,
Nixon tells a fetching anecdote that Radford went to London to 
try to get Prime Minister Winston Churchill to lend British 
military support to deal with the crisis in Southeast Asia. 
Churchill told Radford that considering that the British could 
not get their own people to fight to keep India in the British 
Empire, he certainly did not think that they would fight to 
enable the French to hold on to their colonial claim to 
Indochina. Churchill was said to have agreed that the rest of 
Indochina would fall should Vietnam be lost, but he simply did 
not see any threat to the remainder of Southeast Asia, Japan, 
or Australia. Nixon says that he was "astonished" by 
Churchill's position considering that this was the same man 
who in 1946 issued the caveat to the West that an "Iron
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Curtain" had fallen separating Eastern Europe from the West.
In his memoirs, Nixon does not make too much of the flap 
over the ASNE convention speech in Washington on April 16. 
Nixon must have well understood that the comments would be 
taken as some sort of trial balloon, despite his disclaimer in 
the 1965 interview. What is most telling is that Nixon was 
"concerned" that Eisenhower might be upset by the incident.
But it is highly unlikely that Nixon, experienced Washington 
hand that he was, was naive enough to think that such a bold, 
controversial statement would go unreported.
Nixon then describes the meeting of the National Security 
Council which took place on April 29. At that meeting, Harold 
Stassen proposed that the United States act unilaterally by 
sending U.S. ground troops into battle in Indochina. Nixon 
notes that he countered Stassen*s argument at the time by 
pointing out that winning the war in Vietnam did not 
necessarily have to be based on a strategy of committing 
ground troops. Nixon, writing in 1978, and in concurrence 
with the NSC minutes of the meeting, says that he believed an 
air strike representing a united alliance would send a message 
to the Communists that there was resolve on the part of 
America to fight more expansion as well as serve as a means to 
boost the morale of the French and Vietnamese troops. (One 
must wonder about this for after all, although they had been 
allies early in their careers, Stassen was hardly a favorite 
of Nixon's since he had tried to dump Nixon from the ticket in 
1956. Perhaps Nixon wanted to take advantage of using his
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memoirs to extract a little revenge by painting Stassen as an 
extremist, while portraying himself as far more moderate— when 
in fact, Nixon would have quite possibly been willing to 
resort to nuclear weapons to defeat the Communists in 
Indochina.) Nixon also records that he broached the idea to 
the NSC of trying to develop a coalition in the Pacific which 
would include the British, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Indochina, Australia, and New Zealand. Nixon was clearly 
thinking along the lines of the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), a group which came into being later in 
1954, but which the NSC minutes showed he had some 
reservations about.
Nixon also discusses another meeting in late April 1954, 
shortly after the NSC meeting recounted above. This was a 
meeting that included Eisenhower, Nixon, and General Robert 
Cutler who served as Ike's special assistant for national 
security affairs. Cutler apparently said that the NSC 
planning board had been considering informing our allies that 
if we did go into Indochina, we might use nuclear weapons.
Nixon writes that when Eisenhower asked him what he thought of
such a plan, Nixon responded that he did not think it was
necessary to tell our allies such a thing before they had all
agreed on United Action. Nixon then goes on to write that he 
"emphasized" that it might be feasible to have some 
conventional air strikes.22
But Stephen Ambrose and Fawn Brodie, in their separate 
biographies of Nixon, virtually accuse the then-vice president
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of covering up. Both historians portray him as favoring 
United States military intervention, even if such a step would 
have to be made unilateraly. Brodie, in particular, also 
painted a portrait of a Nixon who was more than willing to use
nuclear weapons, as a last resort to "save" Vietnam.23
In May, the French suffered their ignominious defeat at 
Dien Bien Phu and during July of 1954, a settlement was made 
at Geneva which divided Vietnam in two. The United States 
refused to sign the agreement and Nixon claims that a month
before the signing, he had "urged Dulles not to be part of any
settlement that would result in the surrender of any part of 
Indochina to the Communists." Nixon, reflecting on the 
crisis, and the way it was perceived by the press, wrote in 
his memoirs that he, Dulles, and Radford were portrayed as the 
hawks in the Indochina crisis. He conceded that "to some 
extent Radford did believe that the early use of tactical 
nuclear weapons would convince the Communists that we meant 
business." (There is nothing like slight political 
understatement.) As for the secretary of state and himself, 
Nixon said they "both believed that if the Communists pushed 
too far we would have to do whatever was necessary to stop 
them. Eisenhower fully agreed, although I think that Dulles 
and I were probably better prepared to stand up at an earlier 
point than he was." That was as far as he went in saying he 
disagreed with the president. And in a further invocation of 
his die-hard belief in peace through strength, Nixon concluded 
that "We all hoped that by being prepared to fight we would
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never actually have to do any fighting.11,24
Nixon had glossed over the incident. (The relatively 
recent declassification of a number of sensitive government 
documents from the period indicate that Radford was quite 
prepared to employ nuclear weapons to defeat the Communists in 
Vietnam and again in 1955 during the first Formosan Strait 
Crisis.25) But what Nixon neglects to say is that he, too, 
would have been ready to use nuclear arms at least in 
Indochina. Eisenhower was far more restrained, no matter how 
neo-revisionists like Gordon Chang and H.W. Brands, Jr. 
portray him.
Ambrose offers an incisive view of Nixon and the 1954 
Indochina crisis. He claims that Nixon's interest in foreign 
affairs grew, largely as a result of the trip he and Pat had 
taken to Asia the previous fall. Also, Ambrose indicates that 
1954 was the year when Nixon drew closer to Dulles. Nixon 
gave Dulles advice on the Far East and the vice president 
recounted that they often would meet for drinks and talk late 
into the night about the international situation. They shared 
the same distrust of Nehru and feared that he would lead the 
non-aligned nations closer to the Soviet Union.
Nixon's chief concern was Asia, and this was at a time 
when the Korean War had ended and it could be argued that the 
State Department was far more concerned with Europe and 
building up the NATO alliance against the perceived military 
threat of the Soviets.
Ambrose does not see the ASNE speech as a mere trial
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balloon sent up to get a sense of how the American people felt 
about the possibility of intervening in Vietnam. Rather, 
Ambrose maintains that Nixon was trying to "jolt" Eisenhower 
into supporting United States military action in Vietnam.
And, Nixon had already proposed that the United States not 
sign any accord at Geneva that would lead to the division of 
Vietnam.
The Indochina crisis was, according to Ambrose, Nixon's 
"first major foray into foreign policy" and he observed the 
following about Nixon's actions and positions during that 
crucial time. First, Nixon was unable to persuade Eisenhower 
to order the type of intervention that Nixon wanted. Second, 
he was not afraid to argue for the course of action he 
believed in, despite that fact that he realized that it was 
not what Eisenhower wanted to hear. Also, he put himself out 
on a limb politically, when he spoke in favor of the 
possibility of sending ground troops to Indochina. Ambrose 
claims that Nixon was the only elected politician to do so. 
Finally, at a relatively early age and after only a short time 
as vice president, Nixon had made a commitment to keeping 
Indochina out of the hands of the Communists— a commitment he 
would continue to fight vigilantly for when he ascended to the 
presidency.26
But above and beyond the Ambrose interpretation, what is 
particularly striking about the Nixon position on Vietnam in 
1954 is how consistent it was with his later stand as 
president as well as his perspective 10 years after his
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resignation, when he wrote the polemic No More Vietnams. He 
always stressed the importance of the Vietnamese bearing the 
brunt of the fighting if they were to win as proposed in his 
"Vietnamization" program and the importance of the U.S. 
achieving "peace through strength" and "peace with honor" 
which he hoped would ensure a "generation of peace." Nixon 
knew better than most politicians before, during and after his 
presidency that defeat in Vietnam would have devastating 
ramifications on America's power in the world. As Nixon 
himself often would put it, the "easy" thing would have been 
simply to withdraw but he was concerned not just with the 
current situation but its bearing on the future. Nixon's 
refusal to cave into public opinion for immediate withdrawal 
as president was indeed, nothing less than an act of political 
courage.27
On June 12, Nixon returned to his alma mater, Whittier 
College, to accept an honorary degree. Nixon gave a speech in 
which he combined praise for the Quaker school with a detailed 
assessment on United States foreign policy. However, the day 
was marred when two lines formed after the speech— one, for 
those who wished to shake the vice president's hand, and one 
for those who did not. It certainly was an embarrasing 
incident for Nixon and served as an example of the kind of 
divisiveness he was capable of arousing.
In his speech on the campus, Nixon basically summed up his 
outlook on the struggle between the United States and the
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Communist: world. Much of what he said had been included in 
other speeches that year. But Nixon also spoke out in favor 
of integration and lauded the recent Brown v. Board of 
Education Supreme Court decision which declared segregation in 
the nation's public schools unconstitutional.28 He was 
being consistent with his stand in a nationally televised 
address the previous December when he urged the American 
people to be more racially tolerant. Now, this certainly was 
not the popular stand nationally either by most Republicans 
and certainly not for Democrats, those from the South and even 
the 1952 Democratic candidate for president, Governor Adlai 
Stevenson of Illinois. (In fact, one of Stevenson's major 
political problems in 1952 was that he was perceived in the 
South as being too liberal on the race issue. By 1956, 
Stevenson would hold back to some degree on civil rights in an 
effort to mollify Southern Democrats.29) There is no 
denying that Nixon was certainly ahead of his time (for the 
mid-1950s) on race relations.
In homiletic terms, Nixon spoke to his youthful audience 
of the great promise of the future and he emphasized that 
expectations for a better world could only be realized if 
there was peace all around the world. Nixon saw the world as 
either black or white: namely, that the United States stood 
for peace while the Communist world stood for aggression. The 
vice president remarked that "There is only one threat to 
world peace, the one that is presented by the internationalist 
Communist conspiracy with its power center in the Soviet
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Union." Nixon saw the ultimate objection of the Communists as 
gaining a "balance of power which will enable them either to 
begin a world war they can win, or to force the free world to 
surrender to their domination without a war."
Nixon then praised what Dulles had frequently called 
"Peace Without Surrender." The vice president went on to 
explain how America could achieve the goal articulated by 
Dulles. He realized that America could not act unilaterally 
and that in order to combat communism, the United States 
needed allies around the world. In addition, as a sine qua 
non, he believed that the country had to maintain its military 
strength. He again recited the policy of massive retaliation 
to deter communism by saying, "In the event of future overt 
aggression, we may in our discretion, use our mobile 
retaliatory power against the source of aggression, not 
because we want an atomic war but because we want to avert the 
conditions which might bring one about."
Nixon also described what he considered to be the unique 
nature of America. He clearly defined the nation within the 
realm of "American exceptionalism" and offered an analogy to 
"salesmanship" as a means for communicating the benefits of 
the "American Way" around the world. "We Americans have a 
good cause to sell in Asia and everywhere in the world. We 
are a world power, but we are unique among history's great 
world powers in that the United States wants nothing from any 
other country, no land, no concessions, just friendship and 
peaceful relations." He added that the United States and the
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free world needed to "associate ourselves unequivocably and 
directly with these great causes other people believe in and 
that we believe in— peace, equality, independence, and 
economic progress." Here, Nixon expressed the heart of 
classic American idealistic thought in foreign affairs, the 
very point of view which would be attacked in the 1960s and 
1970s by revisionist historians who saw American foreign 
policy chiefly as the quest to expand foreign markets for 
American goods. But what Nixon was actually doing here was to 
attack indirectly the French and the British for their desire 
to retain their colonies.
Nixon ended his address on an optimistic note, expressing 
his view that we could "win the battles for men's minds" if we 
could convince the non-aligned world that we are for freedom 
and independence. Nixon believed that if only the facts could 
be told, then the people of Asia, Africa and South America 
would rally around the United States.30 Considering how 
detailed and intricate his position on fighting the Vietminh 
had actually been, the Nixon speaking at Whittier seemed a bit 
less worldly as he attempted to provide the remedy for 
Communist aggression without taking into account the nuances 
and differences in the political and economic situations in 
the various countries. Although Nixon did see the ideological 
conflict between the free world and communism to a large 
degree in black and white terms, his insight was far more 
intricate than he let on to his audience that day. Herbert S. 
Parmet suggests that this signified one of Nixon's
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complexities; namely, that his thinking was often more 
sophisticated than the rhetoric he employed both publicly and 
privately. The historian maintains that Nixon, ever aware of 
the subtleties, often kept them to himself, and in this 
instance was also gauging his Whittier audience.
On June 26 in Milwaukee, Nixon delivered another foreign 
policy address which again stirred up discontent and criticism 
from Democrats— many of whom were willing to work with the 
Republican administration on a number of issues. Nixon gave 
yet another speech in which he went on the attack against 
Truman and Acheson by saying that the Truman administration 
had not been able to stop the Communists from winning China. 
Nixon continued to link the fall of China to the onset of the 
war in Korea and the dismal situation in Indochina. Nixon had 
been blaming Acheson and Truman for the loss of China for five 
years. It was a theme he relished but it alienated many 
Democrats whose support Eisenhower needed on Capitol Hill.
This particular speech had offended Representative Sam 
Rayburn, the former speaker of the house who was then serving 
as minority leader but would resume the speakership in the 
next Congress. Rayburn was a key player on The Hill and he 
certainly was one whom Eisenhower did not want to alienate 
since the president depended on both Rayburn and Senate 
Minority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson, another Texan, to 
support him. What is more is that Rayburn and Johnson's style 
concerning Eisenhower was conciliatory when the Democrats were 
in the minority, and even when their party regained a majority
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in Congress.31
Rayburn reportedly had said that if Nixon repeated those 
allegations against the Truman administration, that the 
bipartisan foreign policy on The Hill would be jeopardized.
At a June 30 press conference, Eisenhower defended Nixon when 
a question came up regarding the vice president's latest 
flap— but it was a lukewarm response filled with 
"Eisenhowerese" in which the president stated his admiration 
for Nixon yet refused either to endorse or to repudiate what 
Nixon had said.32
Actually, the day before following a meeting of the 
"Speech Committee" in the president's office, Eisenhower had 
asked Nixon to stay behind for further discussion. The 
president criticized Nixon's Milwaukee speech. Eisenhower 
spoke harshly to Nixon about his "castigation" of the 
Democrats over foreign policy. The president pointed out to 
his protegee that Dulles had been seeking bipartisan support 
and that one Democrat had indicated that his party was 
"smarting" over Nixon's comments in Wisconsin. Nixon defended 
himself before this one-man tribunal by saying he had not 
attacked the Democrats, but only Acheson. But if Acheson was 
not representative of the Democrats, who was? Nixon told the 
president that he feared that the memories of the people were 
"very short" and that he wanted to get the idea across that 
the Republican administration's leadership could not be 
compared to what he termed the "Acheson program." Eisenhower 
retorted that although there were Democrats who did not back
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Acheson*s policies when he ran State, they felt that any 
criticism of the former secretary reflected on them. The 
president was concerned that Nixon's effusive combativeness 
might threaten the essential support from Democrats that 
Eisenhower required if he wanted to see his foreign policy 
program steered through Congress. Nixon defended himself by 
replying that "bipartisanship" in foreign policy had not 
applied in years past to Asia, but only to Europe and that 
Dulles and Eisenhower had criticized the Asian policy of their 
predecessors.33 Nixon again was being consistent here for 
even as the bete noire of the Truman administration over Asian 
policy, he had frequently qualified that opposition in public 
by stating unequivocably that he backed the Democrats's 
European policy. What is striking about this episode is that 
Nixon held his own in answering Eisenhower's criticism.
But Nixon was losing the standing and good press he had 
gained as a result of his Asian trip the year before. James 
Reston wrote The New York Times that Nixon had "steadily 
squandered what seemed to be the most promising political 
reputation in the Republican party." What particularly was 
impolitic of Nixon, according to "Scotty" Reston, was that the 
Milwaukee speech embarrassed Eisenhower and Dulles while they 
were holding sensitive talks in Washington with British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill. The British were quite disturbed 
over the policy of "massive retaliation" and Nixon, 
undoubtedly eager to please his partisan audience in Joe 
McCarthy's home state, praised the policy which only served to
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underscore key Anglo-American differences at the time. And 
Nixon's attack on the "Acheson policy" was privately 
criticized by the State Department and the White House, Reston 
said. The preeminent Washington columnist also scored Nixon 
for having boasted just months before that the U.S. had seized 
the "initiative" from the Communists only to see Dien Bien Phu 
fall within a matter of weeks after that statement and the 
Communists triumph at Geneva. Reston also criticized Nixon's 
"off-the-record" remarks regarding the possibility of sending 
U.S. ground troops to Indochina. The journalist concluded 
that Dulles was having enough problems at the moment without 
having the situation complicated by a "partisan argument 
provoked by his own Vice President." The Washington Post 
criticized Nixon in an editorial, indirectly defending the 
former secretary of state by saying "China was lost by the 
Chinese to some other Chinese" and objected to the vice 
president's "meanly partisan" approach. The New Republic's 
TRB thought Nixon's Milwaukee speech was indicative of 
Republican desperation entering into the 1954 congressional 
campaign and was a "pretty low performance" coming as it did, 
in the middle of Churchill's visit to Washington. TRB 
predicted that the GOP would try to counter the "disagreeable 
loss of Indochina" with what he cleverly referred to as more 
"Acheson." The columnist also believed that Eisenhower 
condoned the Nixon technique since he had called the vice 
president a "splendid American" in dealing with press 
questions on the Milwaukee address.34 But this time around,
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TRB misinterpreted the nuances of "Eisenhowerese," which was 
precisely the objective of the president whenever he resorted 
to that deliberately inscrutable dialect.
On July 1, Republican uneasiness surfaced again in 
Congress over the administration's position vis-a-vis the 
admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Senate 
Majority Leader William Knowland, of California, warned the 
administration not to alter its policy. Knowland threatened 
to resign from his leadership position and devote all of his 
energy to trying to attain U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. 
should the administration waver on this issue. The "Senator 
from Formosa" received strong support from other Republicans 
ostensibily wary of any change regarding China policy, most 
notably Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, the "dean" of 
the Senate who happened to chair the extremely significant and 
politically potent Senate Appropriations Committee.
Knowland was concerned that if Congress adjourned as 
planned by the end of July (and with the next Congress not 
scheduled to convene until January 1955), there might be a 
move to accept Communist China in the United Nations, or the 
administration might passively allow its entrance by not 
blocking it. Knowland was an unabashed Asia Firster who was 
skeptical about continued American involvement in Europe. He 
threatened that should Communist China gain entry into the 
U.N., he would lead a movement in the Senate to cut off 
military aid to France and Italy unless those two nations 
ratified the European Defense Community Treaty, a step that
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obviously would impede the NATO alliance (The French were 
holding back not just because of Gallic recalcitrance and 
desire to go their own way but because of their deep, and 
understandable, reservations about German rearmament as part 
of the pact.)*
What is especially striking about Knowland's comments is 
that he seemed unduly suspicious that Dulles might cave in and 
idly stand by while Communist China entered the United 
Nations. Knowland urged that Dulles act to reappraise 
American foreign policy and he feared that there was a 
movement afoot in the United Nations to admit Communist 
China. Knowland's position was interpreted by one New York 
Times reporter to mean that Knowland expected the secretary of 
state to do all he could to ensure that our allies be 
persuaded not to grant Peking membership into the 
international body.35
This was all just so much political posturing on the part 
of Knowland, who explained to Dulles by phone that he thought 
it necessary to say what he did because he thought the 
government might not be able to go that far. He was another 
anglophobe of the Old Guard who was concerned that the British 
government, in the wake of the Churchill-Eden trip to 
Washington, might bear too much influence on the 
administration's China policy. From the way Knowland spoke on 
the Senate floor, one might have thought he was criticizing 
Truman and Acheson as if they both still held office rather 
than Eisenhower and Dulles. Also at play behind the scenes
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here was the growing rivalry between the two gentlemen from 
California, Knowland and Nixon. The press was already 
speculating that should Eisenhower decline to seek reelection, 
the two Californians would do battle for the Republican 
nomination in 1956. Knowland, it would seem, wanted to seize 
the initiative and preempt Nixon from the right on China.36
Nixon, also only too aware of the potential political heat 
from the right on the China issue, told Dulles as well that 
some thought the U.S. had "made a deal with the British." Nor 
did Nixon care for the impression made by the Knowland 
statement that America was giving in. The vice president said 
he would like to reiterate previous administration positions 
on the issue, as if to suggest the need to clarify it. But 
Dulles, more of a realist than a liberationist here, pointed 
out to Nixon that policy statements regarding China were 
generally couched so that "we would not be committed for all 
time." Was Dulles abandoning the purity of the faith? Not 
exactly. He fully understood that Red China was an enemy of 
the U.N. and under the circumstances could not be admitted to 
the organization. But the lawyer from Sullivan and Cromwell 
was privately considering the long view and did not want to be 
locked into any position that ruled out future change.37
On July 7, less than a week after Knowland's "ultimatum," 
Eisenhower held a news conference in which he denounced the 
Communist regime in Peking and pledged to fight to keep 
Communist China out of the United Nations. But as James 
Reston reported in The New York Times. Eisenhower was
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unwilling to go so far as to say in advance that the United 
States would withdraw from the body should the Communist 
Chinese be allowed to join. According to Heston, Ike did not 
explicitly indicate that the United States would stay in the 
U.N. should China be voted in. Rather, Eisenhower said that 
his decision would depend on "Whether we would accomplish more 
good in the world, whether we could advance the cause of peace 
and decency better by going out than by staying in." This was 
again the invocation of the standard Eisenhower "party line" 
which he used to try to keep the isolationists and Asia 
Firsters mollified while remaining true to his own 
internationalist principles.
Eisenhower listed a number of United States grievances 
against the Chinese. Among these were Eisenhower's feeling 
that the Communist Chinese had "excoriated" the United Nations 
at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, as well as 
their supporting the Communists in Indochina. Also,
Eisenhower raised the issue of the Communist Chinese still 
holding American prisoners from the Korean War.38
Eisenhower's comments served to soothe somewhat the 
temperamental Knowland although the majority leader said that 
he would have been more satisfied if the United States would 
say right out that the admission of Communist China to the 
U.N. would be cause enough for the United States to withdraw 
from it. A compromise was afoot as Senate Minority Leader 
Lyndon B. Johnson and Knowland reportedly were hammering out a 
resolution that would urge a review of the nation's foreign
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policy by the National Security Council should Communist China 
be admitted, rather than simply withdrawing from the U.N. 
Knowland was willing to go along with this although he would 
have preferred a still stronger statement of American resolve 
to withdraw should the Communist Chinese be seated at the 
United Nations.
At this stage, it was quite apparent, even to the less 
politically sophisticated, that Communist China and American 
policy in Asia were going to emerge again as an issue in the 
mid-term elections set for November 1954. Most Republicans 
and Democrats were indeed opposed to the admission of 
Communist China to the U.N. but each party was trying to take 
the intiative on the issue and make the proper political pose 
that would head off the opposition at the pass. William S. 
White, writing in The New York Times, said that the 
Republicans were initially on the defensive since the 
Eisenhower administration had not been able to keep all of 
Indochina within the realm of the free world. As a result, 
politicians of the G.O.P. were returning to the rhetoric that 
scourged Truman and Acheson, and no Republican was more 
effective in this dubious game than Nixon. By July 7, even a 
relatively "moderate" internationalist Eastern Establishment 
Republican like Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, 
issued a statement supporting what Nixon had said in the 
controversial Milwaukee speech. But the senator was 
gentlemanly enough not to mention Acheson by name. Yet, it 
was clear that Smith had adopted the "Nixon thesis" that the
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policies of Truman and Acheson had led to Korea and that the 
Korean War had led to the 1954 crisis in Indochina.39
Not surprisingly, as the Geneva Accords were being 
prepared for signing later that month, Nixon continued to take 
the hard-line against the Communists in Indochina. He advised 
Dulles not to go to Geneva and advocated that the U.S. not be 
a signatory of the agreement, the latter a position that the 
administration ultimately took (and frankly, would have taken 
no matter what the vice president had thought on the matter). 
Nixon feared that if the U.S. was represented at the signing 
of the treaty, it would look as if the country "was giving 
respectability or be a part of a deal which we don't believe 
in." Nixon, again knowing the political bottom line, pointed 
out to Dulles that they had been critical of their 
"predecessors" over matters like this, implying Yalta and 
Potsdam.40 Nixon should have known. He was the Republican 
point man against the Truman Asia policy and Yalta, which was 
a pejorative word for the right. Now, that his party was in 
power, Nixon evidently did not want to see the GOP in the spot 
he had worked so hard to put the Democrats in.
In an August 2 Philadelphia speech to the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, Nixon culled a lesson from the recent Indochina 
experience: namely, that even if the U.S. had been "10 times 
as strong militarily" it would not have made any difference to 
the final outcome there because the problem was one of 
internal revolution rather than overt aggression. Because of 
that factor, Nixon again argued that a mutual defense pact
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treaty like NATO would not have saved Indochina either. He 
also did not think that more economic and military aid to 
Vietnam would have made a major difference. Nixon was showing 
his awareness of fighting Communist rebellion instigated from 
within an Asian country as well as simply meeting the 
perceived threat from without. He implored the veterans to 
"recapture the spirit of the American Revolution" so that the 
United States could be a symbol for free men everywhere. But 
there was even a limit to how far the American Revolution 
could go. Nixon understood that the U.S. could not expect the 
whole world to adopt the American political and economic 
systems. (Was he making an early concession to the notion of ' 
"peaceful coexistence"? It certainly seemed a realistic step 
or two away from "Liberation" and "Rollback.") He merely 
wanted to convince the world that the best hope lay not in 
dictatorship and tyranny but in a society in which nations are 
independent and men free (Politicians were allowed to use the 
generic term for "mankind" in those days.).41
That year there had been serious flooding in China and 
Dulles and Nixon discussed the possibility of disaster 
relief. Nixon thought it was "worth a gamble" and suggested 
it be done through the Red Cross but he realized that proposal 
might be "jumped on" by a few in Congress, such as Knowland or 
Judd.42 Working directly in conjunction with Peking even to 
alleviate the damage done by a natural disaster carried the 
danger of being interpreted as a change in policy on the 
recognition question. The important thing to note here is
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that Nixon and Dulles both wanted to offer some form of aid to 
China but they were wary of alienating the China Bloc. But 
here, as in so many other instances, Nixon was not so clearly 
in the China Lobby's "Amen Corner." He had to consider its 
point of view but he did not necessarily believe privately in 
such a permanent and ardently fought hard-line.
As autumn arrived, Nixon was back out on the political 
hustings, taking the low road with his incessant attacks 
against the Democrats. The campaign aroused many Democrats to 
charge that Nixon had smeared their party with McCarthyite 
tactics, questioning the loyalty of members of the nation's 
oldest continuously functioning political party. Nixon 
certainly did take the low read throughout the campaign, but 
when the situation suited him, he could make an effort to 
appear to claim the higher ground even when it was a means of 
slinging mud at the Democrats. For instance, in Cincinnati in 
early September, Nixon exhorted conservative and liberal 
Republicans to unite for the sacred cause of party and said 
that such unity would make demands upon conservatives to alter 
their position if indeed, the party wanted victory. . But he 
then employed his by now famous scare tactics along with what 
passed for his own sense of humor when he privately told a GOP 
group the same day that if Republicans failed to win the 
congressional elections that year, "the swing is going to be 
completely to the left and the Republican Party will be as 
dead as the dodo bird."43
Nixon arguably reached his ebb point in the campaign in
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October when he charged that there was an alliance between 
Communists and left-wing Democrats of the Americans for 
Democratic Action. Nixon had really resorted to mud-slinging 
here since the ADA was comprised of just those very liberal 
Democrats who were opposed to communism. But the smearing of 
the opposition with pink had proved to be a reliable 
vote-getting tactic for Nixon until then, and he was not about 
to abandon it for a higher level, less visceral attack on the 
Democrats. The responsibility to be fair and accurate was not 
important to Nixon the campaigner. Only winning mattered.
And since so much of Eisenhower's appeal lay in the general 
seemingly being above poltics, it was left for Nixon to make 
the kind of attacks that would have reduced Eisenhower's 
stature had the president, himself, uttered them. Although 
Eisenhower, against his better judgment, eventually campaigned 
that fall but never in the raw partisan manner of Nixon. The 
vice president was still the general's point man.
The New York Times reported on October 23 that while out 
in the Western states, "the Nixon forces made no secret of 
their desire to start a fight with the Democrats over the 
communism-in-govemment issue." It had been ungentlemanly 
enough for Nixon to have accused Representative Jerry Voorhis 
of receiving Communist support in Nixon's first run for 
Congress in 1946— support that came from a small committee 
within the congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
membership endorsing Voorhis. At least in that campaign, 
there was some truth to what Nixon charged, no matter how
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ungenteel the method (not to mention, as Parmet argues, 
Voorhis's own political ineptitude and procrastination in 
fending off those charges). Nixon has been continually 
criticized for his conduct in the Voorhis campaign, and later 
in the 1950 California Senate campaign when he relentlessly 
attacked Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas. As scurrilous 
as Nixon was, he at least had the facts in his favor when he 
charged that Mrs. Douglas had voted against the Truman 
Doctrine to aid Greece and Turkey. In the 1950 campaign, no 
matter how distasteful the infamous "Pink Sheet" was, Douglas 
was vulnerable for not having backed Truman on Greek and 
Turkish aid. But when one reads portions of Nixon's speech 
linking the ADA with the Communists, one cannot help but feel 
that Nixon, resolutely dedicated Republican that he was, had 
gone too far.
In a statement released in Bozeman, Montana, on October 
23, Nixon said "It is time to talk bluntly about the most 
sinister development of this campaign to date." He went on to 
mention four points on which the ADA and Communist Party 
agreed, as if this really meant that there was a conspiracy 
between the two. Nixon decried them both for "1) Calling for 
the recognition of Communist China just before the Korean War;
2) Attacking the Eisenhower security program; 3) Calling for 
the abolition of the committee (i.e., HUAC) which convicted 
Alger Hiss; and 4) constant sniping at J. Edgar Hoover and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation." (This was the same treatment 
he had dished out to Douglas when he compared her voting
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record to Socialist Congressman Vito Marcantonio— drawing an 
invidious comparison between the two when they were really 
quite distinct from one another. Douglas actually tried to 
turn the same trick on Nixon by charging that he and 
Marcantonio both voted against aid to Korea in 1949. However, 
she neglected to explain that Nixon had opposed the measure 
because he objected to the bill not also including a provision 
for aid to Taiwan. When such assistance was added to a 
revised bill, Nixon backed it. One would have to think 
Marcantonio•s rationale for his negative vote came from a 
markedly different point of view.) Although Nixon was quick 
to point out that the majority of Democrats and Republicans 
were loyal Americans, he said that Democrats should repudiate 
the ADA. Nixon topped off this speech by claiming that 
Democratic National Committee Chairman Stephen Mitchell had 
said that if the Congress went Democratic, it would go back to 
the Truman policies. (The Democrats could hardly be expected 
to say that they intended to carry on with the Eisenhower 
program.) Certainly, Nixon was not being fair to the ADA 
whose ranks were composed of liberals who were definitively 
anti-Communist, the very raison d'etre for their forming the 
organization in the first place— as a liberal alternative to 
communism.
Nixon just could not let up on Truman and Acheson. He 
again linked Acheson to the loss of China and accused Truman 
of trying to shield Hiss. Nixon also scourged the Truman 
"so-called 'loyalty order' under which," the Republican
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claimed, "individuals with clear Communist records" were 
retained in government jobs. In addition, Nixon accused the 
Truman administration of also refusing to cooperate with J. 
Edgar Hoover and the FBI.44 In short, this statement 
revealed Nixon at his absolute worst. It was these kinds of 
attacks that made so many in the opposition despise him. What 
must have really hurt the combative Nixon was that despite 
going for the jugular, the Republicans lost both the House and 
Senate in the 1954 election. If anything, since he had 
emerged as the most visible Republican spokesman other than 
the president, he was largely blamed for the loss of both the 
House and the Senate to the Democrats.45
Nixon reserved his most vicious wrath for his old enemy, 
the titular head of the Democratic Party, Adlai Stevenson. He 
tried to tarnish Stevenson by resorting to following his 
favorite formula of claiming Stevenson and the Democrats 
wanted to bring America back to the much-maligned policies of 
Truman and Acheson.. Then, to try to rub the knife ever deeper 
into the Democrats, Nixon claimed that the 80th Congress 
(which Truman had called the "do-nothing Congress" on his way 
to the biggest presidential election upset victory in American 
history) had actually saved the country from programs which he 
said would have socialized medicine, housing, water, 
agriculture and atomic energy. There was never any love lost 
between Truman and Nixon, nor Nixon and Stevenson for that 
matter. But the Democrats were to have the last laugh in 1954 
just as they had in 1948.46
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Eisenhower and Nixon both appeared on national television 
on Election Eve. Nixon had traveled some 25,000 miles to 38 
states and 85 major cities since he hit the campaign trail in 
earnest September 15. The president made a harmonious, 
non-partisan plea to get out the vote. Nixon, while not 
nearly as vitriolic as he had been just a few days before, 
urged the American people to keep both the House and Senate in 
the hands of the Republicans. The vice president, who had 
used the Communist issue to its extreme in the campaign and 
had continued to snipe at Truman and Acheson as if they were 
running, now merely called past Democratic administrations 
"blind" rather than questioning their loyalty to the country.
In a separately prepared statement, Nixon attacked the 
Democrats for using "the Big Lie technique" as the key to 
their election strategy. Although he cut out all references 
to Stevenson, Truman and Acheson in the televised address, he 
kept the references in his written statement and they were 
caustic. Nixon said that the first, perhaps most important, 
"Big Lie" that the Democrats propounded was that the 
Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy had failed. Nixon countered 
with his old standby that the Truman administration had gotten 
us into war and that the Eisenhower administration had gotten 
us out. Nixon also defended the Eisenhower security program 
as necessary to protect the nation. The vice president did 
not let up on his attempt to label the Americans for 
Democratic Action as an extremist left-wing group and he 
charged the Stevenson campaign with using "smear" tactics,
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which was the very charge the Stevenson camp had laid at his 
door! (There was no small amount of audacity in the yice 
president.) Nixon defended himself by saying he did not 
engage in smear tactics because what he was charging against 
the Democrats was the truth.47 Needless to say, even when 
young Mr. Nixon tried to be somewhat non-partisan, he was 
still too extreme in his attacks on the opposition. Nixon did 
what he felt had to be done to win elections and he took the 
low road also because Eisenhower would have demeaned himself 
and the presidency if he had followed Nixon's suit.
After the election, Gerald W. Johnson wrote in The New 
Republic that Nixon had "used himself up" in the campaign and 
predicted he would go the way of Henry Wallace in 1944. 
(Nixon's opponents and critics have always underestimated his 
staying power, resilience, his urge for renewal, or as he, 
himself, would put it, his desire to be "in the arena.") 
Johnson believed that Eisenhower had been hurt by the election 
because he had campaigned when his instinct was to have stayed 
above politics, above party. The writer believed Eisenhower 
was persuaded by Nixon, and others, to depart from the high 
ground.48
Robert Bendiner pointed out in The Reporter that Richard 
Nixon had claimed the mantle of the new "Mr. Republican" with 
his "unique flexibility" whose chief political principle was 
the survival of the GOP. Electorally speaking, Bendiner said, 
Nixon had rejected the Taftite idea that Republicans could win 
only if they brought out the full conservative vote as well as
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the avant garde notion that the GOP could only win by stealing 
liberal votes from the Democrats. Bendiner correctly 
understood Nixon as being more in the center, using "both 
approaches, letting neither hand know what the other doeth." 
But this was old hat strategy for Nixon going back to the 1946 
and 1950 campaigns when he eagerly sought Democratic votes to 
augment his conservative base. On the major issue of Nixon's 
stands on the Far East, the journalist wrote that if any 
position on the Far East is taken, "you can find a Nixon 
quotation to back you up." Bendiner pointed to Nixon's March 
speech when he said the Eisenhower administration would never 
allow "the Communists to nibble us to death all over the world 
in little wars" like Korea while he turned around the 
following month before the ASNE to say that the U.S. would 
have to face up to its responsibility to send in ground troops 
rather than lose Vietnam to the Communists. Bendiner asked 
the obvious stinging question: if that was not another little 
war, what was?49
But Bendiner and many other Nixon critics missed the 
complexities and nuances inherent in the evolution of Nixon's 
strategy for American policy in Asia. It was not just the 
difference between the private and public Nixon that Bendiner 
did not see. He failed to follow the flow of Nixon's public 
arguments, such as Indochina not being analogous to Korea 
because the threat in Vietnam was internal revolution, not 
overt aggression. Nor did Bendiner seem to catch on to 
Nixon's recognition of the ultimate weakness of regional
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military pacts in the fight against internal subversion in 
Asia. And it is quite unlikely that Bendiner necessarily knew 
that privately, at the time, Nixon advocated consideration of 
renewing trade with China.
After nearly two years as vice president, the world 
certainly seemed more complex than it had from the House or 
Senate floor during the Great Debate following the MacArthur 
dismissal. If his critics saw Nixon as overly simplistic, 
that was not necessarily bad for him politically. A 
politician like Nixon needed criticism to keep his own vision 
sharp, to keep himself honed for political battle. And many 
of the enemies Nixon made were perceived to be the enemies of 
his constituency as well. One would never praise the Nixon of 
the 1954 campaign because he was vicious and he certainly 
seemed to have done himself, the president, and the Republican 
Party damage. But the damage was not irreparable and Nixon 
would emerge intact and go on to outlast most of his 
detractors. He did his best to put a good spin on the defeat 
in a post-election interview with U.S. News and World 
Report.50 And for those critics who say he further alienated 
Eisenhower due to the 1954 campaign, they are not looking at 
the reality that Eisenhower never liked Nixon and after 
Checkers his hand was forced politically by the clever Nixon 
to keep him on the ticket. Nixon would survive the downspin 
of the mid-term elections that year just as he would survive 
on the ticket in 1956 and survive two crushing defeats to rise 
phoenix-like from the ashes and finally claim the presidency
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as his own in 1968.
Nixon was evolving, ever learning throughout this entire 
process. It was in essence, a gestation period, in which he 
was formulating a position on Asia that was in reality not 
inconsistent as Bendiner proposed, but just the opposite. 
Nixon's consistency on China— always couching his language in 
terms which would not lead him down a blind alley absolutely 
ruling out reconciliation— ultimately allowed him to claim as 
president that it was China, and not he, that had changed 
since in his view, China had ceased to be an aggressor. And 
consideration of the key China factor was always at the heart 
of his Asian strategy aimed at preventing the expansion of 
Communist influence while enhancing the American political 
position on the vast continent.
As the administration had been preoccupied with Indochina 
in 1954, it would soon have to deal with a potentially more 
dangerous situation: the Formosa Strait crises from September 
1954 through March 1955 and ignited again in 1958. It would 
not only be a crucible for the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign 
policy, but eventually for Nixon as well.
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CHAPTER 4: ISLANDS IN THE STRAIT 
By the end of the summer of 1954, the United States was 
hardly winning its guest to defeat or undermine, let alone 
contain, Communist expansion in Asia. The Korean War had 
ended in stalemate in July of the previous year with the 
restoration of the status quo antebellum, marking the first 
time in American history that the United States had not won a 
complete victory in a foreign war. Although it has often been 
argued that the conflict was a success since the Communist 
invasion of South Korea was repulsed, the Asia Firsters and 
Old Guard of the Republican Party were dissatisfied, to say 
the least, that Korea had not been reunified under Syngman 
Rhee and that its neighboring giant, the Middle Kingdom, 
remained under the thumb of Communist rule.
Chiang Kai-Shek, of course, remained allied with the U.S. 
against Communist expansion in the region but not without 
causing anguish for the Eisenhower administration. Chiang 
was corrupt and tempermental but had to be kept in power on 
Taiwan lest America lose even more ground and prestige in 
Asia. Despite the difficulties of dealing with Chiang, the 
Nationalist leader remained indubitably preferable to Mao.
Even most of Chiang*s American critics agreed with that.
More importantly, Chiang's supporters in the United States 
were plentiful and powerful. Indeed, the administration had 
to appease domestic opinion in favor of Chiang even more than 
it had to placate Chiang, himself. Eisenhower had to appear 
to be supportive of Chiang although privately, the
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administration had made it clear when Nixon delivered the 
message to the generalissimo in November 1953 that the United 
States would not countenance Chiang's pipe dream of an 
invasion to regain the mainland. This was not an endorsement 
of Maoism by any means but a recognition of Chiang's weakness 
and the impossibility of his ousting the Communists from power 
in Peking.
Taiwan had to be kept in Chiang's hands for its loss to 
the Communists would be an insufferable blow to American 
prestige not only in Asia, but with ramifications around the 
world, especially vis-a-vis the perceived Soviet threat to 
Western Europe. The Nationalists were not merely ensconced in 
Taiwan and the nearby Pescadores but in retreating from Mother 
China in 1949, Chiang*s forces had managed to hold onto a 
piece of the rock in the form of the offshore islands of 
Quemoy, Matsu, and Tachen in the Formosa Strait.
These bits of real estate were to provide the spark to 
raise the fear that America might go to war against Communist 
China. The egomaniacal Chiang attached far more importance to 
retaining the offshore islands than Eisenhower ever did. 
Despite the sagacious general's doubts about the strategic and 
military importance of the islands, he, like his vice 
president, realized the value of keeping the Communists 
guessing as to what the United States would do regarding the 
islands and when, how and if any action would be taken. 
Eisenhower may have privately eschewed the "psychological" 
importance of the islands per se, but he knew the importance
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of America saving face. He was even more aware of how the 
"loss" of mainland China led in part to the dethroning of the 
Democrats. Eisenhower did not want to be the Truman of his 
party. Also, although he despised right-wing Republicans, he 
could not politically afford to alienate them.
On September 3, the Communists bombarded Quemoy from the 
mainland port of Amoy. Chou En-lai had announced only a few 
weeks before that the time had come for the Communist Chinese 
to "liberate" Formosa. Could it have been merely a 
coincidence that the Chinese Communists chose this time for an 
artillery volley just as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
was on his way to Manila to sign the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization pact designed to contain Communist China. There 
was nothing inscrutable in the Chinese action. . Chou was 
making it clear that his country would not be intimidated by 
the United States.
Chiang was adamant in holding to the islands because he 
still harbored the dream of using them as a launch pad to 
regain the mainland. Should the islands be lost to the 
Communists, Chiang feared the morale of his troops would be 
shattered and that the Communists could use the islands to 
stage an invasion of Taiwan. Chiang also wanted a mutual 
defense treaty with the United States into committing America 
to protect Taiwan. Chiang reasoned that if the United States 
completed the SEATO and HATO pacts, signed a peace treaty with 
the recent enemy Japan, then surely the Republic of China 
deserved the respect a defense accord would bring.
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Nationalist Chinese honor and dignity demanded no less. One 
can only wonder whether or not Chiang actually delighted in 
the Communist bombardment for he must have recognized this 
offensive onslaught by Peking as his much-awaited, golden 
opportunity for bringing pressure to bear on the United States 
to make such a pact a reality. Chiang's wish was fulfilled in 
December of that year when the Mutual Defense Treaty between 
the two countries was consummated, including additional 
American dollars for the defense of Taiwan.
As far as any imminent danger to Taiwan was concerned, 
Eisenhower knew very well that the People's Liberation Army of 
Communist China simply lacked the capability of making a 
successful amphibious assault on Taiwan. The president had 
made clear in a press conference after the bombardment began 
that an invasion would have to "step over the Seventh Fleet." 
The crisis over the offshore islands was to ultimately reveal 
the skill, leadership, if not a little guile, legerdemain and 
the pure thespian talent of Eisenhower, commander-in-chief, as 
he firmly established America's commitment to the defense of 
Taiwan and the Pescadores while remaining ambiguous about what 
the United States would do should Mao's troops dare to attempt 
to invade Quemoy and Matsu. (The northern island group, 
Tachen, was abandoned during this crisis, much to Chiang's 
displeasure. The Eisenhower administration had pressured 
Chiang to withdraw since Tachen was considered indefensible, 
and because it was some 200 miles north of Taiwan, and 
therefore of no strategic value.
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Eisenhower drew a line in the waters of the Formosan 
Strait and it was not a demarcation founded upon melodramatic 
presidential rhetoric alone. Eisenhower was shrewd enough to 
attain congressional backing through the Formosa Resolution of 
January 1955 for any possible military action he might feel 
compelled to take to defend Taiwan and in ambiguous words, 
"other'* areas, understood to be the much fretted about 
offshore islands.
And just where did young Hr. Nixon fit into this crisis?
He was hardly what the swamis of today's Washington press 
corps would have called a key "player" nor was the Vice 
President nearly as visible or publicly controversial during 
the turmoil over the Formosa Strait as he had been during the 
fall of Dien Bien Phu the previous year. However, the 
Quemoy-Matsu situation was to provide further instruction for 
Nixon's foreign policy education in this "gestation" period of 
his career in which his "world view" was formulated and 
essentially.crystallized.
In the absence of the president, Nixon presided over the 
meeting of the National Security Council on September 9 in 
which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles briefed the 
policymakers on the Formosa Strait situation. The vice 
president then asked how far American prestige had been 
committed to the defense of the Chinese Nationalist garrison 
on Quemoy. Nixon wanted to know if the island's defense 
should be considered the responsibility of the United States. 
He was trying to establish just how geopolitically significant
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the offshore islands were to the national security of the 
United States. Admiral Arthur Radford responded that 
America's prestige had been "committed 100 percent."1
Later in the meeting, Secretary of Defense Charles E. 
Wilson said that the United States was not used to fighting 
limited or undeclared wars. (One wonders where Wilson had been 
during the Korean War). Wilson noted that if American forces 
fought the Communist Chinese over the offshore islands, an act 
of war would have been committed which would require 
Congressional approval. Then Nixon, shifting to the role of 
hard-line devil's advocate, pointedly asked the secretary of 
defense whether he had any alternative. Wilson, never quite 
as prepared as Nixon for such meetings, simply replied that he 
had no alternative at the moment but would try to come up with 
one soon.2
But Nixon weighed a variety of options when he asked Allen 
Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
younger brother of the secretary of state, what ramifications 
might result from the loss of Quemoy to the Chinese 
Communists. Namely, should such a loss occur, what effect 
would it have on American prestige, how would Chinese 
Communist prestige be "enhanced" and what effect would such an 
event have on Chinese Nationalist morale on Taiwan? The 
director answered that American prestige would suffer less if 
the islands were completely evacuated of civilians and 
military personnel rather than merely abandoned to the 
Communists. Allen Dulles then took a markedly different view
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from the one espoused by Radford. He said that the loss of 
the islands would raise the prestige of the Chinese Communists 
but he doubted that in the long run their loss would 
significantly damage morale of the Nationalist Chinese troops 
on Taiwan.3
A more important meeting of the NSC took place three days 
later on September 12 at Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, where 
Eisenhower was vacationing. The secretary of state reported 
on the signing in Manila of the SEATO pact. Dulles also 
discussed his five hours of talks with Chiang Kai-Shek and he 
conveyed Chiang's obsession with getting a mutual defense 
treaty. Ironically, despite all those historians who see 
Dulles as reckless practitioner of nuclear brinksmanship and 
one who was in complete step with the China Lobby, Dulles said 
that he had cautioned Chiang that should such a treaty come 
into being, the president might not feel as free to take 
action. Dulles seemed to be trying to keep Chiang "leashed" 
rather than giving him everything on his wish list. He told 
the council that Chiang was getting old. The secretary 
doubted there could ever be an internal uprising in China 
which would bring Chiang back to power on the mainland.4
The subject shifted to the continuing crisis over the 
offshore islands. Eisenhower, the venerable general who knew 
the horror of war, said that he did not think that the 
American people would accept war at that time over 
Quemoy-Matsu. Eisenhower, a realist, said it would be a 
difficult job to explain to the nation the significance of
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these islands to American national security. The president 
further offered that it was imperative to "recognize that 
Quemoy is not our ship/' and added that he often received 
letters which "constantly say what do we care what happens to 
those yellow people out there?"5 (These comments were made 
in a far less racially sensitive era.)
At this juncture, Nixon displayed an independent spirit by 
differing somewhat with his commander-in-chief. Distancing 
himself from the president before the august NSC, Nixon said 
that he agreed with the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
who emphasized the grave psychological and political 
consequences of the loss of the islands to the Communists. 
Nixon repeated the notion that the best course to follow was 
to "keep the Communists guessing, but take a chance on the 
possible consequences." Nixon, who less than a year earlier 
had met with Chiang in Taipei, knew the generalissimo's 
mindset well enough to state firmly that he did not believe 
that Chiang would evacuate the offshore islands.6
The NSC discussed the possibility of bringing the crisis 
before the United Nations. Nixon was not against this on 
principle and commented that if the issue reached the U.N., it 
would put both the Communists and the British on the spot. 
Still the staunch anglophobe, Nixon wanted to get back at the 
British for recognizing Peking. Harold Stassen then rather 
wryly pointed out to the vice president that if the matter 
came before the U.N., the United States would also find itself 
"on the spot."
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Nixon prided himself on his ardent internationalism, and 
pointed out to Herbert S. Parmet in a 1984 interview that it 
was that stance which distinguished him from the Old Guard of 
the GOP. But at this particular NSC gathering, Nixon offered 
the policymakers some caustic words about the United Nations. 
Despite an interest in some type of U.N. approach to the 
Formosan Strait crisis, he echoed the MacArthur view of the 
Korean War when he expressed his anxiety that the U.N. had 
kept "our boys" from doing the job that should have been done 
in Korea. Nixon cautioned that if the U.N. route was followed 
in this instance, it would be criticized by the American 
people as another Korea. He repeated the need to keep the 
Communists guessing and it is possible to infer from the 
minutes of the meeting that he was willing to back unilateral 
American military action should it be deemed necessary. He 
mentioned that the Intelligence Advisory Committee believed 
that the Chinese Communists would not attack the islands if 
Peking was uncertain about how America would react. Nixon 
remarked that the United States "should play poker in order to 
keep the Communists guessing."7 (Nixon, raised in the 
Quaker tradition where any gambling was deemed sinful, had 
become far more worldy through his Naval service in World War 
II and established a reputation in his supply unit in the 
South Pacific as a superb poker player. One source indicated 
he saved about $10,000 from his winnings, much of which went 
towards his first political campaign, the 1946 congressional 
race against Jerry Voorhis.8) This was a position that was
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very consistent with Nixon's entire career in foreign affairs 
in which he firmly espoused unpredictability as the best 
bargaining chip against Communist aggression. Eisenhower, 
however, having seen much more of war than Nixon did in his 
tour of duty in the Pacific, was far more wary.
The situation in the Formosan Strait was further 
complicated by the Chinese holding 13 American pilots prisoner 
from the Korean War. Their detention was viewed by the United 
States government as a violation of the accord signed ending 
the fighting in Korea. But the administration's problems were 
exacerbated in November when Senate Majority Leader William 
Knowland demanded that the U.S. institute a naval blockade of 
China until all the pilots were released. It is not that the 
administration did not want the captive Americans released as 
soon as possible— it is just that in calling for the blockade, 
Knowland merely increased the tension.(Eleven of the 13 pilots 
were released in 1955; the last two had been "civilian" pilots 
whom the Chinese accused of being with the CIA. The American 
government refused to acknowledge this until Nixon, himself, 
was president and the door had been opened to China. Nixon 
then acknowledged that the pilots had been with the CIA and 
the last two prisoners were let go in 1973.) The "Senator 
from Formosa" was not a favorite of the Eisenhower team and 
his bellicose rhetoric was not appreciated at 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue or at Foggy Bottom. Also, Nixon certainly 
was not enamored of Knowland since the two of them were vying 
to position themselves for the Republican presidential
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nomination should Eisenhower choose not to seek re-election in 
1956. The ill will between the two young and ambitious 
Californians stemmed in part from Knowland having been an 
"Earl Warren man" back in the Golden State whereas Nixon and 
Warren barely could maintain a civil relationship let alone a 
political alliance. Warren, proud of his lack of partisanship 
in governing California, had refused to back the highly 
combative and partisan Nixon in his Senate race against Helen 
Gahagan Douglas in 1950, and Warren resented Nixon's behind 
the scenes maneuvering for Eisenhower in 1952 when Warren had 
been the favorite son candidate of California.
Meanwhile, the crisis in the Strait continued. At a 
December 9 meeting of the NSC, just a week after the 
consummation of the Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and 
the United States, China was once more at the center of the 
group's attention. Eisenhower again broached the possibility 
of encouraging Japan to export goods to North China and 
Manchuria as a means of "infiltrat(ing) democratic ideas" into 
those areas. Eisenhower admitted to the NSC that the domestic 
"political temper" in the U.S. would not allow for American 
trade with China. However, he asked why not at least pursue 
some kind of study of possible beneficial effects of having 
the Japanese trade with Communist China. (Of course, this was 
still during the period when Japan was recovering from the war 
and had not yet become a major international economic power.) 
The president further pointed out that trade was the "greatest 
weapon in the hands of the diplomat."9 Eisenhower was no
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ideologue imprisoned by China Lobby recalcitrance and pipe 
dreams of a grand return by Chiang to the mainland. Ike was 
pragmatic enough to know that the status quo could not 
continue indefinitely, although of course he was politic 
enough not to harbor illusions about recognizing Red China.
Secretary of State Dulles said that Peking's reaction to 
the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was "very bitter" and 
that the pact had been "described as provocative and, indeed, 
as an act of war." Dulles warned that the Chinese Communist 
might make a "move against the offshore islands."10
Eisenhower, who was also a master of playing the devil's 
advocate in such high-level settings, then posed the pivotal 
question of whether the United States had "ever really given 
thought to setting forth the three or four specific actions by 
the Chinese Communist Government which might cause the United 
States to give serious consideration to a change in its policy 
toward Communist China." Dulles responded that if the Chinese 
Communists eliminated "specific sources of friction" that this 
could have some effect on American policy but he offered the 
caveat that the Chinese could just come up with a list of such 
points and then not comply in "genuine good faith" with 
them.11 Eisenhower's question reveals his skepticism about 
the United States position toward Communist China, especially 
when one considers that he raised it during the Quemoy crisis 
and just a week after the treaty with Taipei had been signed.
The president was particularly concerned about how Chiang 
might interpret the new pact upon which the ink had barely
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dried. Eisenhower did not want Chiang to take the treaty as 
carte blanche for the Nationalists to launch an offensive 
against the mainland that would involve the United States and 
lead to American boys dying once again in Asia. With 
Eisenhower's wariness of the generalissimo in mind, Dulles and 
the Republic of China's Foreign Minister George Yeh exchanged 
diplomatic notes on December 10, which Townsend Hoopes has 
written "effectively 'releashed'" Chiang and said clearly that 
any "use of force" from any Nationalist area would "be a 
matter of joint agreement." This diplomatic corollary was not 
made public, however, until February 7, 1955, more than a week 
after the Senate had finally approved the Formosa 
Resolution.12
Eisenhower was trying to ensure that he had some control 
over any drastic action that Chiang might take. The bottom 
line was that Eisenhower knew such offensive action by 
Chiang's army would be futile and despite the political 
strength of the generalissimo's supporters in the United 
States, the president was not about to let the Chinese 
Nationalist leader drag America into another war.
Despite the U.S.-Taiwan treaty, the Communist Chinese 
hardly seemed intimidated and the tension in the Strait 
continued. At the National Security Council meeting of 
January 13, 1955, the topic was the domestic political 
repercussions of the crisis in the Formosan strait. Dulles 
discussed a memorandum that the Democratic National Committee 
had circulated in the halls of Congress. Dulles claimed that
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former Democratic State Department officials such as Dean 
Acheson, Paul Nitze and Benjamin Cohen were criticizing the 
new accord with Taiwan by this memorandum which according to 
Dulles, was "plainly designed to obfuscate the issues and to 
throw monkey wrenches into the Administration's plans,"13 
The secretary of state was incensed by this circular which 
questioned the wisdom of the U.S. aligning itself militarily 
with Chiang. Dulles angrily said that the activities of the 
Democratic "cabal...bordered on the traitorous."
Nixon, who served as Dulles's eyes and ears on The Hill, 
responded that the "whole thing was a calculated political 
maneuver." He pointed out that the opposition party had also 
criticized the president's State of the Union message. Nixon 
called this memorandum a "breach of bipartisanship" and 
suggested that whoever was chosen to respond to it, the 
president or Dulles should not. Rather, he suggested that a 
senator or "well-known press figure" should get the call.14 
Here was one of the most blatantly partisan Republicans of the 
postwar era accusing the Democrats of playing politics. Yes, 
Nixon had supported Truman on Europe but he was hardly the 
embodiment of bipartisanship whether the Republicans were in 
or out of power.
As recounted above, the Formosa Resolution was skillfully 
steered through both the House and Senate by the 
administration at the end of January, giving the masterful 
political magician Eisenhower the free hand he felt he needed 
to deter the Chinese Communists while remaining vague on
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exactly what he would do to thwart them if push came to 
shove. At one and the same time, the president satisfied the 
staunch backers of Chiang, received the support of the 
Congress, and also kept the Communists guessing as to his 
intent while restraining Chiang.
In February, Nixon was again dispatched abroad by the 
president. This time the destination was Latin America and 
Nixon again scored a successful trip as he strove to enhance 
his education in foreign affairs.Nixon, still the best and 
hardest working student in the class, reported to the NSC on 
his travels. The message that the vice president imparted to 
the policymakers in his briefing on March 10 was that although 
Latin America might appear to be "small potatoes" compared to 
other areas in the world, the United States "must never make 
the mistake of taking Latin America for granted" since it was 
"after all, our own backyard, and it offered enormous 
potentials to the United States for good or ill, depending on 
whether the right or the wrong people were in control of the 
American republics." Although this trip did not receive the 
same kind of press attention that his 1953 Asian trip did, it 
served to broaden the scope of Nixon's perceptions of the 
world.15
In the meantime, the Formosan Strait crisis hardly 
receded. Tensions heated up again in March when Dulles 
returned from yet another trip to Taiwan and reported to the 
president and the NSC that the situation was far more serious 
than he had originally thought. Eisenhower went so far in one
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press conference that month to say that atomic weapons might 
be used in a wartime situation, just as bullets are. The 
neorevisionist historians have made much of this statement by 
the president as proof of his bellicose intentions and 
creation of a "national insecurity state." But Eisenhower 
knew how to use a threat and it is no mere coincidence that by 
April when the "non-aligned" world met at Bandung, Indonesia, 
Chou En-lai was making far more conciliatory remarks than he 
had just a few short months before.16 The Chinese now were 
taking the American commitment to Taiwan far more seriously. 
This was no doubt because of Eisenhower's remarks on nuclear 
weapons and the Formosa Resolution's implication that the 
United States would defend "other areas," which was understood 
to be the offshore islands.
But even with the United States on the brink of war with 
China, Nixon remained the president's political point man and 
began to galvanize the GOP faithful for 1956. In a March 14 
speech in Los Angeles before the World Affairs Council, Nixon 
warned that the Republicans needed to develop the strength of 
the party, itself, to elect a president rather than relying 
solely on the popularlity of a candidate to hold on to the 
White House. Nixon knew very well that the future of the 
Republican Party would be dim, as would his own political 
future, should the GOP count solely on the popularity of Ike 
rather than building support at the grass roots for the 
party. Nixon told the group that the major Republican themes 
for 1956 would be "peace and prosperity." He omitted his
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standard chorus on the domestic Communist menace. Was this a 
kinder and gentler Nixon or just an incumbent who wanted to 
take a more statesman-like profile in advance of a 
presidential election? He also said the administration's 
foreign policy was united in retaining a strong position in 
Asia "to resist further Communist aims and aggressions." He 
did not have to mention Quemoy and Matsu for his audience to 
know what he was talking about. The vice president also went 
out of his way to downplay the talk of any differences between 
Eisenhower and Dulles about "whether the policy of resisting 
Communist aggression was correct." (Even though Eisenhower 
had publicly mentioned the possibility of using nuclear 
weapons, Dulles had been taking a much harder line publicly 
against the Communist Chinese.) Once again, Nixon had done 
his bit for the general.17
Nixon spoke in Chicago on March 17 and delivered a 
no-holds-barred warning to the Communist Chinese in an address 
to the Executive Club. The vice president had consulted with 
Dulles before the speech. In one of their innumerous 
telephone conversations from the period, Nixon asked the 
secretary of state if he should stress the "tactical [nuclear] 
weapons aspect" in dealing with the crisis. Dulles told 
Nixon that he should "strike a solemn note about the situation 
in Asia."18 Was Dulles merely asking Nixon to strike a pose 
for the cameras? Or was he deadly serious? Fortunately, for 
the sake of the world, this bluff was never called. The 
administration was really trying to intimidate the Communist
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Chinese government.
In the Chicago speech, Nixon bluntly warned the Chinese 
Communists that any new aggression on their part would be 
greeted with nuclear weapons. The elite audience erupted in 
applause when the vice president said that "it would be 
insanity for them to embark on additional aggression in the 
face of the consequences we have made clear will follow."19
Nixon rationalized the possible employment of nuclear 
weapons against the Chinese Communists because "dictatorial 
leaders of revolutionary movments are always unpredictable" 
and "sometimes do unreasonable things." The vice president 
emphasized that American policy in the Taiwan area was 
"designed only to resist aggression— not to initiate it."
Nixon, the lawyer, defended the use of nuclear weapons by 
saying that they should now be considered "conventional." (He 
was really following Eisenhower's line that tactical atomic 
weapons should be considered no different than bullets.) "It 
is foolish to talk about the possibility that the weapons 
which might be used in the event war breaks out in the Pacific 
would be limited to the conventional Korean and World War II 
types of explosives," he said. The vice president added that 
the United States was "not prepared to fight that kind of war. 
Our forces could not fight an effective war in the Pacific 
with those types of explosives if they wanted to." If this 
was not the New Look of "massive retaliation," more "bang for 
the buck," then what was? If there was any doubt on the part 
of his listeners, he was sure to erase it when he uttered the
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coup de grace that "tactical atomic explosives are now 
conventional and will be used against the targets of any 
aggressive force."20
Nixon took the hard-line on not allowing the Communist 
Chinese to add an inch to the territory they controlled, 
although this did not reflect what Eisenhower had been saying 
privately. Was Nixon, with Dulles's tacit consent, trying to 
pressure Eisenhower to follow a different course, as he 
seemingly had in his remarks the year before about the 
"hypothetical" insertion of American troops in Vietnam to 
prevent a Communist takeover? No wonder that in 1956, 
Eisenhower suggested to his vice president that he "chart his 
own course" and get some "administrative" experience in a 
cabinet post rather than hold on to the nation's second 
highest office. After all, it was Eisenhower who was 
president and the last thing Ike wanted in 1956 was anything 
that might lead to the impression that in essence, the GOP was 
offering a Nixon-Eisenhower ticket.
Nixon was resolute as he implied that opponents of going 
to the limit over the offshore islands were naive. "Those who 
suggest that we could get peace in the Pacific by giving up 
additional territory to the Communists simply do not know the 
kind of animal we are dealing with," he chimed. Then, 
transforming himself into a history professor, he offered that 
"History has proved to us again and again that concessions of 
territory only whet the appetite of dictatorial aggressors and 
this has proved particularly true of the men in the Kremlin
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and Peking." Nixon then expanded on his revulsion toward 
appeasement of the Chinese Communists. "The only way to 
guarantee that there will be no war," he added, "is to 
surrender completely to the enemy." War, to Nixon, seemed 
preferable to the expansion of communism influence to the 
islands in the Strait. "A policy of firmness may not now 
avoid war if the Communists embark on new aggression," he 
said. "But a policy of weakness and partial surrender now 
would inevitably lead to either a big war or complete 
surrender later." This was the reprise of an old Nixon chorus 
going back to the MacArthur episode of 1951 and the debate 
over the Korean War. But the vice president was sure to 
indicate that should war come, the blame would rest solely on 
Peking's shoulders. "We have made it crystal clear to the 
world that if war comes the responsibility will rest squarely 
on the Communists."21
Nixon claimed that despite the risks involved in the 
administration's policy, in the long run it gave the United 
States "the best chance to attain our objective of peace 
without surrender." And Nixon, considering geopolitical 
implications and the importance of perceptions of American 
resolve by allies as well as enemies, pointed out that the 
Philippines and Japan were closely observing the Quemoy-Matsu 
crisis to see if the United States would withdraw from places 
where the Communists were applying pressure.22
Nixon, the partisan Republican, then muddied the name of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Yalta agreements, which from the
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Old Guard's view were the cause of all of the ills in 
international affairs in the postwar period. Here, Nixon took 
on the mantle of the Old Guard, or at least was politically 
shrewd enough to pander to it. (The Yalta agreements had just 
been published, reigniting the issue.) But Nixon was 
slightly more generous to FDR and his cohorts than he was to 
the Truman-Acheson crowd. Speaking of Yalta, the vice 
president said he was convinced that "decisions were made not 
because of a deliberate intent to sell out but that at the 
time the leaders did not know what the Communist animal was 
like." But this was really Nixon's technique of ascribing 
guilt while seemingly exonerating the accused. He still 
managed to twist the knife ever sharper into the Democrats by 
saying that "one of the major reasons" for the Chinese 
Communists's success was "due to the concessions made at 
Yalta."23 (It is surprising that Nixon did not invoke the 
name of Alger Hiss as one of FDR's advisers at the wartime 
conference in the Crimea.) Nixon was just trying to gain 
politcal capital. The Yalta accords clearly show that Stalin 
pledged to support the Nationalists and Chiang rather than Mao 
and the Communists in the immediate postwar period. And 
historians Michael Schaller and Gordon H. Chang have shown how 
dubious Stalin was about his Communist neighbors south of the 
border.24
The vice president deliberately toned down his rhetoric in 
Cleveland on April 3 when he spoke before the American 
Association of School Administrators. But politically, Nixon
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had to gauge his audience, and could not appear excessively 
hawkish before this crowd of educators responsible for 
preparing America's young people for the future. With the 
stench of death and casualties from Korea and World War II 
still so freshly in the nostrils of the nation, Nixon could 
hardly exhibit great enthusiasm for sending American boys off 
to war before this group. But measuring an audience, or a 
local or national constituency is the mark of a smart, 
effective and successful politician. Nixon certainly had all 
three of these qualities.
He strongly denied that there was a "war party" in the 
United States and that neither the Eisenhower administration, 
Congress, or the nation's military leaders wanted war. He 
delicately ignored the small matter that Admiral Radford, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Robert B. 
Carney, the navy's chief of naval of operations, had been 
loudly beating the drums for offensive military action, 
including the use of nuclear weapons, to thwart Communist 
designs on the offshore islands. Nixon also was soft-pedaling 
the bellicose line he had taken just two weeks before in 
Chicago. The very term, "war party," Nixon charged, was a 
"big lie" that the Communist propagandists were stirring up to 
cause problems and he assured the educators that no 
"trigger-happy" decisions would be made by the administration 
during the present crisis.25
With the Republicans in control of the White House, Nixon 
suddenly espoused bipartisanship. Of course, it had been
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different when he had been a prominent spokesman for the 
opposition during Mr. Truman's war in Korea. He urged that 
the country "advocate vigorously the policies that we think 
are best designed to avoid war and obtain peace" but he 
expressed the desire that this be done "without questioning 
the motives of those who disagree with us." One of the chief 
architects of postwar virulent partisanship was now calling 
for national unity. But the view is vastly different for the 
party in power than it is for the opposition. Nixon also 
reiterated that there would be no major war unless the 
Communists started it and he stated his confidence in the 
leadership of Eisenhower and Dulles. The vice president 
maintained that the guiding light for the administration 
remained "peace without surrender" and as he had noted so many 
times in the past, he said that this required the free world 
to be stronger than the Communists both militarily and 
economically.2®
Nixon enunciated his faith in firmness, fairness and 
friendship: the determination to use American military 
strength against aggression while at the same time to exhibit 
"readiness to join with other nations in converting the power 
of the atom to peaceful uses" and "willingness to participate 
in big power conferences when conditions are such that there 
would be a chance to reduce world tensions."27
Alluding to the crisis in the Formosan Strait, Nixon said 
that the administration's policy had been questioned and that 
opponents had "suggested...that the United States should
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announce tc the world now that certain named areas [i.e., the 
offshore islands] would not be defended by us if they were 
attacked. Apparently," he added, "they believe such an action 
would avoid war." The vice president again took on the guise 
of a history professor to draw a parallel from the past. He 
lashed into his favorite target, Dean Acheson, to restir the 
charge that Acheson's January 1950 speech on the defense 
perimeter of the United States had brought on the Communist 
aggression in Korea. Nixon also invoked Danzig and the cry at 
the time of "Why die for Danzig?" The vice president pointed 
out that no one died for Danzig then but that millions died 
not long after. "History shows that surrender of territory, in 
itself, never satisfies an aggressor; it only increases his 
appetite."28 But in the case of the Chinese Communists, no 
one disputed that the offshore islands were sovereign 
territory. The question, of course, was which China would 
rule them?
Nixon put a peculiar spin on the subject of nuclear 
weapons. He had been in favor of using them, if necessary, to 
contain the Chinese Communists. Now, through a bit of 
rhetorical legerdemain, he stated that "this terrible new 
weapon, the atomic bomb...may, in the end, prove to be a boon 
as a great equalizer." Nixon's argument was that as the 
arsenals of the two superpowers increased, the matter of who 
had the "most" weapons would be dwarfed if both sides had 
"enough" and therefore, "a military leader will not advise 
political leaders to wage war, because they will be risking
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national suicide."29 Rather than appearing as a war monger, 
he virtually took on the aura of a peacenik. However, he 
neglected to say what political leaders might conclude in 
their own right concerning the use of the "terrible" weapon. 
But he was downplaying the nuclear threat because he fully 
understood that that was what his audience wanted to hear.
His backers in southern California had not previously awarded 
him the honor of being named "Salesman of the Year" because 
Nixon could not successfully sell his ideas as merchandise 
designed for public consumption.
But Nixon displayed an open mind to the educators in 
exhorting them tc teach America's schoolchildren more about 
communism rather than less. This was tantamount to Jesuits 
devoting themselves to studying Lutheran theology so as to be 
better prepared to deny it. As for how Nixon could square 
this up with the ban on Communist teachers, Nixon gave the pat 
explanation that they would be under strict party orders not 
to teach about communism as it really is. Instead, Nixon 
proposed that the young be taught about Communist ideology in 
comparison to American theories of government and learn that 
Communists promised the people much and delivered little. 
Nixon, who so eloquently and effectively expressed his own 
traditional philosophy of education in his 1990 book, In the 
Arena, also put in a plug for American children to learn 
foreign languages and to attain a "genuine respect for the 
cultures, traditions, and customs of other people" around the 
world. He stated that America would win its struggle against
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communism and that he hoped it could be won without a war.
The reason for his optimism was simple; America was on the 
right side. Here, again a little American idealism and 
moralism could go a long way in the domestic political 
marketplace and in the rationalizing of foreign policy. He 
concluded his remarks by keeping the door open to the 
possibility of renewed Chinese-American friendship someday 
despite the current crisis. He held out the hope that the 
time would come when the peoples of the two countries would 
live together in peace and friendship.30
By late April, tensions abated somewhat when Chou En-lai 
sounded a conciliatory note at Bandung by saying that China 
did not seek war with the United States. But for Nixon, the 
tempest still loomed, although he, too, continued to tone down 
his rhetoric. In a May 7 New York speech before the Society 
of American Military Engineers, Nixon forcefully stated the 
case for Eisenhower to have the option of taking action "to 
maintain peace without surrendering" (his favorite "buzz 
words") because the president was ultimately the "person with 
the most complete, up-to-date knowledge of all the facts." He 
added that the decision on how to achieve this had to finally 
rest with the president and he urged that the nation rally 
around Eisenhower in that time of crisis. Although he gave 
lip service to welcoming debate on the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, he 
nevertheless proposed that America's interests would be better 
served if there were less pronouncments on the situation by 
"those who did not have all the facts."31
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This was strikingly consistent with Nixon's own conduct 
and vision as president of his constitutional powers as 
commander-in-chief when he ordered the incursion into Cambodia 
and vetoed the War Powers Act, which he perceived as designed 
to emasculate the President's ability to exert American 
military might. With the notable exception of his distaste 
for Truman's firing of MacArthur (which in Nixon's view 
prevented the more drastic military action in Korea he 
advocated), Nixon was a staunch proponent of a powerful 
executive, who in essence would have more control than 
Congress concerning military and foreign affairs. The 
difference between Nixon and Eisenhower in the presidency was 
that Eisenhower was far more solicitous of Congress. In 
seeking the Formosa Resolution and Eisenhower Doctrine, Ike 
was also more effective in achieving his goal of giving the 
chief executive the freedom of action while politically 
mollifying Congress and American public opinion. Nixon, on 
the other hand, all too often aroused the contempt of Congress 
over his conduct of the Vietnam War, not to mention his 
conception of paramount presidential power and executive 
privilege which so offended the institutional pride of those 
lawmakers who jealously guarded their constitutional role in 
matters of war and peace.
Downwind from Geneva
Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the Russians under 
the "triumverate" transitional leadership of Nikita Khruschev,
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Nikolai Bulganin, and Georgi Malenkov had begun a "peace 
offensive" aimed "against" the West. Washington was skeptical 
about what it feared to be just another Soviet propaganda 
ploy. But even Churchill in 1953 had called for a summit 
between the Russians and the Western allies. This was all the 
more complicated from Washington's perspective when, as 
already mentioned, at Bandung in April 1955, Chou En-lai 
appeared to take the bite out of his bark in proclaiming that 
China did not seek war with the United States. The 
temperature accordingly declined in the Formosan Strait and 
American attention turned back toward the old nemesis,
Moscow. But the pressure for a summit to ease international 
tensions, and abate the fear that the two superpowers would 
bring the world to a premature apocalypse through nuclear war, 
finally induced the Eisenhower administration to agree to a 
conference at the highest levels with the Russians, British, 
and French at Geneva to be held in July 1955. The most 
serious political problem for the White House was ironically 
not how best to save the world from self-destruction but how 
to engage in discussions with the Kremlin without unduly 
inciting the Old Guard of the Republican Party to stage a 
revolution of its own against the American Presidential Palace 
of Power. It was a shaky tightrope that Eisenhower had to 
walk and he needed to be as agile as the army rangers who 
scaled the cliffs at Normandy in the first wave of the 
"Crusade" to liberate Europe.
No one was more skeptical of the "fresh air" from the East
-213-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
than the vice president. Suspicions of Soviet intentions were 
another constant throughout Nixon's career. Such misgivings 
were not evolutionary on his part. Not only was he wary of 
smoking a peace pipe with the Russians in 1955, but he was one 
of the few voices during the Gorbymania of the late 1980s that 
dared question the motives of that latter-day saint of 
communism, Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnosf offensive.32 Even 
as president, in pursuing his policy of detente with the 
Russians, Nixon did not romanticize the relationship, sensing 
that the national interests of both superpowers at the time 
dictated the need for improved relations. Despite his 
recurrent invocations of Wilsonian rhetoric, idealism 
ultimately played a far smaller role in Nixon's view of 
international affairs than the realpolitik of power and 
national interest.
During this period, Nixon further cemented his already 
good and cordial working and personal relationship with Dulles 
as the secretary of state turned ever readily to the Vice 
President for political advice. The older gentleman who had 
been Nixon's tutor in "The Way of the World" found himself 
just as often his protegee's student in "The Way of American 
Politics"; particularly that never ending saga dramatically 
played in the United States Congress.
Dulles called Nixon May 19 to get his impressions of 
potential domestic political ramifications and how best to 
deal with Congress concerning the upcoming Geneva Summit.
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Nixon advised against congressional participation and he said 
the door should be shut on disarmament advisor Harold Stassen, 
Nelson Rockefeller (who was doing everything possible to 
influence the administration's foreign policy through a 
variety of presidential appointments during the Eisenhower 
era), and Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Jr. Nixon's great fear, one that would haunt him in the 
future, was the possibility of leaks to the press. He told 
Dulles that "you can't have a squadron" at a summit because it 
would just provide more players who could talk to the press. 
But even more importantly, from a purely domestic political 
standpoint, was that his future enemy Rockefeller was 
"considered part of the previous [i.e., Truman] 
administration" and that the "Taftish group" would not be 
pleased at a high profile role for Lodge despite the "good 
job" the ambassador had done at the U.N. As for Stassen, 
Nixon told the secretary of state that the American people 
just would not trust him.33 But Rockefeller headed the 
so-called Quantico Panel that recommended the "Open Skies" 
proposal and after the Geneva Summit convened, Eisenhower had 
Dulles summon Rockefeller and Stassen to the lakeside 
conference from Paris, where they had both been eagerly 
waiting in the wings to come share the limelight in 
Switzerland. Nixon had stayed home and may have been more 
haunted that touched by the "Spirit of Geneva."
The vice president expressed his reservations about the 
Kremlin's intent in a June 2 speech before the Rotary
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International Convention in Chicago. He applauded the 
Eisenhower administration for having "firmed up" its 
"diplomatic policies" concerning Taiwan and especially lauded 
the Formosa Resolution for "giving the President power to take 
steps to defend Formosa." Nixon claimed that the new found 
"firmness" (the implication being of course that the Truman 
team had been most decidedly infirm) was responsible for the 
Chinese Communists having "virtually ceased their threatening 
actions in the Formosan Straits." He noted that the Chinese 
had already released four American pilots they had held 
prisoner. As further proof of the dividends of toughness 
toward the Communist world, Nixon reminded the Rotarians that 
the Russians consented to attend the "Big Four Conference" 
slated for Geneva and had offered a disarmament proposal.34
But the Californian was not about to be snookered by 
Khrushchev and his comrades, and was quick to take the air out 
of the Russian trial balloon. Nixon warned that "this is no 
time for unguarded optimism" and urged "caution" in light of 
history. (Nixon, to his credit, understood that the present 
had a past, something that average politicians of the Post 
Cold War era seemingly fail to grasp.) The vice president 
believed that Communist doctrine still held out the ultimate 
goal of "conquer[ing] the world by force, if necessary, but by 
other means if possible." To Nixon's mind, Geneva clearly 
fell into that devious and diabolical category of "other 
means." The Kremlin's disarmament proposal was "full of booby 
traps," he cautioned. Yet, he resoundingly supported the
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American effort aimed at "exploring every road that could 
possibly lead to peace." As if by cue, the Rotarians broke 
into applause.35
Nixon then turned Wilsonian before the very eyes of the 
conventioneers. He pointed out that geographic isolation no 
longer protected the United States from "man's conquest of the 
air and the atom." Just three days after Memorial Day, he 
reminded his listeners of the thousands of Americans who had 
died in the three foreign wars of the 20th Century, "not 
because of glory of war or the rewards of conquest...[but] to 
make the world safe for democracy." Americans had fought 
"against dictatorship, against fascism" he told an audience 
that undoubtedly was replete with veterans of World War II and 
he hit a chord when he chimed that "we can partially repay the 
debt we owe to our dead" by finding "the road that leads 
to peace." But Wilsonian or not, the vice president implored 
the group to remember that if the Communists were given "an 
inch they are likely to take 1,000 miles" and that "strength 
with firmness is the only language they understand."36
Nixon headed south to the heart of the Lone Star State to 
deliver another speech on June 11 before the Texas Press 
Association in Galveston. He reiterated his skepticism of 
Communist intentions. "No one knows why the Communist leaders 
in both Peking and Moscow have made conciliatory moves during 
the past few weeks," he told the Texans, "but we must never 
forget that it is standard Communist tactics to retreat at 
times in order to move forward more effectively toward their
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announced goal of world domination." Nixon must have had in 
mind Lenin's dictum, "One step back, two steps forward" as he 
referred to the Russians as the "master conspirators in the 
Kremlin." From Nixon's vantage point, the Communists had two 
major foreign policy goals: the neutralization of Germany and 
the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. He 
claimed that the Communists had been unable through threats to 
stop Germany's inclusion in the Western Alliance and he 
further claimed that they were losing support from the 
"all-important neutrals in Asia." Nixon reasoned that there 
was no surprise in this new tactic of seemingly conciliatory 
rhetoric and he predicted that America be on the lookout for 
other "spectacular conciliatory moves, both before and during" 
the Geneva Summit. The bottom line for Nixon was that the 
free world should "not be lulled into a false sense of 
security" in this time of "apparent conciliation."37
Although nothing concrete was accomplished in Geneva in 
July, there was much talk of the "Spirit of Geneva." Although 
the Soviets had rejected Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, 
the general consensus was that tensions between the two 
superpowers had eased and that the world was not on the brink 
of nuclear self-destruction. If anything, the summit served 
to enhance Eisenhower's stature both at home and abroad, not 
to mention the international image of the United States.
Nixon, however, was not about to be caught up in the 
euphoria. The vice president and Dulles again compared notes 
on August 23 prior to the American Bar Association's annual
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convention in Philadelphia. Both were to speak before the 
national lawyer's group and the international outlook after 
Geneva was to be the subject. As one indication of Dulles's 
increasing confidence in the vice president, he had shown him 
a draft of his speech, which Nixon approved. Nixon then 
divulged the gist of what he planned to tell the lawyers. 
Dulles, also a skeptic of Geneva (as was Eisenhower 
privately), advised Nixon to stress that prior to Geneva the 
president said "the purpose is to develop a new spirit" but 
that it was "not an end in itself." Nixon replied that Geneva 
could be understood as a "prologue" to be followed by "the 
Act." The vice president added that he would probably be 
called a "warmonger" but that he did not mind since he thought 
it "good to prick the bubble of optimism."38
In his August 25 brief to the Philadelphia lawyers, Nixon 
offered an appraisal of Geneva. He said that the United 
States had been successful because it had avoided "the 
surrender of any free world interests." But he did not 
hesitate to throw cold water on the perception of Geneva 
representing an historic breakthrough. As to whether or not 
the summit contributed to making any genuine and significant 
progress for peace, Nixon asked the lawyers to take into 
account the "sobering thought" that the Russian leaders had 
not changed their position in the least on what he termed the 
"two great issues considered at the Conference, disarmament 
and unification of Germany."39
Nixon then reminded the attorneys that "the Geneva
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Conference was not an end in itself." Rather, "it was a means 
to an end" and following his direction from Dulles on this 
part of the script, he added that Eisehower's view of the 
"purpose of the Conference was not to settle these complicated 
issues but to develop, if we could, the spirit and procedures 
for reaching agreement on such issues at later conferences." 
Nixon suggested a number of steps that he advised the 
Communists to take if they were sincere about peace. He 
insisted that the Chinese Communists withdraw their troops 
from Korea, consent to free elections and unify that country. 
Nixon, who could always come up with a very effective turn of 
phrase, added that what the Communists "will determine whether 
there is a real thaw in the cold war or just a brief warm 
spell before an even bigger freeze."40
On August 29, Nixon traveled up to Boston to deliver the 
keynote address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars National 
Encampment. He started his speech with a recitation of the 
"roadblocks" to peace posed by the Soviets in Europe, but 
devoted a considerable segment of his remarks to why the 
United States had to remain firm in its policy of 
nonrecognition of China. Although the China issue had taken a 
back seat to American preoccupation with the summit with the 
Soviets at Geneva, Nixon gauged his audience and instinctively 
knew that China would have an emotional and political appeal 
to the veterans. After all, his listeners included men who 
had recently fought the Chinese enemy in Korea.
The vice president enumerated the reasons why the Chinese
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Communist government did not measure up to the requirements 
described in the United Nations Charter for membership in the 
international organization. The Communist Chinese were 
responsible for the deaths of "thousands of American 
boys...because the Communist Chinese supported the attack on 
South Korea." Nixon also pointed to Korea's continued 
division which he explained by Peking's refusal to hold free 
elections as well as the continued presence of Communist 
Chinese troops in North Korea "in direct violation of the 
truce." Nixon played on the veterans's emotions by reminding 
them that the Chinese still held Americans as prisoners. 
Furthermore, the vice president again branded the Chinese 
Communists as aggressors saying that "they encourage, incite, 
and support insurrection, rebellion, and subversion in every 
free country of Asia, and particularly in Indonesia, Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaya." Not least, according 
to Nixon, they had "not renounced their previous threat to 
take Formosa by force."41
From Nixon's point of view, this naughty behavior by the 
wayward Chinese Communists simply made it unthinkable that 
they could sit at the same table with the family of civilized 
nations. And of course, the corollary to this was that the 
United States could not countenance the thought of rewarding 
such rampant juvenile delinquency by appearing to acquiesce to 
it through diplomatic recognition of the Communist regime. 
Although Gordon Chang has overstated the case by claiming that 
China was the "main enemy," his other point is well taken that
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there was a certain tinge of "racism" in the American attitude 
toward the Chinese Communists.42 It was as if they were 
some sort of misbehaved children who needed to be taught 
proper manners. Such an attitude, disguised by rhetoric 
though it might be, could only serve to offend the Chinese, 
whose civilization was far older than young America and even 
Western Civilization, itself* However, this does not mean 
that Nixon, himself, was a "racist." Far from it, for he was 
one of the few in the administration who realized the need to 
respect the dignity of the Chinese and all the peoples of 
color throughout Asia and Africa, as well as blacks here in 
the United States. Yet, Nixon was much like other Americans 
of the time who naturally assumed the superiority of not only 
Western Civilization in general, but American know-how in 
particular.
But as he had so many times in the past, Nixon refused to 
shut the door completely on the prospect of ever recognizing 
the Communist regime in Peking. He took this stance even 
before this audience of veterans. If only the Chinese 
Communists would undergo some kind of what psychologists would 
call "behavior modification," then, Nixon certainly implied, 
there might very well be the prospect of eventual alteration 
in the U.S. position against admission of Peking to the United 
Nations. Playing again to the emotions of the veterans, he 
first demanded that the Chinese release all American prisoners 
and take their troops and materiel out of North Korea, consent 
to "free U.N.-supervised elections and unification of the
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country." In essence, Nixon was trying to make the veterans 
of the Korean War feel that they had not fought in vain. The 
vice president also demanded that Peking renounce the use of 
force against the "Formosa area" which could only be 
interpreted to include the offshore islands as well. Finally, 
he called for the Chinese Communists to "discontinue the 
undeclared war they are waging against established free 
governments through the operations of their Peking-controlled 
and directed organizations for infiltration, subversion, 
sabotage, and insurrection." He said the United States was 
"willing to go half-way" in trying to remove differences 
between the nations and he again invoked the Wilsonian chorus 
that the peoples of China, Russia and America could and should 
be friends. The only thing getting in the way of that natural 
friendship was the Communist governments, not the people. "We 
are confident," he said, "that if the governments of the 
Soviet Union and Communist China reflect the will and true 
spirit of their people the barriers to friendship and peace 
which have been erected by those governments will be 
removed." But between the lines, Nixon was clearly saying 
that Peking did not have to revert to Nationalist Chinese 
control (which was a total fantasy to begin with) as the sine 
qua non for the reestablishment of relations with China and 
its admission to the United Nations.43
Despite having inspired more than his share of unfavorable 
press as a result of his off-the-cuff comments on sending 
American troops to Indochina, and his role as Eisenhower's
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hatchet nan in the 1954 campaign, Nixon showed the signs of a 
resurgence in his standing among the Washington journalists. 
James Reston, who had thrashed Nixon after his June 1954 
speech in Milwaukee brutally lambasting Democratic foreign 
policy, was now back in Nixon's comer. Writing in The New 
York Times. "Scotty” Reston praised the vice president for 
having changed his tactics and discounted the popular 
assumption circulating in Washington that Nixon would "play 
the same role in the campaign of 1956 as he did in the 
campaign in 1954.” Reston disputed the notion espoused by the 
intellectual columnist Walter Lippmann (Reston always prided 
himself on being a "working stiff”, a newspaperman's 
newspaperman) that Nixon was really at one with the GOP right 
wing and who should be dropped from the 1956 ticket because he 
was too divisive. Reston thought that Eisenhower, assuming 
the president chose to seek re-election, would keep Nixon.
But Reston overstated his case by saying that Eisenhower 
"likes and admires” Nixon. Yet, Reston was more right than 
wrong. Eisenhower's behavior the next year in hedging on the 
choice of Nixon to be his running mate was not anticipated by 
Reston but the ultimate decision to keep Nixon, rather than 
"dump" him, was on the mark. In praise of the vice president, 
the journalist said that Nixon, "like most 42-year-olds...is 
changing and learning from his experience.” The Timesman 
correctly claimed that Nixon was now being "judged...against 
the standards that apply to a potential President" and Reston 
wrote this three weeks before Eisenhower's heart attack.
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Reston also praised Nixon for not accepting fees for public 
speaking engagements, in stark contrast to his predecessor, 
Alben Barkley.44 In Reston's mind, the Nixon of 1955 seemed 
far removed from the overly rambunctious, eager beaver of a 
•young man on the make whose integrity had been questioned and 
vilified in the 1952 "fund scandal."
Too Many Raw Onions
Nixon's standing in the press was even more enhanced in 
the wake of the national scare engendered by the president's 
heart attack. (On the day of the attack, Eisenhower had first 
complained of discomfort which his friends on the golf course 
in Denver attributed to his eating too many raw onions on his 
hamburger. They chided him for it but that night he awoke in 
extreme pain from the coronary.) Nixon impressed even his 
previous detractors with the restraint he exhibited in the 
immediate aftermath of Eisenhower's illness and in the 
prolonged period of convalesence. The accepted interpretation 
of events surrounding the president's illness has it that his 
chief of staff, Sherman Adams, who was not known for his love 
of Nixon, wanted to ensure that the vice president was frozen 
out of any direct access to Eisenhower. Adams's repugnance at 
Nixon was certainly true but the grubbing, middle-class Nixon 
accepted the snubbing quite graciously and proved that he had 
far more class than the Yankee former governor of New 
Hampshire descended from Mayflower stock.
If anything, Nixon was extremely sensitive to Adams's
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position as Eisenhower's chief of staff, as shown in the 
memoranda of several conversations he held with Dulles at the 
time. Nixon told New York Times columnist Arthur Krock that 
the impression had to be maintained that the president was in 
charge and the government had to carry on as Eisenhower would 
have led it. Also, Nixon explained that he was extremely wary 
of any perception that he was trying to make "personal, which 
is political capital out of this distressing situation."
(Nixon realized the need to avoid the kind of situation that 
occured after Woodrow Wilson's stroke, which the vice 
president called an "interregnum [that] was tragic." But 
Eisenhower's steady progress in Denver seemed to allay fear of 
such a dire predicament— although, of course, the same 
question was to rise in 1957 when Eisenhower suffered a 
stroke.) Even The New Republic's TRB, as tough a critic of 
Nixon as there was, praised him for having handled "himself 
with discretion and dignity" since the president's heart 
attack. Nixon, rather than being the overly rambunctious 
earnest understudy that many expected, proved to be a class 
act in an unsettling and potentially perilous and precarious 
situation.45
As the president recovered, Nixon again took to the road 
to carry the torch for Eisenhower. He delivered a major 
foreign policy address to The New York Herald Tribune Forum on 
October 18, and as usual, he discussed the speech with Dulles 
beforehand. Dulles suggested that Nixon should strike "a 
pretty high and non-controversial note," although as if to
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assuage the vice president, the secretary said that he 
"realized" Nixon already knew this. (Of course, if Dulles was 
so confident that Nixon knew how to conduct himself, why 
bother to point out proper modes of behavior? The last thing 
Dulles wanted was for Nixon to go on the warpath as the 
president recuperated and as the "Big 4" Foreign Ministers 
were preparing to convene later that month in Geneva to follow 
up that summer's summit and try to put some flesh and bones on 
the "spirit of Geneva.") Dulles told Nixon it was important 
that such a tone be set because the vice president had been 
"cast in the role of 'hatchet' man." But Dulles was hardly 
going soft as he further advised Nixon that Eisenhower's theme 
was "peaceful change" and "this idea that we are not going to 
use force against each other doesn't mean that we accept the 
status quo." Then, Dulles seemed to take a tack goading Nixon 
on a bit as he suggested that "it would not be out of order" 
to stress that "we are struggling" now in the Far East and 
Middle East. He was referring to the mounting tensions 
between Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal which was to 
culminate in Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser 
nationalizing the canal, and an October 1956 joint invasion of 
Egypt by British, French, and Israeli troops). Dulles feared 
that in the aftermath of Geneva, the Russians might use force 
by "proxy" in the Middle East. In a stark role reversal, it 
was Nixon who cautioned the secretary that such comments might 
be "going a bit far" and Dulles had to concede that much to 
his star student. But Dulles did say that Nixon could mention
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"the renunciation of force" issue concerning Communist China, 
i.e., that the Chinese had refused to make such a 
renunciation. Nixon was to incorporate that thought in his 
New York speech.46
But apparently the student had reconsidered his tutor's 
thoughts on the growing morass in the Middle East. Nixon, 
having turned the matter over in his mind, asked Dulles what 
he thought of his saying "It is unfortunate that just before 
the For Min Conf [sic] begins we are witnessing what appears 
to be an attempt to stimulate by proxy an arms race which 
could increase the chances for armed conflict in the ME 
[Middle East— sic]." Dulles gave his assent to that 
approach. Nixon also advised the secretary that he intended 
to say that in reference to that old-time Geneva spirit, the 
"time for words had passed; the time for deeds had come."47 
Nixon, although originally instructed to seek a higher level, 
was still going to keep his feet on the ground of realitistic 
skepticism. This stand had been consistent with the one he 
had taken since the first "peace soundings" emanated from 
Moscow.
In his speech to the forum sponsored by the voice of the 
Republican Eastern Establishment, Nixon warned against being 
too trusting or naive as far as Soviet intentions were 
concerned. Nevertheless, he put a more optimistic spin on the 
international situation than he had in the recent past. He 
said that the foreign ministers meeting slated for October 27 
held "more promise" than any other conference between the East 
•
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and West in the last ten years. The New York Tiroes commented 
that Nixon's speech was "notable for its nonpartisan, and even 
bipartisan tone." Even though the nation and the world's 
focus was fixed on Soviet-American relations and Europe at the 
time, Nixon still noted that Communist China's refusal to 
"renounce the use of force" was one of the many elements 
unsettling the globe, along with Soviet domination of Eastern 
Europe and the fear of surprise attack. Nixon denounced "what 
appears to be an attempt to stimulate by proxy an arms 
race...in the Middle East." He was actually referring to 
Czechoslavakia's willingness to provide arms for Egypt.48
But despite all of these "time bombs" ticking away in the 
world, Nixon saw the situation potentially balanced by the 
United Nations, the combined strength of America and the free 
world, atomic power, and the "spirit of Geneva" which he 
cautioned did not mean "naive acceptance of good words for 
good intentions." Yet, he still tried to arouse enthusiasm 
for the upcoming gathering of the "the Big 4" foreign 
ministers at Geneva.49
Nixon had backed foreign aid since his first term 
representing California's 12th Congressional District. This 
stand was anathema to the Republican right wing. He continued 
to support foreign aid not only through the Marshall Plan but 
as vice president, he consistently supported the domestically 
controversial foreign assistance programs. Nixon told Dulles 
that the administration should do even more about foreign
-229-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economic aid, or at least have the White House propose that 
Congress allocate more money for it. He advised that such a 
request should be made to "seem somewhat more dramatic" and he 
believed that this was "sound" policy and "good politics."50
But it certainly was not "good politics" as far as the Old 
Guard was concerned. Nixon had never agreed with the 
"Neanderthals" on America's role in international affairs. He 
was once more to distancing himself from the Old Guard and 
trying to appeal to a wider constituency. The vice president 
knew that the United States could not shrink from the 
responsibilities inherent in being a superpower. Nixon always 
preferred the challenge of the international arena to what he 
considered the more mundane matters of domestic affairs.
Also, as the 1956 election approached, whether or not 
Eisenhower would run (and it was by no means certain that he 
would since the health issue had not been laid to rest), Nixon 
realized the Old Guard would have no where to go other than 
the Republican Party, so he could take them for granted to a 
certain extent. Just as in his 1950 California Senate 
victory, and the 1952 national election, he knew that 
Republicans could not win with the conservative vote alone. 
Looking ahead to his own much-hoped for turn at seeking the 
White House, whether it be 1956 or 1960, Nixon had to do what 
was politically appealing to the broadest constituency. It so 
happened that in the case of foreign aid, what was good 
politically within the full electorate also coincided with his 
own firm beliefs on what the United States should do. In this
-230-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
instance, what was good for Richard Nixon politically, night 
very well also be good for the United States and vice versa.
Opening Salvos of the 1956 Campaign
Unlike in 1952, China and American foreign policy toward 
Asia were not destined to play the key role in the 1956 
presidential election. Nixon had predicted three weeks before 
Eisenhower's heart attack that the Battle of 1956 would be 
fought over the major issue of "the differences of economic 
philosophy" between the president and his Democratic opponent, 
"whoever he is going to be." In virtually the same breath, 
Nixon added that foreign policy would not be an issue but the 
Democrats would still have to defend the Truman 
administration's policies.51 This was Nixon's none too 
subtle way of saying that despite the stated emphasis on the 
economy, he would do his best to keep alive the 
"Achesonphobia" he had stirred up in the campaigns of 1950, 
1952, and 1954. Nixon persistently tried to haunt the 
American people with a spectre— the spectre of the ghoulish, 
mustachioed Yale man in the striped pants. Dean Acheson.
Nixon reinjected his rationale for foreign economic aid in 
a January 17, 1956, Philadelphia speech. Building on his 
conversation with Dulles just the month before, Nixon called 
for a "new definition for internationalist" which he proceeded 
to define as a "nationalist who realizes that what is good for 
our friends and allies abroad is in the final analysis good 
for us." He warned his audience at a Poor Richard Dinner (in
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honor of Ben Franklin, not the vice president) that the free 
world faced defeat not in "hot war but...in cold war" in which 
America's enemies would use psychological, political and 
economic tactics in trying to take over territory. This had 
become an old Nixon theme, but he never tired of saying that 
blatant armed aggression was not the only way for the 
Communists to make inroads. Foreign aid, wisely distributed, 
was for Nixon a vital armament in the cold war against 
communism. While the vice president charged that the Russians 
and Chinese offered foreign aid as a means of achieving 
domination of other countries, the U.S. granted aid "because 
we want every country...to be strong enough economically and 
politically to be independent of any foreign domination." 
Foreign aid was a means of shoring up the strength of friendly 
nations, not buying their loyalty to the United States, Nixon 
said.52 If perchance this just happened to be in the best 
interests of the United States, so much the better.
It was on to Chicago after the Philadelphia speech where 
Nixon spoke on January 20 to an enthusiatic crowd of over 
4,000 Republicans at a "Salute to Eisenhower" dinner. Nixon 
displayed no bipartisan magnanimity before this group as 
indicated in The New York Times comment that the vice 
president had returned "to his slashing platform style of 
1952... in what many in his audience regarded as the manner of 
a man who was running for high office."53 The evening may 
have been billed as a hearty salute to the general, but since 
Ike had not yet publicly decided what course he would chart
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for himself, Nixon wanted to be sure to be in position, young 
as he was at 43, for a shot at the GOP nomination for 
president should Eisenhower bow out. Nixon, as usual, went on 
the attack against Adlai Stevenson, who had recently offered 
his own critique of Dulles for the secretary's "brinksmanship" 
diplomacy, much ballyhooed in an article by James Shepley in 
Life magazine. It was the first sparring between Stevenson 
and Nixon in a year that would see the two frequently come to 
vicious verbal blows and impugn each other's fitness to be 
president. (The bogeyman that Stevenson created in an effort 
to frighten the American people was Nixon, who was the villain 
in the Democrat's nightmare scenario as the possible, even 
probable, successor to President Eisenhower. Nixon's 
screamer, in turn, had the weak-kneed Adlai as 
commander-in-chief.54)
Nixon attempted to revitalize the offshore islands as a 
political issue when he derided Stevenson for having "quavered 
over our strong stand when the Chinese Communists threatened 
Quemoy and Matsu and suggested that perhaps we had better 
force our Allies to give up these areas in order to avoid the 
risk of war." To add insult to injury, the vice president 
further accused Stevenson of "indecision, weakness, retreat 
and surrender."55 True to form, Nixon also made his 
traditional stab at the devil incarnate, Acheson, much to the 
appreciation of his fellow party members.
Back in New York for the Lincoln Day Dinner at the 
Waldorf-Astoria, Nixon again hit the Democrats hard, warning
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his Republican comrades that the country faced a stark choice 
in 1956 between the Eisenhower program and "something more 
radical."56 No interpreters were needed to translate that 
turn of phrase. Nixon might as well have cited the 
"Democratic threat" to America posed by liberals within that 
party. One wonders who Nixon really thought presented the 
most danger to the survival of the American way of life: the 
evil men in the Kremlin or the misguided leadership of the 
subversive, conspiratorial, appeasing, anglophilic, and 
revolutionary Democratic Party.
Throughout the winter, spring and even up until the 
Republican National Convention that August, Eisenhower let 
Nixon "twist, twist slowly in the wind" as to whether or not 
the younger man would keep his place on the GOP ticket. Nixon 
had to be on his best behavior and even though the Lincoln Day 
speech was a fighting partisan attack, it was given on the one 
day of the year when Republicans were allowed to let it all 
hang out. Eisenhower put Nixon through prolonged agony 
(torture might be a more apt description) as to what Nixon’s 
fate would ultimately be. The president camouflouged his 
desire to dump Nixon by trying to persuade the vice president 
to take an "administrative" post in the cabinet (except for 
the most prestigious posts of secretary of state or attorney 
general) so that the Californian could acquire the experience 
needed to make him more "mature." As if that was not enough 
for Nixon to have to deal with, Eisenhower insisted that the 
"choice" of remaining on the ticket was Nixon's and that he
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"chart his own course." Nixon, the experienced political 
survivor, managed to rally enough support within the GOP so 
that Eisenhower had to keep him despite the fact that the 
president, in his heart of hearts, wanted to dispose of him. 
But that was not politically expedient given Nixon's strong 
constituency among the Republican Party regulars.
Return To The Asialand
On May 11, Dulles sounded Nixon out on whether he would be 
willing to go to Manila in honor of the 10th anniversary of 
Philippine independence that July 4th. (The Philippines 
having been an American commonwealth, saw fit to have the same 
independence day as the mother country). Nixon wondered what 
Dulles "thought about the worthwhileness of the affair." To 
put it mildly, Nixon was not eager for a grand return to the 
archipelago.
In feeling Nixon out, Dulles asked if the trip was too 
close to August 11, which was a week before the Republicans 
convened their national convention. It is possible that Nixon 
may have been uneasy about being out of the country so close 
to the convention since it might allow his enemies within the 
party time to undercut his position as running mate-select for 
the 1956 ticket. As it turned out, it was difficult enough 
for Nixon to hold onto the No. 2 spot. Despite Nixon having 
Eisenhower's "endorsement," Harold Stassen worked behind the 
scenes at the convention in a last ditch effort to depose the 
Californian in favor of Governor Christian A. Herter, Sr. of
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Massachusetts.
Nixon took the trip which included another meeting with 
Chiang in Taiwan and a stop in Saigon. Even if he really had 
not wanted to go, he simply had no choice for being vice 
president was a bit like being expendable in wartime. His 
initial reluctance is quite understandable and perhaps one of 
the best examples of domestic political considerations 
influencing the "conduct" of foreign affairs. But in fairness 
to Nixon, he was fully prepared to do whatever Dulles and 
Eisenhower asked him to do.
Dulles said that should Nixon go, the Philippine 
independence celebration would present a good opportunity to 
make an appeal to the Asian people. The secretary advised 
Nixon to "delicately" suggest that the Philippines, having 
achieved their own independence should "do more in helping 
others, i.e., Vietnam, etc." Dulles told Nixon that "there 
was a tendency on the part of the Filipinos to be on the 
•gimme' side" and that it would be good if they "build up 
freedom" in Asia. Just how Dulles expected the Filipinos to 
do this was unclear, but perhaps he may have meant a wider 
role for them in SEATO.57
Nixon and Pat spent less than two weeks touring Asia 
rather than the two months they had traveled the continent 
three years before. Nixon set off some fireworks in his 
Fourth of July oration in Manila when he warned the "neutral" 
nations against thinking they could be safe by maintaining 
friendship with Moscow and Peking. Nixon's concern was that
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in rejecting collective security arrangements like SEATO, 
neutralists were leaving themselves open to what he often 
referred to as "communist colonial imperialism," playing on 
the recent memory in Asia of European colonialism.
The vice president saw two strains of neutralism in Asia. 
The first was on the part of those newly independent countries 
who "feel that their own internal problems compel them to 
abstain, at least for the moment, from mutual security pacts 
and associations." Nixon said the United States could 
"understand" such attitudes, especially when these countries 
"may feel that they are too geographically exposed to risk 
provoking communist colonial imperialism." In a suave 
debater's analogy, Nixon told the Filipinos that America, too, 
had once sought neutrality and that although that policy 
worked fine in the 19th Century, Americans "learned from [the] 
hard experience" of the two world wars that what worked in the 
previous century was "completely inadequate" for the 
present.58
In an intriguing choice of words considering his own 
recent ordeal at the hands of President Eisenhower, Nixon said 
that the U.S. believed "in the right of each individual nation 
to chart its own course" even if America did not completely 
agree with that decision. However, he added that it was "only 
natural" for America to "feel closer to those who stand with 
us as allies in the effort to keep the world free."59
Nixon next expressed his distaste for a second "brand of 
neutralism,11 one which "makes no moral distinction between the
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Communist world and the free world." The vice president 
proclaimed that the U.S. had "no sympathy" with this point of 
view and challenged it on the grounds that it did not 
distinguish between democracy and dictatorship. He 
acknowledged that there were indeed, "faults in the nations of 
the free world...but can anything that we have done compare 
with the history of Communism recently portrayed by Nikita 
Khrushchev himself?" (Nixon was referring to Khrushchev's 
denunciation of the Stalin purges of the 1930s). For extra 
impact, Nixon said he realized "there are those who feel that 
friendly neutrality toward the Kremlin and Peiping may spare 
them." He then quoted an old proverb as a caveat to those 
neutralists: "He who sups with the devil, must have a long 
spoon." He further warned of Communist ruthlessness, that 
they were "cold and calculating masters" and that "those who 
feel they can outmaneuver them are taking a fearful risk." 
Nixon exhorted the Filipinos to assist in the cause by 
"interpreting our views and intentions to your neighbors," 
thereby, following Dulles's prescription for delicately 
suggesting to America's former colonial subjects that they do 
more than just be on the receiving end.60
The next stop was Saigon which presented another delicate 
diplomatic backdrop since Nixon's arrival would coincide with 
the second anniversary of the beginning of rule by President 
Ngo Dinh Diem, which ultimately led to Vietnamese independence 
from France. The United Press reported that "an informed 
source" said that Nixon would try not to "steal the limelight
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from Mr. Diem and will try to avoid any suggestions that he 
came to Saigon to help celebrate the Diem anniversary."61
Nixon met with Diem on July 6 and spoke before the 
Vietnamese National Constituent Assembly, the first guest 
speaker ever invited to appear before that body. He praised 
Diem and delivered a letter from Eisenhower congratulating the 
new Vietnamese government for its "courage.1,62 Just two 
years after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the partition of 
Vietnam, that country had for the time being actually taken a 
lower priority in American concerns in Asia. For the moment, 
South Vietnam seemed relatively stable although the Eisenhower 
administration would have preferred, to say the least, that Ho 
Chi Minh not control North Vietnam. But in an election year, 
Nixon had to take the low profile of support for the Diem 
regime without rattling sabers that the voters back home might 
fear would ultimately be held by American boys— a fear that 
was to become a reality in the not too distant future.
. From Saigon it was on to Taiwan where Nixon delivered 
another letter from Eisenhower to Chiang. Although China was 
not at the forefront as the November election neared, 
Eisenhower thought it politically prudent to use the Nixon 
trip as a pretext to restate American support for the 
generalissimo. Eisenhower's letter tried to relieve the aging 
Chiang by assuring him that he should have "no 
misapprehension" about the "steadfastness" of U.S. support for 
the Republic of China.63 Eisenhower was really just 
covering his right flank here to ensure the support of the Old
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Guard and appease the Knowland wing of the GOP, but the 
"amateur" politician shrewdly ascertained that what he 
referred to as "mossbacks" had no where else to go but his 
column.
The New York Times reported that Eisenhower's message was 
intended to "relieve at least some of the doubts and 
suspicions that have existed here [Taipei] regarding the 
future course of United States policy on China." The "paper 
of record" also noted that "extra uneasiness" had been 
"generated" by the recent publication of Robert Donovan's 
Eisenhower: The Inside Storv in which the highly respected 
reporter had accurately portrayed Eisenhower as not wanting to 
be forced into any ironclad position regarding American policy 
toward Peking.64
The vice president held a press conference July 8 before 
departing for brief stopovers in Bangkok and Karachi on the 
return trip home. He categorically rejected the notion that 
Eisenhower's attitude on Peking had "softened." Chou En-lai 
had recently proposed that he and Dulles meet but Washington 
spurned that offer. Nevertheless, Taipei was worried and 
Nixon's remarks apparently eased the trepidation somewhat. 
Nixon told reporters that he had never "heard" Eisenhower 
suggest that the United States alter its policy of 
nonrecognition of Peking and opposition to the regime's 
admission to the U.N.65 Of course, Nixon was not telling 
the "truth" but one should not call him a liar. The 
realpolitik truth (that the U.S. government privately gave at
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least some thought to the day In the distant future when 
reality would have to be faced) was limited to the top secret 
National Security Council meetings.
During a four-hour stopover in Karachi, Nixon equated 
receiving aid from the Soviets to having a "rope tied around 
[the] neck." The Russians were generous in their offers of 
assistance, according to the vice president, because they had 
the ulterior motive of making the countries that received aid 
"satellites"— either economic, political, military or "all 
three." Yet, in virtually the same breath Nixon dismissed the 
notion that the United States should instantaneously reject 
helping nations that might accept help from the 
Communists.66 Knowing Nixon and Dulles's disdain for 
"Nehruism," it may have been no accident that India was 
omitted from the Nixon tour, but it should be pointed out that 
Nehru was in London for the Conference of the Commonwealth. 
Perhaps knowing that there was no love lost between Messrs. 
Nehru and Nixon, a visit to New Dehli was deemed 
diplomatically unnecessary, if not unwise. One persistent 
sticking point at this time resulted from remarks by 
Eisenhower in June that gave the impression that he held a far 
more moderate, and even sympathetic, view toward the neutrals 
than either his vice president or secretary of state. Also, 
since Nehru was abroad when Nixon reached Asia, one wonders 
whether or not the trip may have been timed when it was not 
only to help the Philippines celebrate its independence but to 
avoid any possibility of having to meet with the leader of the
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non-aligned world on his home turf.
As for Nixon's warning to the neutrals that economic aid 
from the Russians led to "satellitism," A.M. Rosenthal of The 
New York Times wrote that at least in Karachi, America's ally, 
the government was not quaking in its boots over the vice 
president's foreboding. The general sense in Pakistan, 
according to Rosenthal, was why not take assistance from 
whoever offers it? The Karachi papers downplayed the Nixon 
story and it was dismissed although such a reaction did not 
mean that Pakistan was moving into the Soviet camp.67 It 
simply illustrated that the newly independent nation had its 
own interests to protect and that if push came to shove, those 
interests, naturally, would be seen as more important than the 
whims of Washington.
As if the Pakistanis's lukewarm reception to their old 
friend Nixon's unsolicited advice was not bad enough, the next 
day the vice president's mentor, Dulles, undercut Nixon even 
more by backing off from his own previous hardline against the 
neturals. Now, the secretary of state maintained that "very 
few, if any" neturals were immoral. Nixon must have been 
exceedingly grateful for having such good friends at home in 
the administration. It was one thing for Eisenhower to leave 
Nixon dangling, but it must have really smarted when Dulles 
appeared to pull the rug out from under him, too. However, 
the real heat came from the opposition when Democrats Senator 
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee (soon to carry his party's 
standard on the second spot of the national ticket) and New
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York Congressman Emmanuel Celler let scored Nixon over his 
recent comments. Celler charged Nixon with having an "open 
feud" with Nehru and urged Eisenhower to disavow Nixon's 
assault on neutralism which the Brooklyn congressman 
maintained were endangering American-Indian friendship.68
Nixon's second time around in Asia received scant press 
attention compared to his trip in 1953. Although Time played 
up Nixon's welcoming party at Washington's airport which 
included Dulles, Knowland and Republican National Chairman Len 
Hall as an indication of administration backing of the Nixon 
hard-line against the neutrals (Nixon's cheering section at 
Henry Luce's influential magazine apparently chose to overlook 
Dulles's remarks), most of the press seemed more concerned 
with whether or not Eisenhower would indeed deign to retain 
Nixon as his second in command. The focus was on the upcoming 
election rather than any Nixon thesis on the political 
situation in Asia. Upon returning to the country, Nixon did 
go up to Gettysburg to see Eisenhower, who was recuperating 
from an operation the previous month for ileitis. Although he 
reportedly briefed the President on his trip, newspaper 
reports concentrated on politics back here on the home 
front.69 With Americans no longer losing their lives in an 
Asian war, the vast, populous continent had rapidly receded 
from the hearts and minds of the voters.
The 1956 Election
Nixon continued to take the hard-line publicly against
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Peking. In a September 6 speech before the American Legion in 
Los Angeles, Nixon attacked what he called the "new look” in 
Soviet diplomacy and explained why the West should not be 
taken in by it. He pandered to the legionnaires on China when 
he chided the infamous "some” who said that "from a practical 
business standpoint we are foolish to persist in our refusal 
to recognize Red China and to admit its representatives to the 
United Nations." Nixon declared that the U.S. would "not 
yield to blackmail" and rejected "cowardly expediency" as he 
dismissed Communist China as a "bully." He lashed out against 
the Democratic opposition who was "well-meaning but mistaken" 
in having the United States "seek the surrender of Quemoy and 
Matsu."70 The vice president, a legionnaire himself, was 
just giving a warmed over version of his speech the previous 
year to the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
As the campaign progressed, the Mephistopheles for Nixon 
was, not surprisingly, the Democratic presidential nominee, 
Stevenson. Nixon told Dulles that Stevenson was 
"irresponsible" on foreign policy and defense and Dulles 
countered that the country could not "afford" a "trial and 
error Pres, [sic]"71 Both of these themes became stanzas in 
Nixon's rhetorical battle with the Democrat that fall.
Stevenson got into political trouble over two 
controversial proposals made early in the campaign. These 
ideas were laid out before the legionnaires in Los Angeles the 
day before Nixon addressed the convention. Stevenson stirred 
up a storm by suggesting a world-wide ban on hydrogen bomb
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tests and that the country convert from a military draft to an 
all volunteer force. (Stevenson knew of rumors that the 
administration was thinking of scrapping the draft as part of 
its military modernization program.72 This was a preemptive 
strike by Stevenson but unfortunately for him, it just left 
him all the more vulnerable to Republican massive 
retaliation.)
Nixon immediately picked up on this and charged that 
Stevenson was naive and his policies could only endanger 
America's national security. Politics is full of irony, of 
course, and it was Nixon as president who would end the draft 
and seek nuclear arms reductions with the Russians. But that 
was in the distant future and Nixon seized on Stevenson's
stand to taint the Democrat as being unfit to lead the nation.
After all, Nixon argued, who better to watch over the defense 
of America at home and abroad than the greatest soldier of the 
20th Century, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Stevenson, the 
darling of the liberal Democrats, the egghead, simply was not 
up to the job. It is ironic, of course, that Eisenhower had
first proposed "atoms for peace," although he seriously
doubted that the Russians would accept the offer. But the 
president reaped the harvest of propaganda benefits for the 
free world's cause and his own political benefit. Stevenson 
had the misfortune of making a well-intended, even rational 
proposal at the wrong time in the nation's history. Political 
expediency ruled the roost and Nixon treated Stevenson's good 
will as a sign of weakness to be capitalized on by the GOP.
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As for Stevenson, he did show political courage although 
one has to doubt the efficacy of his political judgment. He 
was sailing against the wind for what possible political gain 
could he make by trying to take on Eisenhower over defense 
issues? It was a no-win situation for the Democratic 
nominee. Although Nixon certainly took the low road in 
questioning Stevenson's qualifications to be president, 
Stevenson ultimately degraded himself by desperately striking 
out against Nixon and trying to frighten the American people 
with the spectre of Nixon as president should Eisenhower not 
make it through the next four years. Such drastic efforts to 
induce Nixonphobia in the body politic were unbecoming to 
Stevenson, who was an eloquent, idealistic visionary if 
ultimately an ineffectual politician. The "health issue" 
concerning Eisenhower undoubtedly stuck in the minds of those 
who detested Nixon, but it seemed as though Adlai had adopted 
the voice of Nixon, himself, to go after the vice president. 
Stevenson seemed to be an actor in the wrong play and this 
hurt him because he had established such a solid reputation as 
a reflective gentleman in his politics, no matter what the 
opposition hurled at him. It seemed that all he needed now 
was a persistent five o'clock shadow to make him Nixon's 
equal.
Whatever slim chance Stevenson had of sending Eisenhower 
to an early retirement at the Gettysburg farm was dashed with 
the culmination of crises over Suez and the brutal Soviet 
squelching of the Hungarian uprising. Stevenson was cursed
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with the bad luck of having these crises erupt on the eve of 
the election and with the world facing turmoil, the American 
people chose to stay with War Hero Eisenhower.73
The China issue simply did not figure in the election 
outcome for it seemed that the last thing the American people 
wanted to hear about was Quemoy, Matsu or the Communist threat 
in Vietnam. "Peace and Prosperity" was what they wanted and 
what the Republicans played up to the hilt. What had been one 
of the hottest political issues of the last seven years, not 
to mention the "brinksmanship" of 1955 over the islands in the 
strait, had temporarily cooled off. But China was not fated 
to remain dormant for long and Nixon would once again find 
himself in the midst of a storm between the two nations and 
the subsequent domestic political ramifications at home.
Quempy-MatsuEncore
A long intermission in the melodrama of the islands in the 
strait lasted from April 1955 until August 23, 1958, when the 
Chinese Communists renewed shelling of Quemoy and Matsu.
Chiang declined to follow the American government's advice 
three years before to reduce the Nationalist presence on the 
principal offshore islands. Rather, he had stubbornly 
increased his military forces on Quemoy to nearly 100,000 
ground troops, flying in the face of Eisenhower's private 
judgment that the islands were not strategically important to 
the survival of Chiang's regime on Taiwan.
But publicly, the president took a different tack and
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ordered an increase in the U.S. naval presence in the Formosa 
Strait. On September 4, Dulles met with Eisenhower in 
Newport, Rhode Island, where the president was vacationing.
The secretary of state then held a news conference, where he 
cited the Formosa Resolution of 1955 and unequivocably stated 
United States resolve to defend the islands from any Communist 
invasion. Dulles actually took a far harder line than did 
Eisenhower (or the Formosa Resolution). A week later, on 
September 11, the president tried to assure the nation that it 
was not on the brink of the apocalypse and confidently stated 
that he thought peace far more likely than war. On September 
6, Chou En-lai had called for the resumption of ambassadorial 
level diplomatic contacts in Warsaw between the U.S. and 
Chinese Communist ambassadors to Poland. This lessened 
tensions somewhat but the Chinese Communists continued to 
shell Quemoy while the United States successfully assisted the 
Chinese in resupplying the islands. The Communists called off 
the bombardment for a week in October and then resumed it cn 
an every other day basis, which prompted Eisenhower to quip 
that he "wondered if we were in a Gilbert and Sullivan war." 
The crisis soon fizzled out like a wet firecracker but 
Quemoy-Matsu did intrude into the 1958 mid-term congressional 
campaign largely due to Nixon sniping at the Democrats for 
criticizing the administration on the issue.74
Nor did Foggy Bottom escape Nixon's sharp tongue. The 
vice president was a little trigger-happy when on September 27 
he lashed out against the State Department for what he wrongly
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assumed was a leak. The vice president was angry that the 
State Deparment, in responding to a routine question from the 
press, had said that the White House mail was running four to 
one against the administration's Quemoy-Matsu policy. Nixon's 
charge that the State Department was trying to "sabotage" the 
administration's Far East policy drew not only the wrath of 
the usual Nixon critics, but the unhappiness of Dulles as 
well. All of the talk being encouraged by the vice 
president's supporters of the "new Nixon" seemed to have been 
for naught.75
Nixon had confided to Dulles as early as September 25 that 
he thought the situation in the strait was not necessarily 
harmful to the Republicans in the upcoming November election 
and that a "strong line" should be taken through the campaign 
because it "is bound in the end to be more effective" than 
either retreat or surrender.76
The vice president adamantly insisted on October 2 in San 
Francisco that the administration was not "retreating" on the 
islands in the wake of Dulles's comment a couple of days 
before that the Nationalists might cut the size of their 
forces on the rocks. Nixon stuck to the hard-line and told 
the reporters that he had cleared his remarks with Dulles, so 
as not to leave himself vulnerable like the week before when 
he lashed out against the imaginary sabateurs at State. He 
warned that if the islands were handed over to the 
Commmunists, it would be interpreted as a "reward for 
aggression and an invitation for the Communists to use similar
-249-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
tactics to nibble away parts of the free world."77
Up the coast in Portland, Oregon the next day, Nixon 
proposed that the United Nations oversee a referendum in 
Communist China and the Soviet bloc on whether the people of 
those countries wanted to be ruled by the Communists. It was 
a proposal that Nixon knew the Chinese and Soviets would never 
agree to. He made it simply to counter a separate idea put 
forth by his old nemesis, Adlai Stevenson, who had spoken out 
strongly against administration policy in the Formosa Strait 
and suggested that the United Nations supervise an election on 
Taiwan to determine if the people there wanted an independent 
government or to continue under Chiang's regime.78
Nixon turned up the heat in Chicago on October 13 when he 
reopened fire on his favorite target, Dean Acheson. Someone 
should have told Nixon that Acheson had been out of office for 
nearly six years and that indeed, the Republicans were the 
party in power. But Nixon raised Acheson up as another 
bogeyman. The only difference in the castigation of the 
Democrats this time was that Nixon branded the Democratic 
misdeeds of the past as the "Acheson foreign policy" rather 
than "Truman-Acheson." Acheson had been one of the most vocal 
critics of the Eisenhower administration over the offshore 
islands, saying that they were not worth one American life.
In defense of the overall administration foreign policy, Nixon 
declared his favorite standby that "In a nutshell, the Acheson 
foreign policy resulted in war and the Eisenhower-Dulles 
policy resulted in peace" alluding to the Acheson "defense
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perimeter" speech of 1950 in which the then secretary of state 
placed Korea outside of the U.S. defense perimeter. The Nixon 
interpretation, repeated ad nauseum, held that the Acheson 
"policy" of "retreat and appeasement" led to the "loss of 
China" and ultimately, the Korean War.79 Nixon wanted the 
voters to be sure that the Republicans would hold fast and not 
give up an inch of the offshore islands.
In a press conference on October 14, Dulles made some 
remarks which were taken as a rebuke of Nixon since the 
secretary of state said that he did not think that foreign 
policy should be injected into the campaign. Eisenhower made 
a similar comment as well. But Dulles issued another 
statement the next day which seemed to give Nixon the benefit 
of the doubt by saying that Nixon could respond to attacks 
from the Democrats on the Eisenhower policy. Dulles, however, 
lamented the loss of the spirit of bipartisanship past but 
praised the many Democrats who had supported the 
administration in the international arena.80
Although Dulles appeared to be backtracking, Nixon was 
smarting from the sting of the rod inflicted on his knuckles 
by the schoolmaster, especially since it turned out that 
Dulles had actually asked Nixon to give a speech scoring the 
Democrats on Quemoy-Matsu! In fact, Dulles had even written 
the draft of the address he criticized Nixon for making!
Meade Alcorn, who was then chairman of the National Republican 
Committee told Herbert S. Parmet in an April 1984 interview 
that Nixon was livid about the press's interpretation of
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Dulles's words as a rebuke to Nixon when the secretary had put 
Nixon up to the speech in the first place. Nixon, himself, 
confirmed Alcorn's account in a June 1984 interview with 
Farmet. Alcorn claimed that he and Democratic National 
Chairman Stephen Mitchell had an understanding in the 1958 
campaign that Quemoy-Matsu would be kept out of the political 
debate. But Democratic Senator George Smathers of Florida 
(who was actually a friend of both Nixon's and John F. 
Kennedy's) broke the truce and attacked the administration 
over the the islands. Dulles asked Nixon to respond and 
prepared the draft of the speech. Nixon had good reason to be 
piqued and Alcorn claimed that soon after a meeting took place 
in the White House between the president, vice president and 
secretary of state to smooth over the trouble that Nixon had 
inadvertently been hurled into by his superiors.81 He was 
again being the point man but as the press portrayed the 
incident, he was taking the heat from Dulles and even 
Eisenhower rather than the opposition. That was too much to 
ask of anyone and Nixon understandably was angry.
Eisenhower, too, had to recant his initial back of the 
hand to Nixon. He sent the vice president a telegram more or 
less giving him the green light to stand up for the Republican 
administration's foreign policy. "Questions and criticismhave 
involved...our relationship with Nationalist China, the 
defense of Quemoy, Matsu, etc.," the president's telegram 
read. "These actions, when criticized, should be supported by 
our side. No one can do this more effectively than you."82
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Although Elsenhower, like Dulles, mourned the passing of the 
"Golden Age of Bipartisanship" in foreign policy, it seems 
that the old general and the even older dean of American 
diplomacy finally had to publicly come to grips with the 
reality that yes, indeed, foreign policy can and does become a 
major political issue in the course of an election campaign.
At least Nixon was honest enough to tell it like it is; 
namely, that foreign policy is not above the discourse of 
political debate. Unfortunately for the vice president, he 
was left dangling again for a time by the commander-in-chief 
and even his mentor, the secretary of state. The 
Eisenhower-Nixon relationship had all the elements of the 
classic Freudian father-son competition and Eisenhower, in 
that all too human desire to hold on to the reins of power, 
was not eager to be succeeded by anyone, let alone the young, 
often brash, Californian who he never liked much anyway.
After the Communist Chinese resumed their on again, off 
again bombardment, Nixon claimed in Baltimore on October 21 
that such action would not deter the United States from 
following its "firm policy." As usual, he castigated 
"radical" Democrats who were "bitterly partisan" in their 
criticism of the Eisenhower administration but praised Lyndon 
Johnson, who had supported the president. He added that the 
U.S. "learned once and for all that in dealing with 
dictators— first Hitler and then Korea" that a "weak policy is 
a war policy" while a "firm policy is a peace policy."83
The next day in Providence, Nixon once more distanced
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himself from the Chiang devotees of the China Lobby by saying 
that the free and independent government on Taiwan was 
ultimately more important as a symbol than Chiang Kai-Shek, 
himself. So much for the George Washington of the Chinese 
Revolution. On that very day, Dulles was meeting in Taipei 
with the generalissimo to try and get Chiang to discard his 
delusion that an invasion would bring about his glorious 
return to the mainland. Dulles may have despised the 
Communist Chinese but Eisenhower simply did not have the 
appetite to bring America to war over the islands. Dulles got 
Chiang to agree to a "non-force" declaration in qualifying his 
desire to "liberate" the Chinese people on the mainland 
through political and peaceful means rather than force of 
arms.84 (The Chinese Communists, also, had often spoken of 
"liberating" Taiwan.) Of course, the irony is that Chiang 
never had the power to pose any serious threat to Peking but 
Washington frequently had to soothe the generalissimo's ego.
The 1958 election turned out to be a disaster for the 
Republicans with the Democrats dramatically increasing their 
hold on both the House and the Senate. Despite Nixon's 
nonstop campaigning, the GOP suffered a serious setback and 
Nixon took most of the blame, as he had in 1954, since he had 
been the primary spokesman for the Republicans. By election 
day, the offshore islands had sunk as a determining issue of 
the campaign and the controversy really lay in Nixon's brutal 
attacks on the opposition. But to Nixon's credit, he did not 
shy away from a fight that he knew was going to be next to
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impossible to win.
Looking to the future, Nixon's seemingly tenable grasp on 
the 1960 Republican presidential nomination suddenly appeared 
to be less than a sure thing after Nelson Rockefeller's 
landslide victory for governor of New York. The New York 
Times even ran a headline two days after the election that 
stated the case succinctly: "Results Weaken Nixon Hold on 
•60."85 Yet, Nixon's partisanship, although far from 
gentlemanly, paid off at least in terms of his winning the GOP 
nomination two years later. Not even Rockefeller's millions 
could compensate for the position of leadership Nixon had 
earned within the Republican Party. Sometimes there is just 
no substitute for pure hard work and while Nixon went down 
with a losing cause in 1958, the party faithful would not 
forget that he was out there fighting, while Rockefeller made 
virtually every possible effort to disassociate himself from 
the national Republican Party and the Eisenhower 
administration. Nixon's tactics were often reprehensible but 
politics is a nasty business and Nixon was willing to do 
battle. The importance of the 1958 election is that Nixon 
bore the torch for the GOP and even got the president to 
concede that foreign policy was not entirely out of place in 
the rough and tumble of political campaigning. Despite 
Nixon's initial embarrassment and anger over Dulles and 
Eisenhower's apparent criticism for the speech the secretary 
of state had asked him to give, Nixon still emerged 
politically alive.
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The campaign also added to the enduring deep-seated 
emotions of the legions of Nixon haters in the Democratic 
Party. If they hated him, he had certainly brought much of 
that wrath upon himself through his own bellicosity. But 
those who saw his standing diminished by the 1958 vote 
underestimated Nixon. Then again, he had often been 
underestimated and his political obituary was written many 
times only for his enemies to see him ultimately survive.
China had reemerged for at least a while as an important 
issue in 1958 due to the crisis in the strait. The bits of 
rock and the length to which the United States should go in 
defending them would also play a role in the 1960 campaign 
when Nixon squared off with John F. Kennedy in quest of the 
presidential prize.
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CHAPTER 5;-BIgK AWD.. JACK
Richard Nixon had once again done battle for the 
Republican Party in 1958. His detractors in both parties 
blamed him for the GOP's poor shoving that year but Nixon, 
ever the party man, had decided not to duck the inevitable 
criticism that would come with the party's unimpressive 
performance. He proudly waved the bloody shirt, albeit in 
defeat. He would make the best of the situation, as he so 
often did. After all, he had gone down with the good ship GOP 
when others had abandoned it.
Nixon, who had been considered the front runner for the 
1960 Republican nomination, awoke the morning after the 
election to a living nightmare for any hard working middle 
class American boy who had struggled up the ladder in 
politics: a man by the name of Nelson Rockefeller had won the 
New York governorship in a landslide, and this was the period 
in the country's political history when New York was still 
truly the Empire State, the big playing card in presidential 
elections. Was all of Nixon's hard work of the last 12 years, 
fighting in the trenches of political warfare, to be for 
naught as John D. Rockefeller's dyslexic grandson positioned 
himself to take the grand prize? Nixon was not a quitter then 
and he was not going to stand on the sidelines (this was not 
Whittier College football) and allow Governor Rockefeller to 
take away the crown that he thought was rightly his (no matter 
what the opinion of the bald, elderly general in the Oval 
Office).
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Nixon was fortunate to be coming into his political 
maturity (even though Ike seemed to be forever wondering if 
the young Californian would ever grow up) at a time before 
liberal, moderate Republicans had gone the way of the buffalo. 
Nixon could hold down the center and plan to lure the support 
of both the right-wing and those namby pamby moderate Eastern 
Establishment New York Herald Tribune types who had engineered 
the great Eisenhower victories of 1952 and 1956. Nixon, a 
great student of his own defeats, was to follow a similar, and 
ultimately victorious path in 1968. But that was still in the 
future. The gods were not to smile upon the man from sunny 
Southern California his first time running atop the ticket.
But as the 1960 election approached, the vice president 
had only one recourse: To work harder than any potential 
opponents within the party apparatus and ready himself to call 
in his chits from all of the dedicated Republicans for whom he 
had campaigned during both the times of feast and famine. (If 
one thing could be said accurately about Richard Nixon, he was 
never above politics in the Eisenhowerean sense of the term, 
and it was this very quality that would lead him not only to 
his later triumphs but also to his decline, fall and disgrace, 
not to mention his public relations plotted post-presidential 
rehabilitation as elder American statesman of world affairs.)
And Nixon did just that. He was out on the circuit in 
1959 giving serious speeches, most of which he crafted 
himself, in the waning age of oratorical politics before 
Madison Avenue and the 30-second sound bite revolutionized the
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American Republic. China was not to be a major issue until 
the 1960 presidential debates with that handsome, 
full-head-of-wavy-hair junior senator from Massachusetts, John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy. Even then, it seemed more a matter of 
geography than potential gain or loss of international 
prestige. But foreign affairs undoubtedly were to prove to be 
the crux of that election. Nixon was fresh from victory at 
the "Battle of Caracas" in 1958, where he and his wife, Pat, 
suffered the humiliation of being spat upon with the minor 
footnote that he was lucky to escape with his life from an 
anti-Yanqui mob that had surrounded his limousine. But the 
Navy veteran did get revenge of a sort when he kicked a 
Communist demonstrator in the shin. The world traveler from 
the small Quaker town wanted to keep a high profile as 
America's up and coming leader in 1959 with steady work in the 
international arena. He'd show Rockefeller and the other 
father-made millionaire, Kennedy, that experience and hard 
work could beat money any day. This was America and to Nixon, 
himself, he was some latter day proof of the American Dream, a 
Lincoln for the 1960s.
BeSociable. Have a Pepsi
The high point of 1959 for Nixon was his trip to Moscow in 
July where he held his own in the now legendary "Kitchen 
Debate" with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the American 
Exhibition. As black and white television had saved Nixon's 
career during the fund crisis, color television was to give
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the vice president a boost as the lean Californian and chubby 
Russian were to play to the color cameras as they each chimed 
in with what they believed to be the virtues of their own 
societies. Nixon, still the young and dashing debater, 
praised the American system of capitalism as he stood in a 
"model" middle class home of the much lauded "American worker" 
while Krushchev historionically indicated to the vice 
president that the Soviet Union would pass the United States 
and wave "bye-bye" as the "Paradise of the Proletariat" played 
out its dialectic and catapulted into the future leaving the 
country that brought the world Disneyland back in the past.
It made for great television and Nixon, only a year after the 
showdown in Caracas, once again was seen around the world on 
the tube as having stood up to the Communists— this time, in 
the person of the leader of the Soviet Union.
While praising communism and excoriating capitalism and 
the United States, it was no small symbolic point that 
Chairman Khruschev took a sip of Pepsi at the exhibition, 
which that corporate giant was to be sure to immortalize with 
a photo using its advertising campaign slogan "Be Sociable, 
Have a Pepsi." The old Russian could shout and stamp his feet 
all he wanted, but the Capitalists had the last laugh at the 
Chairman's expense. It seemed that Communist leaders made for 
good advertising copy for capitalist e n t e r p r i s e s .
Off and Running
Nixon became a formal candidate for the Republican
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presidential nomination in January 1960. The vice president 
had probably breathed a sigh of relief just after Christmas 
when Rockefeller withdrew from the race. But Nixon was shrewd 
enough to know that he still had to keep his eye on the New 
York governor and maintain his guard. Kennedy also declared 
his candidacy that month and was the clear front runner for 
the Democrats. Kennedy opened the campaign barrage with an 
attack on Eisenhower, claiming that the old general was not a 
strong president. Nixon defended the 34th president by 
lauding Eisenhower as a "persuader” and he pointed out that 
Eisenhower had handled the crises over Quemoy-Matsu without 
getting the United States into war, as well as similarly 
handling the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Lebanon crisis of 
1958.1 It was as if the vice president were just 
discovering the benefits of Theodore Roosevelt's dictum, "Walk 
Softly, but Carry a Big stick." One can only surmise that 
Nixon was trying to reassure the electorate that he was no mad 
man and that despite his bellicose positions throughout the 
1950s, the American people could expect a President Nixon in 
1961 to lead the nation in the calm, persuasive and effective 
manner of the "Great Hero" Ike.
The vice president portrayed himself as a "progressive 
conservative" in an April 23rd Washington speech before the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors. Indeed, Nixon was 
holding onto the center within the GOP and looking, as he had 
since his first California congressional campaign, to court 
the votes of independents and those Democrats who he thought
-268-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
might choose him as an alternative to a more liberal 
Democratic candidate. Nixon used the opportunity to continue 
his strong backing of foreign aid and he observed that the 
future of America as a world power depended upon the peoples 
of Asia and Africa.2
In his remarks that day, Nixon raised the spectre of what 
later in the decade became known as the Sino-Soviet split. 
Speaking of Khrushchev, Nixon told the assembled editors that 
"while it is probably too early to conclude that he 
[Khruschev] may be troubled by his Chinese ally...he may well 
be deeply concerned by the nightmare which is taking form on 
his long common border with China." Nixon was then asked by 
one of the editors how the American and Chinese governments 
and their people could "develop greater intercommunication?" 
Nixon's response was revealing of his consistency throughout 
the period under study on China. He broke down the question 
into two parts: when the U.S. should recognize Communist China 
and the fact that the two countries could have relations of a 
kind without formal recognition. He did not sound like a 
front man for the China Lobby but like a realistic statesman 
who had thought through a very delicate and complicated 
issue. Nixon maintained that the United States should 
recognize Peking and support its admission to the U.N. when 
the latter "qualifies for recognition and for admission to the 
U.N. as a peace loving nation in its international policies." 
The vice president disputed the notion that it was impossible 
to have disarmament agreements with the Chinese without formal
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recognition of their government. He pointed out that the U.S. 
and China had been negotiating for the last two years over 
American prisoners held by Peking (Nixon was referring to 
pilots who had been downed by the Chinese).3
Nixon insisted to the editors that the United States 
maintain its position of nonrecognition and opposition to 
Peking's admission to the U.N and he described the Communist 
regime as an "outlaw government." But as Nixon always seemed 
to do in discussing this highly sensitive matter, he left 
himself an "escape clause" in which he kept open the 
possibility that the United States would change its policy 
when the Communist Chinese changed theirs. "Looking to the 
future," Nixon said, "I would say that there will be certain 
facts and circumstances which will be motivating them toward a 
change in direction of their policies just as there may be 
facts and circumstances which...may be motivating us." Was 
Nixon being prescient or was this something that academic 
psychologists call a self-fulfilling prophecy, to be achieved 
when Nixon was to become president? Nixon reaffirmed the view 
that the Chinese could be brought into disarmament 
negotiations with the Russians and the United States even 
though Washington did not recognize Peking. At the same time, 
walking a political tightrope, the vice president called for 
the United States "to keep before the world our position that 
our failure to recognize and our opposition to support them 
[the Communist Chinese] for admission to the United Nations is 
based on sound principles of international morality." But
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Nixon added this capper: that the American "policy can and 
will be changed once the Chinese Communist Government merits 
its change."4 The lure was cast upon the waters— recognition 
of Peking might well be ahead (sometime in the undefined 
future). Nixon put the ball squarely in China's court. The 
question was really up to the Chinese, or so it would seem 
according to the vice president's remarks. Only the Chinese 
could earn American recognition. Good faith but especially 
good works would be rewarded. China would have to abandon its 
"outlaw ways" and live by the creed of the United Nations 
Charter. But Nixon said nothing about China giving up 
communism. All those years in southern California high school 
and college debates paid off for Nixon, who could master the 
nuance of a political argument and manage to satisfy a 
constituency far broader than the Asia Firsters. Nixon said 
nothing about driving Mao from Peking nor did he declare that 
Chiang would have to be allowed to reestablish his government 
on the mainland. His position on China was founded on the 
bedrock of realpolitik and not the wishful, pipe dream that 
kept the China Lobby living in "hope of heaven"— of a return 
to Peking and a Paradise Regained.
As mentioned above, Nixon also used the forum of newsmen 
to reiterate his support for foreign aid. In addition, he 
warned that if the United States should change its policy of 
reciprocal trade, it would have dangerous repercussions. He 
particularly was concerned that if the United States raised 
its artificial tarriff barriers with Japan, it would only
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succeed in forcing Japan to turn to Communist China, which to 
say the least, would be detrimental to American interests in 
Asia.5 Herbert S. Parmet has suggested that worry over 
inadvertently leading Japan into the arms of China was also a 
widespread concern within the State Department.
Nixon had a revealing private conversation in early May 
with one prominent newsman, The New York Times's Arthur Krock. 
Nixon categorized the most important area of rivalry with the 
Soviet Union as the "economic" which echoed the stance he had 
been taking for more than the last decade, namely that the 
United States needed to be economically strong as well as 
militarily powerful. The most significant comment Nixon made 
to Krock was that he viewed himself as a consistent 
internationalist. Nixon complained to Krock that "it was a 
prevalent practice to accuse him [Nixon] of having switched 
from insularity to internationalism for political reasons." 
Nixon saw this as an "effort to prove he is without conviction 
or principle." The vice president then told the distinguished 
Washington columnist that "My record, from the time I entered 
the House, completely refutes this charge or insinuation. It 
shows that I have voted for all international legislation, 
even before the Greek-Turk aid bill, and Chris Herter [then 
secretary of state who had headed the 1947 Herter Committee of 
which Nixon was a member; the committee consisted of 
congressmen who went to Europe to witness first hand the 
devastation wrought by the war and to recommend what course 
American aid should take in Western Europe's reconstruction]
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can verify this so far as the House is concerned if anyone 
doubts my statement. What the internationalists among the 
liberals really have against me is my part in exposing Alger 
Hiss, which embarrassed many of them and angered more. This 
is the real animation of their untrue representation that I am 
a Johnny-come-lately on the foreign policy they are aligned 
with."6
Nixon was right insofar as he had been consistent on his 
record as an internationalist for he had supported the 
Marshall Plan and the Truman policy in Europe. As for his 
sense that liberals were "against" him because he had unmasked 
Alger Hiss, he was not wrong. As Herbert Parmet quoted the 
late poet Delmore Schwartz in a lecture on Nixon, "Just 
because you are paranoid does not mean there is not anyone 
after you."7
Nixon also made clear to Krock one difference he had with 
Eisenhower: If Nixon were at the helm, he intimated to Krock 
that there would be more forceful presidential leadership in 
the area of civil rights. Nixon told Krock that "I think the 
President alone can exercise the essential moral leadership 
against racial discriminations, and should do so." The only 
thing left unsaid was that Eisenhower was not exercising that 
moral leadership, was not utilizing the "Bully Pulpit" that 
was the presidency.8
On May 15, Nixon made a splash by being interviewed for 
over three hours on David Susskind's live television program 
"Open End." With that much time on camera, Susskind had to
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ask Nixon about China. Nixon restated his oft said public 
position that the U.S. should oppose Communist China's entry 
to the United Nations as long as Peking defied the U.N. 
articles. But before the national television audience, the 
vice president was sure to sound more hawkish on the China 
question than he had before the editors' meeting. After all, 
this go-round with Susskind was televised for domestic 
political consumption. He told Susskind that "There is no 
nation in the world today which is more an outlaw nation than 
Red China" and that Mao "might welcome" a third World War as a 
way for Communism to grow around the globe. Nixon also 
commented that "admission of Red China to the U.N. at this 
point, and its recognition by the United States could well set 
in motion a chain of events in Southeast Asia which would 
result in communization of that area." This latter remark was 
merely a reiteration of what he had been saying during the 
Korean War and also during the Indochina Crisis of 1954— that 
it was China that posed the most serious threat to the 
stability of Asia.9
But the eyes of the world that week were on the Paris 
Summit, which was to shortly be torpedoed by the Russians in 
their anger over the shooting down of the American U-2 spy 
plane. China was continuing to fade from the forefront as the 
bellicose Khruschev stole the headlines and made hearts pound 
around the world as it seemed that the apocalypse might well 
come in the time of the chairman. The world situation was 
tense and this sense of danger was to be infused into the 1960
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campaign. The stage appeared to be set for a world which 
would not be able to survive "half-slave and half-free" or 
half under the dominion of the United States, heir to Lincoln, 
and half under the iron glove of the Soviets, heirs to Lenin.
On May 31, Nixon addressed the Council of Ministers of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Washington.
Nixon told the SEATO ministers that their collective security 
alliance was even more important than when it was founded six 
years before, particularly in the aftermath of the derailed 
Paris Summit. The presidential candidate noted that SEATO had 
been established "when Communist aggression was directly 
challenging Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and other countries of 
southeast Asia and when the unity of the non-Communist 
countries was by no means so clear as it is today." Nixon 
claimed that during its six years of existence, "overt 
Communist aggression has been deterred" but he observed that 
"probing actions, indirect aggression, and subversion have 
continued." As examples, he pointed to incidents along the 
Chinese-Indian border, "the rebellion in Laos stimulated 
across the north Vietnamese border" and "the continuing 
Communist-instigated violence in South Vietnam." Nixon acidly 
commented that Communism had not changed in the years since 
SEATO's founding, but that the "free countries" of the region 
had "gained greatly in strength at home and in their posture 
of preparedness and solidarity."10
Nixon was especially harsh in his criticism of the 
Communist Chinese government before the SEATO ministers. He
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was not talking now to the editors of America's leading 
newspapers but to representatives of countries for whom China 
posed the most serious threat. Nixon could always play to an 
audience and he knew what these Asian politicians wanted to 
hear. They would not walk away dissatisfied for the 
Californian was humming the tune for which they yearned. The 
vice president scored Peking on its reaction to the torpedoing 
of the Paris summit. "Peiping [Peking], almost unique among 
the capitals of the world," Nixon said, "has received the news 
of Mr. Khrushchev's sabotage at Paris with undisguised 
satisfaction." Nixon portrayed Mao rather than Khrushchev as 
the main impediment to peace, adding credence to historian 
Gordon Chang's view that China was the "main enemy" of the 
United States. "The Chinese Communists have long been openly 
disgruntled with even the appearance of peaceful intent by the 
Soviet leaders," Nixon commented and he claimed that Peking 
"made no secret of their unswerving adherence to the Stalinist 
line." Nixon seemed to be saying that at least Khrushchev had 
the good sense to denounce Stalin. Nixon also charged Mao 
with having said just two months before the doomed Paris 
Summit that "rather than fearing an atomic war, a third world 
war mnight assure his ultimate goal of a Communist world."11
The vice president then made an intriguing charge against 
the Chinese saying that the Peking leadership had "seized upon 
the failure of the [Paris] conference as an opportunity for 
renewed emphasis on the 'orthodox' Communist philosophy of the 
need for force as an essential ingredient in world Communist
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tactics." Nixon was certainly perceptive for he had just 
outlined the basic tenets of Maoism on the international 
scene. Was Nixon ready to stand up for his friend Nikita? 
Compared to Mao, it would seem that Khrushchev was manageable 
despite his bluster, braggadocio, and boorish behavior. 
"Fortunately, there are good indications even since the Paris 
conference that this view is not shared by Mr. Khrushchev," 
Nixon concluded.12
Meanwhile, back in the down and dirty world of American 
presidential politics, it seemed for a few days in June that 
Nixon's worst case scenario nightmare might well become a 
reality. Rockefeller was stirring, vehemently criticizing 
Nixon and seemingly ready and rearing to forget his disavowal 
of candidacy for top gun on the GOP ticket. He had previously 
stated firmly that he would not accept the No. 2 spot on the 
ticket. His renouncing of a presidential candidacy the prior 
December seemed far less firm. The scion of one of America's 
wealthiest families challenged Nixon to make clear his 
positions prior to the Republican convention. Nixon countered 
his nemesis by offering to submit to televised questioning by 
Rockefeller. But this did not satisfy the New York Republican 
who proceeded to spurn the Nixon offer.13 Had Nixon bowed 
humbly, kowtowed and kissed the ring of the governor, it is 
still doubtful that Rockefeller would have been appeased. 
Rockefeller had always gotten whatever he wanted and it was 
unimaginable to him to think that he could not have the 
presidency of the United States for the asking. As to why
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Nixon was so eager to please the Pontiff of New York Politics, 
the answer has already been alluded to. In that time, now 
appearing as ancient history, a Republican needed the support 
of the liberal, Northeastern GOP establishment-and Rockefeller 
embodied that "interest group" which was soon on its way to 
becoming yet just another minority in the American polity. 
Nixon ultimately met with Rockefeller on the governor's home 
turf (quite literally, for they met in the Rockefeller triplex 
apartment on Fifth Avenue) and hammered out what became known 
as the "Treaty of Fifth Avenue" in which Rockefeller tried to 
influence the Republican Platform toward a more liberal vein. 
Some of Nixon's critics on the right labeled the results of 
the meeting the "Surrender at Fifth Avenue." But the platform 
was not the most important thing and Nixon knew it. The 
nomination was the only game in town. A Rockefeller candidacy 
never got off the ground and Nixon succeeded in beating the 
richest kid on the block (and in the world) and emerged as the 
Republican presidential nominee in Chicago in late July. As 
Robert Divine has shrewdly pointed out, the "deal" with 
Rockefeller was helpful to Nixon because it gave him the 
advantage of being able to separate himself somewhat from the 
Eisenhower record without repudiating the Old Man on his 
stinginess regarding further expenditures for defense.14
On July 28, Nixon gave his acceptance speech before the 
party faithful in the town where 100 years before, the 
Republicans had crowned Lincoln as their choice for President. 
Nixon went immediately on the offensive, castigating the
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Democrats for criticizing America in a period which saw an 
onslaught of Communist propaganda from the Kremlin aimed at 
Washington (Kennedy's pointed critique of the Eisenhower 
administration in his acceptance of the Democratic nomination 
two weeks prior in Los Angeles was construed by Nixon to be 
nothing less than an attack from within the borders of the 
United States). Nixon struck back at the Man from
Massachusetts by bellowing "I say that at a time the
Communists are running us down abroad, it is time to speak up
for America at home." The vice president further poured on
the rhetoric in which he depicted America as being in "a race 
for survival in which our lives, our fortunes, our liberties 
are at stake." It was as if the Americans were the Greeks 
faced with the threat from the East mounted by the Russians as 
Persians led by Cyrus. As if on cue, Nixon sang his standard 
chorus in which he warned his fellow countrymen "that 
appeasement leads not to peace but to war" and he called for 
sound leadership (that apparently only he could provide) that 
would "steer us through these years, avoiding the extremes of 
belligerancy on the one hand, and appeasement on the 
other."15 Nixon had the doubly difficult task of convincing 
the electorate that he was tough but not reckless and not 
eager to push America towards the Apocalypse. The last thing 
he wanted was for the voters to recall his readiness in 1954 
to commit American ground troops in Vietnam. Such memories 
made for problems in election years.
Nixon also invoked another of his favorite themes that
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rang with consistency throughout the 1950s: the need for 
America to fight "another kind of aggression, aggression 
without war, where the aggressor comes not as a conqueror, but 
as a champion of peace, of freedom, offering progress and 
plenty and hope to the unfortunates of the earth."16 It was 
this very kind of propaganda war that Nixon had been warning 
about since the dismissal of General MacArthur.
With his finest rhetorical flourish, Nixon called for 
"victory for the free world...But let the victory we seek be 
not victory over any other nation or any other people. Let it 
be the victory of freedom over tyranny," he added, "of plenty 
over hunger, of health over disease in every country of the 
world." The vice president then went one to say that "When 
Mr. Khrushchev says our grandchildren will live under 
Communism, let us say his grandchildren will live in 
freedom."17 Nixon, staunch Republican that he was, had the 
memory of an elephant. He was to requote this line on 
Khrushchev in a 1990 interview with Mike Wallace of the CBS-TV 
program 60 Minutes, in which the then rehabilitated although 
formerly disgraced ex-president mused on the World and the 
Soviet Union in the Age of Gorbachev.
Nixon's antidote to the plague of communism was the ideals 
of the American Revolution, from his point of view the one and 
only paradigm for revolution. The vice president told the 
Republicans assembled in Chicago "that our answer to the 
threat of Communist revolution is renewed devotion to the 
great ideals of the American Revolution, ideals that caught
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the imagination of the world one hundred and eighty years ago 
and that still live in the minds and hearts of people 
everywhere."18 The Republican candidate had issued a 
clarion call of Vive La Revolution Americaine.
Nixon, ever steady on the volatile issue of civil rights, 
was sure to also remind the 1960 members of the party of 
Lincoln that racial discrimination here at home tarnished 
America's image abroad. He called for "ending the prejudice 
which one hundred years after Lincoln, to our shame, still 
embarrasses us abroad and saps our strength at home."12 The 
Republicans adjourned from Chicago with Nixon wearing the 
mantle of the GOP, eager to take on that young upstart, 
Kennedy, the Democracy's torchbearer.
In the International Arena
Columnist C.L. Sulzberger of The New York Times called 
Nixon "open-minded and sensitive" and wrote that should he be 
elevated to the presidency, "he doesn't intend to be bound by 
past methods and conceptions in formulating foreign policy." 
The vice president had expressed his litany of concerns in the 
international arena to Sulzberger, which the journalist 
dutifully recorded in his column. Nixon emphasized that "the 
Communists have identified themselves with the aspirations of 
other peoples but we speak only for Americans" and he 
suggested that "the Voice of America should seek more to be 
the voice of other peoples." Nixon retained far more 
sensitivity than most American political leaders of the day to
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the need to identify and resp«*ct the pride of the people of 
the developing world. For Nixon, the propaganda war remained 
as important in 1960 as it had been to his view of the world 
in 1951 and 1954. "We do not adequately let others know that 
we do not want to dominate them and that we believe in their 
economic progress for their sake as well as in our interests," 
he told Sulzberger. Nixon then reiterated his theme of a 
revitalized American Revolution as the grand example of change 
around the world, not just a means of preserving the status 
quo. "We must get across that ours is the true revolution and 
talk more of the promise of the American revolution, less of 
the menace of the Communist revolution," Nixon said. He was 
doing his best to accentuate the positive for all the 
developing world to see. "And we must make plain that we do 
not expect others to share all our views and imitate all our 
actions," the vice president concluded.20
He included his standard defense of foreign aid, then not 
a popular stand for a Republican candidate for president to 
make. Nixon never lacked "the vision thing." "We are not 
wedded to the status quo," he said. "We recognize that the 
world is in a process of change and that the popular masses 
want a better way of life." Nixon showed a keen sensitivity 
as to how American intentions were often misinterpreted and 
misconstrued around the world. "Unfortunately," he added,
"the image we present is often distorted. Indeed, we are not 
for change merely for the sake of change, as Russia is; but we 
do not oppose change." Nixon was definitely of a mind of his
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own in his emerging geopolitical strategy. Decidedly 
anti-Communist, yes, but not knee-jerk in any sense of the 
term. He even remarked that the United States should assist 
"independent" nations like Spain or Yugoslavia. The latter 
nation may have been independent of Moscow but it was still 
decidedly under the grip of Tito. Nixon also supported 
economic aid to Poland to "encourage its national forces."21 
(Nixon and his wife, Pat, had been enthusiastically received 
during a stopover in Poland the year before on their way back 
from the Moscow visit with Khrushchev.) Nixon was biting at 
the rein to be independent of General Ike. It was finally his 
turn to be in the limelight.
America, the Catholic periodical of opinion ran an article 
by Robert Pell on Nixon's foreign policies. On the question 
of China and the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split, Pell 
maintained that Nixon "believes it is highly dangerous to 
stress political differences between Soviet Russia and 
Communist China and to predicate policies on a potential 
collapse of the existing alliance between Moscow and Peiping 
[Peking]." Pell portrayed Nixon as believing that Moscow and 
Peking had to be assumed to be close allies based on the 
30-year Treaty of Friendship the two nations signed in 1950.
As has been pointed out earlier, historian Gordon Chang has 
made a case that Nixon and other key members of the Eisenhower 
administration actually suspected the rift between the two 
Communist giants and looked upon China as the "main 
enemy."22 Nixon, in his May 1960 remarks to the SEATO
-283-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ministers had made clear that he thought the Chinese far more 
extreme and dangerous than the pudgy, bald Russian chairman. 
More attention was paid to the Soviets in 1960 but then again, 
the United States and Soviet Union were the only two 
superpowers, each capable of destroying the world with nuclear 
weapons. (Yes, the British had nuclear capabilities but by 
1960 the British were no longer seen as being key players on 
the international scene— the torch had been passed to a new 
generation, on the Western side of the Atlantic...)
Pell further maintained that Nixon was "wholly 
reluctant...to ’move forward' toward formal recognition of 
Peiping." Pell pointed to Nixon's concern with the "overseas 
Chinese"— some eleven or twelve millions scattered throughout 
Asia. Nixon had voiced concern about the overseas Chinese in 
1953 during his Grand Tour of Asia. According to Pell, Nixon 
believed that if the United States recognized Peking, the 
obvious next step would be admission to the United Nations for 
the Communist country, and then the overseas Chinese would owe 
their allegiance to Peking rather than Tapeii. The America 
piece said that recognition of Peking by the United States 
would "betray" America's allies in Asia and Nixon considered
this to be disastrous. Nixon told America that he supported
\
blocking Chinese Communist expansion in Southeast Asia through 
the utilization of the SEATO alliance and he favored "'boxing' 
the outlaw Chinese Government with air and naval bases and a 
mobile striking force, until it shows a minimum disposition to 
obey some of the rules of a civilized state and live with its
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neighbors in a reasonably genuine stable status quo."23
The article then claimed that it might be possible for the 
United States to reconsider the nhardn policy towards China if 
indeed, Peking modified its ideology and stopped pressuring 
Taiwan. But America said for Nixon "it is not a question of 
whether with regard to Communist China. It is a problem of 
if. and, much more remotely, when, in dealing with a regime 
which has transformed a weak, fragmented nation into a 
monolithic totalitarian state in an incredibly short period of 
time and is projecting its influence far beyond its borders." 
America concluded this portrait of Nixon on China as having 
the vice president very pessimistic and expecting a "prolonged 
struggle" between Washington and Peking. The best that could 
be hoped for in this view was that the struggle might be 
conducted by "non-military" means.24
America had presented the stereotypical, hard old party 
line but it obviously had not listened closely to Nixon's 
speeches during his vice presidential years. The journal 
completely mixed the nuances that Nixon had drawn in many 
discussions of the China issue, both in public speeches and 
private remarks. Nixon was not for recognition but he had a 
far more realpolitik sense of the diplomatic problem posed by 
the Peking regime and was not taken in by the pipe dream of 
Chiang returning one day to save China from the Communists. 
Pell must not have been aware of Nixon's sensitive remarks 
before the American newspaper editors the previous April as 
well as the very speeches he gave on Taiwan back in 1953
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lauding the friendship between the American and Chinese 
peoples. But for the readership of America. Nixon was 
politically astute enough to "spoon feed" his audience the 
hard-line it wanted to hear without getting into the various 
complexities of the issue. After all, he was out to win a 
presidential election, not teach a political science course on 
the foreign affairs of the United States.
"The Great Debates"
Nixon pledged the night he received the nomination to 
campaign in all 50 states of the Union, despite the better 
judgment passed along to him by his advisors of concentrating 
on the key states in the Electoral College. But Nixon, ever 
the loner, decided to heed his own counsel. One wonders why 
he bothered to have a campaign staff at all in 1960 since he 
kept all political strategy close to the vest, making all the 
major decisions himself. After eight years in the wings as 
understudy to Eisenhower, the vice president had a will to 
power, or at least the will to run the show the way he saw fit 
with no ifs, ands, or buts, not to mention stem written 
reprimands from the aging commander-in-chief. The young 
Californian had won the nomination and he was going to call 
the signals in this game, no matter what Ike really thought of 
him and his qualifications for the Supreme Office in the Land.
But 1960 was not to be Richard Milhous Nixon's luckiest 
year. Nixon was not going to yield the South to Democratic 
Kennedy without a fight— therein lay one reason for the
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50-state pledge. After all, Republican President Eisenhower, 
of the Party of Lincoln, had actually carried a few Southern 
states in 1956, and Nixon, during what night be termed the 
gestation period of his "Southern strategy" as president, 
wanted to build on Ike's electoral success in the vital 
political region. The only problem in 1960 was that the good 
folks in the Southern states who had voted for Ike in 1956 had 
done just that; in their minds, they were not voting 
Republican but for America's bald-headed war hero. Also, 
although Nixon undoubtedly took the high road and kept the 
"religious issue" out of the campaign, any good national 
politician in 1960 worth his salt would fully know that the 
South, although solidly Democratic, was nearly as solidly 
Protestant, and that many of the southern Democrats might not 
feel at ease voting for the Catholic Kennedy. In addition, 
as Tom Wicker points out, Nixon took an early campaign trip to 
Atlanta where he was warmly received by an integrated crowd.
In the South before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks did 
not make up a large part of the electorate, but those few that 
voted might make a difference in some of the southern states. 
Nixon had a far more consistent pro-civil rights record 
entering the campaign than the junior senator from 
Massachusetts, a fact not lost on blacks. But any chance 
Nixon had of gaining an appreciable part of the black vote, 
north or south, vanished when Martin Luther King was jailed in 
Georgia and Kennedy personally telephoned Mrs. Coretta Scott 
King to offer assurance shortly before Bobby Kennedy called
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the judge in the case to ask that King be released.26
Nixon later wrote in Six Crises that it was improper for 
Bobby Kennedy, as a lawyer, to have called the judge and that 
Nixon, himself, did not try to contact the judge because it 
would not have been ethical. But the nuances of Nixon's legal 
reasoning and his adherence to strict judicial ethics went 
well over the heads of the electorate, and in the end, his 
conduct in this incident cost him crucial votes.26 Despite 
what Nixon wrote, he may have had a simple case of political 
anxiety that intercession on King's behalf would alienate 
white voters. Although he actually had a positive record on 
civil rights, he could not possibly expect that a Republican 
would be able to cut into the old New Deal coalition to gamer 
a majority of the black vote. So, perhaps Nixon just took a 
gamble here over King that backfired on him.
While campaigning in Greensboro, North Carolina in August, 
Nixon knocked his knee on a car door. A little pain at first, 
but after all, Nixon had ridden the bench on Whittier 
College's football team, dreaming of the chance to play with 
the pain, so the irritation in his knee only seemed a minor 
inconvenience at first. But in a few days, he had to be 
hospitalized for a severe infection, which kept him off the 
campaign trail for two weeks. Yet the determined young 
Californian, only 47 years old, with the presidency within 
his grasp, emerged from the hospital campaigning harder than 
ever and he refused to back away from his promise to visit 
every state in the land. It was true grit.
-288-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The only problem was that the even younger Democratic 
nominee, Jack Kennedy, was pacing himself and even managed to 
take in a few sun rays while campaigning in Nixon's home 
state. There was nothing trivial about Nixon's driving 
himself into the ground and Kennedy, actually a man in poor 
health, appeared fit, tanned and rested. Something 
revolutionary was about to take place in American politics 
that fall. The "little boxes" in living rooms all across the 
land that had so drastically molded, effected, manipulated and 
dominated American life in the preceding decade were now going 
to have their turn to alter the face of American democracy 
forever. The candidates had agreed to debate, face to face, 
live on the three major networks, to be televised nationally. 
Nixon had been advised not to debate for the consensus among 
his staff was that the debates could only benefit Kennedy who 
was still considered to be not as widely known as Nixon, 
despite being the Democracy's choice for the White House. But 
Nixon took the more difficult road and agreed to meet Kennedy 
on the tube. He may well have been overconfident that with 
his finely honed high school and collegiate debating skills, 
he could make mincemeat out of the young upstart. Nixon 
defended his decision to debate Kennedy in his post-mortem of 
the campaign, as written in Six Crises.27 And Nixon 
undoubtedly did the right thing in 1960 although he would be 
wise enough not to debate in either 1968 or 1972.
Some 80 million Americans tuned into the debate on Monday 
night, September 26 as the two candidates squared off in
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Chicago. This first "debate" was limited to domestic 
issues.28 As numerous commentators have noted, it was not a 
debate at all. Although each candidate had an opening 
statement, the duration of the program consisted of 
journalists asking each nominee questions. It was far more 
like a joint appearance on "Meet the Press" than a genuine 
back and forth, reeling and rocking debate. It rapidly 
entered the folklore of American politics with far more 
attention paid to the beads of perspiration on the vice 
president's forehead and chin, his ill-fitting white shirt 
collar and eternal five o'clock shadow rather than to the 
substance of what was said. Kennedy was cool, calm, collected 
and confident, in his blue shirt and California golden sun 
tan. The oft-repeated story is that radio listeners thought 
Nixon had an edge over Kennedy but this was the Age of 
Television and Kennedy had been seen around the country 
holding forth with the supposedly more widely known Nixon (One 
says "supposedly" since there had been numerous Gallup Polls 
from 1958 on showing Kennedy in the lead over Nixon; if, 
indeed that was the case, how could it possibly be that Nixon 
was so much better "known"? Yes, the vice president had been 
in the national political limelight for a longer time than 
JFK, but the Gallup Polls belie the notion of Kennedy as an 
out-of-nowhere candidate, little more than a stranger in a 
strange land by September 1960. How else could an alleged 
"unknown" have led a "known" candidate for President in the 
nation's most prestigious poll?). America was entering a dark
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age from which there would be no return, when the nation's 
politics would center on imagery and gadgetry and as is so 
often said by the legions of media critics, style over 
substance. Going back and rereading or watching tapes of the 
broadcast, the two candidates seem far more articulate than 
any presidential candidates eince and with a grasp of details 
that sometimes is clouded over by the rhetoric of the moment. 
But it was undeniably the end of one era and the beginning of 
another. The dominance of "talking heads" and 30-second 
television manipulations from Madison Avenue would not be too 
many years in the future. As the years would pass and 
politics would become more and more manipulative and reduced 
to bumper stickers and television commercials, the rhetoric 
and joy of American political oratory as well as the vibrancy 
of American Democracy would be the ultimate casualty.
The second encounter between the two former junior naval 
officers of World War II took place in Washington on October 
7. After Kennedy objected to the bright lights and the cold 
temperature in the television studio, and had them adjusted to 
his liking, (did the Irish "Brahmin" want the heat up so that 
Nixon's sweat glands would be moving again?) he and the vice 
president settled down to a vigorous discussion of foreign 
policy, focusing on those tempestuous pieces of real estate, 
Quemoy and Matsu.29 Nixon was back in familiar territory 
and he seized the day by attacking Kennedy's position, 
portraying it as somehow being too soft in the glare of the 
threat that communism posed to the free world. Kennedy
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actually fell into a trap on this and politics being what it 
is, should have known better than to try to make ostensibly 
rational and reasonable arguments on the highly charged 
emotional China issue, especially when zealots of the 
opposition were poised to stir up the ashes and remind the 
American people that the Democrats under Truman had nlost 
China." Kennedy's idea was that the defense of a few 
strategically worthless piles of rock just off the coast of 
the Chinese mainland simply was not worth the effort, nor was 
it militarily feasible, when the important thing was keeping 
Taiwan and the Pescadores free of the Communists. This was 
too sophisticated for an electorate still vastly 
anti-Communist in the manner of a Pavlovian dog who salivates 
upon hearing a bell. (One has difficulty thinking of the 
Republic of China as wholly "free" under Chiang Kai-Shek, 
although Chiang with all his faults— and they were many— was 
still preferable to Mao across the strait.) Kennedy's 
rhetoric might have played in Harvard Yard but it certainly 
was not going to "play in Peoria" (yet, an ironic 
afterthought: it was in carrying Illinois that JFK clinched 
the election victory). Nixon had been playing the China issue 
to the hilt since 1949, perfecting his pitch during the 
MacArthur controversy and the two "crises" of the previous 
decade over the Formosa Strait. It is not unfair to say that 
he pounced on Kennedy, much like a lion in his den awaiting 
his moment.
One problem for Nixon though was that there were 20
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million fewer viewers of this television debate, a mere 60 
million rather than the 80 million Americans who had tuned in 
for the first round. Nixon had placed himself on a strict 
regimen of four milkshakes a day so that his neck would fit 
properly into his collar and that he might look healthy enough 
for the nation's top job. But many historians concede, the 
damage had been done in the first debate, and despite Nixon's 
stronger showing the second time around, that first impression 
lingered in the political air. Nevertheless, the vice 
president had struck a rhetorical blow against Kennedy over 
the delicate matter of the offshore islands, and Kennedy's 
eyes were a bit puffy when the bell rang.
Although Kennedy explicitly said that Taiwan should be 
defended, he suggested that the "line" be drawn over Formosa 
rather than Quemoy and Matsu. He indirectly suggested that 
the Chinese Nationalists withdraw from those offshore 
islands.30 The Democratic candidate objected to the Formosa 
Resolution passed by the Senate in January 1955 which 
deliberately, on the part of the Eisenhower administration, 
left open to question how far the United States would actually 
go in its defense of Taiwan and the so-called "other areas," 
which were buzz words for the Quemoy and Matsu island groups. 
The General President, in his best Eisenhowerean fashion, had 
wanted to keep the Chinese Communists guessing as to what the 
United States would do in the event Peking chose an all-out 
attack on the offshore islands, in this instance, Kennedy 
knocked vagueness, but it was that very vagueness and patience
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that Eisenhower aspired to in tines of international 
crises— the nation may not have done a lot of moving in the 
1950s but Eisenhower commanded the nation through rocky seas 
in the oceans of foreign affairs.
Nixon retorted to Kennedy's pronouncement on those islands 
in the strait by lashing out that the Harvard graduate's 
approach was "the same kind of wooly headed thinking that led 
to disaster in Korea."31 From the MacArthur controversy 
and throughout the 1950s, this was Nixon's cue to lash into 
the Democrats by charging that the Korean War would never have 
occurred if the Democrats, namely the Truman administration, 
had not "lost" China and if then Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had not omitted Korea from the U.S. "defense 
perimeter" in his famous speech before the National Press Club 
in Washington on January 12, 1950. Nixon recited that chorus, 
a stanza that was consistent for him throughout the preceding 
decade. Nixon attacked Kennedy over his statement that the 
offshore islands were indefensible by reminiscing about those 
golden days when the GOP formed the opposition rather than 
being the party in power subject to the "vigorous" stinging 
criticism of Democrats hungry for the White House. "I 
remember the period from immediately before the Korean War," 
the vice president said. "South Korea was supposed to be 
indefensible as well. Generals testified to that and 
Secretary Acheson made a very famous speech at the Press Club 
early in the year [1950] that....started indicating in effect 
that South Korea was beyond the defense zone of the United
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States."32
With those familiar words off his chest, Nixon could now 
pounce on JFK over the offshore islands, the issue directly at 
hand. "...The question is not these two little pieces of real 
estate— they are unimportant...It’s the principle involved," 
the vice president said.
The Republican then elaborated upon that principle.
"These two islands are in the area of freedom. The 
Nationalists have these two islands. We should not force our 
Nationalist allies to get off of them and give them to the 
Communists," Nixon told the national television audience.
He then evoked the nightmare of the domino theory. Nixon 
further countered Kennedy by warning that if the offshore 
islands came under Peking's orbit, it would "start a chain 
reaction because the Communists aren't after Quemoy and 
Matus. They're after Formosa. In my opinion, this is the 
same kind of wooly headed thinking that led to disaster for 
America in Korea. I'm against it. I would never tolerate it 
as President of the United States, and I will hope that 
Senator Kennedy will change his mind if he should be elected," 
Nixon concluded.33 In his adept handling of this issue, 
rhetorically and politically, Nixon was proving he was a 
master of sophistry. Nixon certainly performed (and perform 
is the key word) better in the second debate.
James Reston wrote in The New York Times that the vice 
president had "clearly made a comeback after his disappointing 
showing in the first debate."34 But The New Republic
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excoriated Nixon's posture on the offshore islands as 
"demagogic." The liberal magazine attacked Nixon for having 
stated that the defense of those islands was necessary because 
of "the principle involved." The journal said "'Principle' is 
a solemn word, and the voters had better be clear what this 
principle would mean if applied. The practical result of the 
new Nixon Doctrine is U.S. involvement in a war with Communist 
China at any time the Communists launch an all-out attack on 
these offshore islands," the editorial warned. The New 
Republic was concerned that such a military pursuit would only 
isolate America from its friends in that vital region of the 
world. "In such a war, it can be predicted with almost 
absolute certainty that the United States would fight without 
Asian allies and very little support from any other quarter. 
One can be sure also that an attempt to implement this 
doctrine would destroy probably for all time, the slim 
remaining possibility that Formosan independence could be 
established by separating the future status of that island 
from that of Quemoy and Matsu." The weekly further scored the 
vice president by stating "What Mr. Nixon said perfectly 
illustrates how dimly he comprehends the character of a 
responsible foreign policy."35 Such a searing critique was 
to be expected from The New Republic but in the height of the 
Cold War Nixon seemed to have struck a nerve against Kennedy's 
attempt to insert reason into the political campaign.
The Nixon camp was ready to play up the "islands in the 
strait" issue to try to indicate that the young, inexperienced
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Democratic nominee was, indeed, "soft" on communism and too 
lacking in the qualities of discernment to hold the highest 
office in the land. "Charlie" McWhorter, one of Nixon's 
campaign advisers prepared a 14-point memo on October 12 for 
the Republican candidate concerning "Political arguments on 
Quemoy-Matsu issue." (Were these, indeed, the Second 14 
Points of American diplomatic history?). McWhorter smelled 
blood and sensed that political dividends could be earned by 
exploiting the issue. The politico's advice to Nixon, given 
just before the third debate, is important for its revelations 
of the thinking within the Nixon campaign and also because 
Nixon did use some of the arguments put forth by McWhorter in 
the further debates on Quemoy and Matsu. McWhorter exhibited 
a lot of savvy, and although Nixon ultimately made all the 
decisions and relied on himself, he thought enough of 
McWhorter to bring him back to work on the 1968 campaign.
McWhorter wrote to Nixon that "The American people have 
begun to grasp the naivete and danger of Senator Kennedy's 
announced intentions— if elected— to force our ally, 
Nationalist China, to withdraw its forces from Quemoy and 
Matsu islands. Senator Kennedy has resorted to a cheap 
demagogic argument when he asks American mothers whether they 
want their sons to die in a war for a couple of rocks."36 
McWhorter exhibited quite a talent for political phraseology.
The politco then emphasized to Nixon that the Formosan 
Resolution had worked well and at the time of its passage, 
Janaury 1955, had enjoyed overwhelming, if not unanimous,
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support within the Congress and the nation. McWhorter 
reminded Nixon that it was the "policy of the United States 
government to resist invasion of these islands if (underlining 
added) it should be decided that such an invasion was part of 
an attempt to launch an attack upon Formosa." This was the 
very Eisenhowerean ambiguity designed to keep the Communist 
Chinese guessing as to what kind of U.S. response they could 
expect if they did indeed attack the offshore islands. 
McWhorter then pointed out that "This policy of the Eisenhower 
adminstration has worked. We have stood firm and the Chinese 
Communists have not launched an invasion upon these islands or 
Formosa, which is their announced objective."37 Of course, 
this was another way to insert a Hail to the Commander in 
Chief, the great Ike, whose record Kennedy was thrashing at 
every opportunity. After all, Poor Richard did have to run on 
the Eisenhower record, no matter what he thought of the Old 
Man, and the general, despite his misgivings about the vice 
president, found Nixon far more palatable than the young 
"upstart" Kennedy.
McWhorter then put in a rhetorical flourish about Danzig 
and World War II, something that Nixon would employ during the 
future debates (although one wonders if Nixon needed McWhorter 
to make the historical analogy in order for him to use it in 
his speeches). The staff man wrote Nixon that "The last time 
the people of the free world heard leaders who asked whether 
they wanted their sons to fight for 'so-called' unimportant 
areas was when British mothers were asked whether they wanted
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their sons to die for Danzig in 1938. This was at a time when 
firmness against aggression by Hitler might have averted the 
enormous tragedy in human suffering which he caused."38 In 
1960, the memory of World War II was fresh in the minds of the 
electorate and there was political capital to be gained in 
frightening the voters into thinking that if a tough stand was 
not taken then, it would only lead to more difficult times 
later. What was ironic was that Nixon was, in essence,
arguing that the United States should go to war, if necessary,
to keep the offshore rocks in Taipei's orbit although from 
Nixon's point of view, he thought that the hardline approach
was the only way to avoid war.
McWhorter also suggested to Nixon that "The type of naive 
thinking represented by Senator Kennedy's position on Quemoy 
and Matsu can only lead to surrender on the installment plan.
A bully or a blackmailer can only be handled by a policy of 
firmness, strength and no concession."39 That was tough 
talk and Nixon would also use the line "surrender on the 
installment plan" although since the Korean War he had called 
for "Peace Without Surrender," a phrase intended to sully the 
opposition Democrats with the appeasement smear.
In a politically charged stab at Kennedy's immense wealth, 
McWhorter wittily stated that "These are not Jack's islands to 
turn over to the Communists. They are held by our ally, the 
Chinese Nationalists, with whom we have a mutual defense 
treaty." (McWhorter was referring, of course, to the Mutual 
Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the United States,
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negotiated by John Foster Dulles and signed by both parties in 
December 1954.) McWhorter, a pious Republican operative who 
was unwilling to forgive the sins of the Truman-Acheson 
foreign policy, twisted the knife a little more into Kennedy 
and knocked Acheson when he wrote that "Senator Kennedy talks 
of a 'New Frontier.' Presumably this 'New Frontier' is new 
because it marks a retreat and defeat for the boundaries of 
freedom. The last time we heard an announcement of such a 
'new frontier' for American defenses it constituted an open 
invitation to aggression in South Korea which the Communists 
gladly accepted."40 The last sentence cutting away at 
Acheson was music to Nixon's ears, since he had been making 
that attack on the Democratic diplomat since the controversy 
surrounding the MacArthur dismissal. The then California 
senator's highly spirited (not to mention highly politically 
calculated) defense of the General was combined with Nixon's 
own unsparingly vitriolic assaults on Truman and Acheson's 
Asia policy-with Nixon levying the ultimate insult that the 
Democrats had, in essence, no Asian policy at all.
On October 13, Nixon was in Los Angeles for the third 
debate. This time around the two candidates for president 
would be separated by a continent with Nixon in a studio in 
Hollywood and Kennedy in another one in New York. In addition 
to the debate that day, Nixon spoke at the University of 
Southern California, his wife Pat's alma mater. The vice 
president praised Eisenhower's Formosa Resolution of 1955 and 
made a lot of political hay about the fact that Kennedy had
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supported an amendment to that measure (voted for by only 12 
Senators) that would have, according to Mixon, "denied to the 
President the power of the President to defend the two 
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu."41 Nixon would harp 
on the same point in the third debate.
Nixon defended the status quo of American policy towards 
the islands. He claimed that the Eisenhower policy, backed by 
the Formosan Resolution, had "worked." "It has meant that the 
Chinese Communists in that five years [since the Formosan 
Resolution] have not launched an attack upon Formosa or the 
offshore islands of a massive type," the vice president told 
the eager collegians, conveniently omitting that the Chinese 
Communists had sprinkled the offshore islands with artillery 
shells in the spring of 1955, right on the heels of the 
Formosan Resolution, and that the artillery assault had been 
resumed in 1958, fomenting the second Formosan Strait crisis. 
If "massive," as Nixon used the term, meant that there had 
been no amphibious assault on the islands with crack Red 
Chinese troops, he was technically right. But others might 
disagree and point out that artillery attacks from guns 
mounted just a few miles away could be considered "massive" by 
any one who might have the misfortune to fall into the line of 
fire.
Nixon advocated the United States standing firm vis-a-vis 
its position over the islands. As he had often suggested in 
the past, any American move that might even be perceived as a 
sign of "weakness" by the Chinese Communists (or any
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Communists in the Nixon worldview), could lead to war, no 
matter what the original intentions. "And I say the moment 
you change the policy, and in effect, draw a line back of 
those islands and say: Now we'll surrender these to you, in 
effect, we'll turn them over, that this is a policy that does 
not lead to peace," Nixon said.42
"It is one which will inevitably encourage the Communists 
and could lead to war," the vice president warned. "I'll tell 
you why," and he proceeded to draw the Danzig analogy to these 
rocks in the strait. Nixon, now the historian, told the 
students, who he could then assume had some grounding in 
recent international history, that "The record with dictators 
is as consistent as anything in the world's history. We have 
to go back only to World War II. You remember Hitler, first 
it was the Rhineland, then it was Austria, then it was Danzig, 
then it was Sudetenland, and every time they said he only 
wants this, but after all, in the end, there had to come a 
place when he had to be stopped."43
Then Nixon drew the inevitable analogy, for rhetorical 
purposes, between Communists and Nazis. "...When you're 
dealing with a dictator, be he a Communist or a Nazi, or a 
Fascist, or any kind of dictator, surrendering territory to 
him at the point of a gun does not lead to peace, it does not 
satisfy him, even if he says it will, it only whets his 
appetite. And it means that it encourages him to push you 
further."44 Communists and fascists, like bullies, had to 
be stood up to.
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Nixon then turned his guns on the Asian giant, whom he nor 
unjustifiably considered a menace to peace and stability 
throughout that emerging region. "Now I do not want to see," 
he lectured the students, "the United States adopt the policy 
at this time which will encourage a dictator, Mao Tse-tung, to 
push us to the point where we will get into a war. And," he 
added, "that's why I say that this is a period over the last 
7 1/2 years [referring to the tenure of the Eisenhower 
administration] in which we have not had retreat in the face 
of Communism,"45 conveniently omitting that half of North 
Vietnam fell under the domination of the Communists after 
Eisenhower took office, not that one could suggest that was a 
failure of the administration. After all, the French had been 
defeated despite American support (and Nixon's willingness to 
up the ante in that struggle back in 1954) but North Vietnam 
was a far bigger chunk of real estate than the rocks off the 
Chinese mainland, and it was far too much land and too many 
people to ignore. Then, of course, Nixon could not point with 
pride to what had happened in Indochina as a result of 
Geneva. Nixon, the rhetorician, could have undoubtedly made a 
sophistic argument that the situation in Vietnam was anything 
but a retreat and that rather, it was a stand against further 
aggression by the Communists.
The vice president then fell back on a little football 
jargon, one of his favorite approaches to any matter on earth. 
"This is no time to change that policy," he said. "This is a 
time to extend freedom, to extend it without war, and you
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can't extend freedom by running backwards, and on this I 
disagree with Senator Kennedy as I have indicated," he 
concluded, wrapping up his position on those politically 
volatile offshore islands.46
That same day prior to the evening's debate with Kennedy, 
Nixon campaign aide Fred Seaton received a telephone call in 
Los Angeles from Secretary of State Christian Herter back at 
Foggy Bottom. Herter's call was a not so subtle effort on 
the part of the administration to make sure that Nixon did not 
get too fired up over Quemoy and Matsu and "overcommit" the 
United States "militarily" in the course of debate. It seems 
that Kennedy may not have been the only one with misgivings 
about the islands but Herter primarily wanted to ensure that 
Nixon understood the administration position on the Formosa 
Resolution, although that is not to suggest that Eisenhower 
publicly would have gone as far as Kennedy did. This Herter 
call could have been yet another exercise in Eisenhowerean 
efforts to rein in his party's choice as his successor. 
According to the memorandum of the telephone conversation, 
Herter "wanted to be sure that there was no misunderstanding 
that the Congressional authorization for use of troops 
requires a determination on the part of the President that an 
attack on Quemoy or Matsu is an attack on Formosa and this is 
a finding the President must make."47 Herter was reminding 
Nixon through Seaton of the leeway the Formosa Resolution 
granted Eisenhower, or his successor, as president.
The memorandum further recorded that Herter told Seaton
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that “ever since the bombardment [of the offshore islands] the 
ChiComs [Chinese Communists] have said it was preliminary to 
taking of Formosa but if the time came to move only on Quemoy 
and Matsu and they made no move toward Formosa we might find 
ourselves in a very difficult situation." Herter, apparently 
speaking for the administration, undoubtedly dreaded the 
thought of the United States having to defend those "pieces of 
real estate" for their own intrinsic value, which certainly 
appeared to be far less from State's point of view than from 
Nixon's, who was earnestly trying to garner votes on a most 
politically sensitive although potentially militarily 
catastrophic issue. Herter summed up by telling Seaton that 
he "hoped the Vice President, in the heat of debate, would not 
get himself too far committed from a military point of 
view."48 The secretary of state had said at the beginning 
of the conversation that the advice about to follow was all 
being done "in the spirit of being helpful to the vice- 
president" yet it all had the aura of another attempt from the 
powers that be to keep Poor Richard in line and leave him 
chastized. Seaton reassured Herter that he could be "sure" 
Nixon followed the line the secretary outlined.
But even more interesting was the brief discussion that 
ensued between the Nixon aide and the nation's senior diplomat 
concerning Chinese admission to the United Nations. Seaton 
exhibited some flexibility on Nixon's behalf on this matter 
which was well in keeping with the position and rhetoric the 
vice president had employed since his Grand Tour of Asia in
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1953. Seaton told Herter that on this score, Nixon "would 
plan to indicate that as matters now stand and if the Chicom 
attitude and behavior does not change if he were President he 
would seriously consider instrucing [sic] the US to use its 
veto, but would take a look if their actions changed."49 
The "Big If," of course, surrounded whether or not the Chinese 
would ever change. Mao is reputed to have said that "If the 
Americans do not recognize us in 100 years, they will 
recognize us in 101." What Mao may not have anticipated is 
that in Nixon, he had a shrewd opponent who had an oddly 
oriental-style patience in which he would be willing to mark 
his time and await the politically opportune moment to strike 
a deal that would be as beneficial to Washington as to 
Peking. There would be nothing unduly idealistic about 
Nixon's later play as President for a "generation of peace."
It would be marked by the pragamatism and realpolitik that are 
the sine quo non of bringing any idealism into the life of 
nations, rather than allowing those much vaunted ideals to 
remain in the realm of some stratospheric spirit.
The coast-to-coast debate on the night of October 13th had 
its most dramatic (or more accurately, melodramatic) moments 
centered on the offshore islands. Russell Baker summed up the 
tempest that had ensued best when he wrote in his lead for The 
New York Times that Kennedy and Nixon "bitterly accused each 
other before a national television audience...of advocating 
policies on Quemoy and Matsu that would lead to war." Baker 
further noted that "while the rhetorical temperature of the
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third debate was torrid, the actual policy difference between 
the two Presidential candidates appeared to have narrowed 
considerably, Mr. Nixon pulled back from the strong position 
he took last week."50 It would seem that Seaton may have 
passed Herter's advice along to the Republican presidential 
candidate.
Baker further observed that although Nixon in the second 
debate had stated that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu was "a 
matter of 'principle' because no territory 'in the area of 
freedom' should be surrendered," the vice president was "much 
less categorical" in the third round. Although it would not 
be fair to say in the parlance of the time that Nixon had 
"backed down," he was sure this time around to say that Quemoy 
and Matsu would only be defended if an attack upon those 
islands were "a prelude to an attack on Formosa" which Baker 
pointed out had been the Eisenhower administration 
position.51 That had, in fact, been the policy since the 
passage of the Formosa Resolution in 1955.
Baker got to the heart of the matter when he observed that 
in this particular political rumble over Quemoy and Matsu, 
Kennedy "sought to deprive Mr. Nixon of the 'peace' issue and 
Mr. Nixon sought to depict Kennedy as a man dangerously . 
ignorant of the ways of dictators." During the interim 
between the second and third debates, Kennedy had attacked the 
Nixon position on the islands as "trigger-happy leadership." 
This charge must have made Nixon's blood boil and he was to 
take it head on in Round Three by using what was an old GOP
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campaign curve: namely, that the Democrats had "led" the 
nation into war three times in the 20th century while 
Republicans had vigilantly kept the peace on their watch.52 
(This charge was to be repeated by Republican vice 
presidential candidate, Senator Bob Dole of Kansas in the 1976 
nationally televised debate with his Democratic counterpart, 
Senator Walter Hondale of Minnesota.)
Nixon shot back at Kennedy's "trigger-happy" rhetoric by 
declaring that he resented it. "I resent it because it's an 
implication that Republicans have been trigger-happy and 
therefore, would lead this nation into war," he said. "There 
were three Democratic Presidents who led us into war," Nixon 
added. "I do not mean by that that one party is a war party 
and the other party is a peace party," he expounded although 
that was exactly what he meant— certainly, that was the 
political implication. (Nixon had also used this "war and 
peace party" disclaimer to attack Democrats nearly ten years 
before over the worsening situation in the Korean War.)
"But," Nixon said in party-defense, "I do say that any 
statement to the effect that the Republican party is 
trigger-happy is belied by the record."53
Nixon then proceeded to drag up the old Democratic "mess" 
on Korea as if this was the 1952 campaign and not the 1960 
campaign. He was one politician with an historical memory, a 
species that would not too far in the future vanish from the 
American political landscape. "We had a war when we came into 
power in 1953," the candidate said in case anyone had
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forgotten. "We got rid of that. We stayed out of others," he 
stated with the pride of a prince of peace. "And certainly 
that doesn't indicate that we're trigger-happy."54
As a further test of just how trigger-happy Nixon night be 
in the nidst of an international crisis, one correspondent 
(the third debate really resembled a joint news conference for 
the two presidential contenders) asked him point-blank how he 
would react as president if the Communist Chinese invaded 
Quemoy and Matsu. Would he deploy the Seventh Fleet to stop 
the Reds and resort to nuclear weapons if conventional forces 
could not do the job?
Nixon was too clever to fall for this one. He first took 
the high ground and simply responded that it would be 
"completely irresponsible" to say what he would do in such a 
case. But he was not going to roll over and play dead 
either. To make clear that he still would not "surrender" 
free territory, he added "In the event that their [the Chinese 
Communists] attack [on the offshore islands] then were a 
prelude to an attack on Formosa, there isn't any question but 
that the United States would then again, as in the case of 
Berlin, honor our treaty obligations and stand by our ally 
Formosa."55 (Just how far the United States would go to 
defend the territorial and political integrity of West Berlin 
was also an issue in I960, actually a far more volatile one as 
the Berlin Crisis of 1961 would all too soon prove.)
Nixon was still talking tough and trying to present the 
Democratic Kennedy as weak and inexperienced. He further
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castigated his opponent's stance on the offshore islands by 
portraying Kennedy's approach as the more likely to lead to 
war than the apparently unyielding position that Nixon was 
espousing. "To do what Senator Kennedy has suggested," the 
vice president declared, "to suggest that we will surrender 
these islands or force our Chinese Nationalist allies to 
surrender them in advance is not something that would lead to 
peace, it is something that would lead, in my opinion, to 
war."56
Nixon next reprised the chorus on dealing with dictators 
and the need to stop them early rather than late. He again 
raised the spectre of Hitler. Nixon suggested that 
"surrender" was part of the "history of dealing with 
dictators. This is something that Senator Kennedy and all 
Americans must know," he said, with no small trace of 
condescension towards the junior senator from Massachusetts. 
"We tried this with Hitler," Nixon added, "and it didn't work. 
He wanted...Austria...and then he went on to the Sudetenland 
and then Danzig, and each time it was thought this was all he 
wanted."57
The Republican candidate then refocused on the issue of 
the offshore islands. "Now what do the Chinese Communists 
want?," he asked. "They don't just want Quemoy and Matsu. 
They don't want just Formosa. They want the world," Nixon 
claimed without blinking an eyelash as to how the Colossus to 
the North of China might react should Peking try to conquer 
the globe on its own. "And," he continued, "the question is
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if you surrender or indicate in advance that you're not going 
to defend any part of the free world, and you figure that 
going to satisfy them. It only whets their appetite," Nixon 
warned, "and then the question comes when do you stop 
them?"58 Nixon was again insisting on the primacy of always 
keeping the Communists guessing as to American intentions.
Nixon may have had mixed feelings about Eisenhower playing 
too high profile a role in the campaign but he was quick to 
invoke the name of the Great Old Man in an effort to gain some 
political capital over Quemoy and Matsu. "I've often heard 
President Eisenhower, in discussing this question," Nixon said 
of his good friend Ike, "make the statement that if we once 
start the process of indicating that this point or that point 
is not the place to stop those who threaten the peace and 
freedom of the world, where do we stop them?"59 But Nixon's 
statement belies the private reservations over the strategic 
importance of the offshore islands Eisenhower expressed in 
National Security Council meetings during the first 
Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1954-55. However, Nixon was not about 
to take advantage of the opportunity before a national 
television audience to try to foster yet another "New Nixon," 
this time in the guise as a revisionist historian of the 
Eisenhower presidency.60
Nixon concluded this portion of the debate by advocating 
holding fast and not giving in. "And I say that those of us 
who stand against surrender of territory— this or any 
other— in the face of blackmail and in face of force by the
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Communists are standing for the course that will lead to 
peace."61 Nixon, of course, was referring to himself as 
opposed to the stance of Kennedy. The vice president may have 
been less bellicose in his rhetoric, and reigned himself in to 
some degree as Herter had requested, but he was still on the 
offensive, trying to make himself appear to be the stronger, 
tougher candidate. For Nixon, long before his Presidency and 
the Vietnam War, "peace through strength" was the axiom upon 
which he viewed America's place in the world.
Douglas Cater of The Reporter magazine, serving on the 
panel of newsmen posing the questions for the candidates, 
pointedly asked Nixon to respond to critics who claimed that 
Nixon had "overstated" the position of the Eisenhower 
administration concerning its commitment to defend the 
offshore islands. The journalist also cited Nixon's 
off-the-record comments in 1954 on the possibility of sending 
American troops to Indochina as another example of Nixonian 
overstatement. Nixon dismissed the criticism as invalid 
although it was true that he had taken a far harder line than 
Eisenhower on Indochina in 1954 just as he had over Quemoy and 
Matsu throughout the volatile periods in 1954-55 and 
1958.62 If Nixon had not been off target from the 
administration line, why else would Herter have bothered to 
call Nixon aide Fred Seaton? But now in the campaign, 
although he very much wanted to be his own man, he could not 
disrespectfully refute the Eisenhower record. On Indochina, 
Nixon said that "...It was essential during that period that
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the United States make it clear that we would not tolerate 
Indochina falling under Communist domination. Now, as a 
result of our taking the strong stand that we did," he added,
11 the civil war there was ended and today, at least in the 
south of Indochina, the Communists have moved out and we do 
have a strong, free bastion there."63
Here, as he had earlier in the debate, Nixon skirted 
around the fact that North Vietnam was now under the 
domination of a certain Communist named Ho Chi Minh. He was 
also exaggerating the strength of the "free bastion" of South 
Vietnam. History would all too soon reveal it as weak, and 
indeed, even then with a remaining pernicious presence of 
Communists who had not moved out of the South and would 
ultimately triumph over the American-backed government in 
Saigon. But Nixon cannot be blamed or praised for the 
situation as it stood in I960. He had, after all, been vice 
president and not commander-in-chief and one cannot forget 
that holding the second spot affords at least an occasional 
political advantage in what is often an "unsplendid misery" of 
the frequently ignominious office.
In response to the charge that he was not at one with the 
General's administration on Quemoy and Matsu, rather than 
addressing the matter of whether he had strayed from the Ike 
line, Nixon took the opportunity once more to rail against 
Kennedy's position on the islands. He reiterated his own view 
that for the United States to tip its hand as to what it would 
or would not do merely would "encourage them [Chinese
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Communists] to more aggression.1,64
Kennedy had been making much throughout the campaign and 
in the debates on what he called America's declining 
"prestige" in the world during the Eisenhower years. He 
predicated his campaign on a call for a "new frontier" 
complete with the new, "vigorous" leadership he hoped to 
provide. Nixon turned the rhetoric of prestige against 
Kennedy in the third debate by playing up the great prestige 
at stake in the maintainence of the status quo on the offshore 
islands through their defense by the United States. Nixon, 
coming into his own a couple of debates too late, said that he 
could "think of nothing that will be a greater blow to the 
prestige of the United States among the free nations in Asia 
than for us to take Senator Kennedy's advice to go against 
what a majority of the members of the Senate, both Democratic 
and Republican, said in 1955, and to say in advance we will 
surrender an area to the Communists."65 (Nixon was referring 
again to the Formosa Resolution)
"...If the United States is going to maintain its strength 
and prestige," Nixon continued, "we must not only be strong 
militarily and economically, we must be firm diplomatically." 
The vice president then resorted to his rendition of a rhyme 
by concluding that "Certainly we have been speaking, I know, 
of whether we should have retreat or defeat. Let's remember 
that the way to win is not to retreat and not to 
surrender."66
New York Times columnist James Reston incisively
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criticized both Nixon and Kennedy for having allowed Quemoy 
and Matsu to become a campaign issue in the first place, 
although he felt that the Democrat had handled the question 
far better in the debate. Reston wrote that "the experts in 
Washington are furious at both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Nixon for 
getting into this Quemoy-Matsu controversy." Reston also 
revealed that unnamed officials were "surprised at the Vice 
President— and this included many of his colleagues in the 
State and Defense Departments— for committing himself to a 
policy of going beyond President Eisenhower and asserting that 
these two small islands are part of the free world and should 
be defended as a matter of principle." Nixon, had in the 
end, strayed from the "suggestions" imparted by Secretary of 
State Christan Herter. Reston conceded that Nixon "may have 
made some progress among voters with his no-surrender stand" 
but "won little support among the experts." Then again, Nixon 
was in the midst of a presidential campaign and not an 
academic forum. But Reston further criticized Nixon's 
presentation as "general and often emotional" and scored him 
for lacking the discretion not to discuss it. The newsman 
charged Nixon with having "elevated what the State Department 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded as a tactical question 
into an issue of fundamental principle." Reston made it clear 
he thought Nixon put politics before the good of the 
nation.67
An old Nixon ally, retired Admiral Arthur W. Radford, who 
had been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the
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first Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1954-55 (and had endorsed the use 
of nuclear weapons against the Chinese Communists) was quick 
to denounce Kennedy. The retired Navy man, who had endorsed 
Nixon in the 1960 campaign, raised the cry that Kennedy's 
position on the offshore islands "could certainly start a war 
if they are believed by the Red Chinese." Radford feared the 
old domino effect, that if the two islands were "lost," other 
Asian nations would be vulnerable to the Communists.68 Even 
the old Nixon nemesis, Nelson Rockefeller, went out of his way 
to support the vice president's stance on the issue.69 But 
after all, Rockefeller was first and last a rabid cold warrior 
whose reputation as a liberal Eastern Republican belied the 
depths of his ardor to fight pernicious communism. The Cold 
War was the one item on the nation's political agenda that 
could truly bring the two frequent antagonists together.
Nixon had indeed won some political points over the issue, 
James Reston's acerbic, although not unjustified, criticism 
not withstanding. Yet, the offshore islands were hardly a 
major source of concern in 1960, despite the temperatures 
raised over them in 1954-55 and 1958, and the extent to which 
Nixon and Kennedy tried to capitalize on them. The truth is 
that the focus of American foreign affairs had returned to 
Europe and the Soviet Union. The more immediate and important 
concern was maintaining the status quo in Berlin. (And yet 
another "offshore island," far more strategic geopolitically 
to the United States, was to emerge as a more significant 
issue in the fourth debate and latter part of the campaign.
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That island was thousands of miles away from the Chinese 
mainland but only 90 miles from the continental United 
States. That particular collection of rocks nearly 700 
hundred miles long was Fidel Castro's Cuba.) Even historian 
Robert Divine has shrewdly remarked that the give-and-take 
over the islands was emblematic of how the television debates 
could create an "artificial issue."70 It was as if the tiny 
islands had been transformed into giant land masses the size 
of continents.
Divine also writes that the commander-in-chief, himself, 
was "disturbed" over the infusion of the islands into the 
campaign.71 Quemoy and Matsu had given the general enough 
"angina" in the last six years and the Old Man undoubtedly 
would have preferred not to see this volatile issue reignited, 
especially after having successfully steered the Good Ship 
United States through treacherous waters during the two 
previous crises over the islands in the strait. The debate 
over the islands must have been just another example of his 
young junior officer vice president giving him headaches, but 
Eisenhower's virtually visceral hatred for the even younger 
(and to Ike's mind, callow) Kennedy would make him allow for 
the continued errant ways of his not-first-choice for heir to 
the throne.
But Eisenhower was definitely unhappy, especially since as 
Divine points out, the Chinese Nationalists said they "would 
fight to the death" to defend Quemoy and Matsu not to mention 
growing trepidation that Mao and his friends in Peking might
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well view the election of Kennedy as an invitation to invade 
the rocks off the mainland. Eisenhower still firmly believed 
that the United States should not tip its hand over any 
actions it might take concerning the islands, and he spoke to 
Nixon the day after Debate Three. The president announced 
through a statement that he and his second-in-command were in 
agreement after all on this dormant issue that had been 
brought back to life- like some kind of vampire. Was Ike 
using a carrot (or stick) to bring Nixon back to the more 
preferred Eisenhowerean ambiguities? This actually had the 
effect of taking a little heat off Kennedy, who had been 
talking over the heads of the American public. Nixon would 
have preferred to keep the heat up on Kennedy but the issue 
soon faded in part because of its complexities and nuances and 
no doubt, as mentioned earlier, because China was not the 
paramount foreign policy issue anyway.72
With the previous night's battle of words with Kennedy 
still clearly in the mind of the press and public, Nixon gave 
another foreign policy speech in Beverly Hills, California on 
October 14. He took advantage of the occasion to hedge a bit 
on Quemoy and Matsu and to make himself appear to be at one 
with the Eisenhower policy on the defense of the offshore 
islands. Rather than talking tough about any disaster that 
would ensue from surrendering "one inch” of free ground, Nixon 
made it a point to talk about the defense of Quemoy and Matsu 
in the context of the protection of Taiwan.73 This was 
precisely the gist of the deliberate ambiguity that Eisenhower
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had effected all along in the Formosa Resolution. Once again, 
Nixon had been corrected, if not actually sent to the 
woodshed, by the Old Bald Man in the Oval Office.
Although Nixon had pulled back somewhat on Quemoy-Matsu 
per se, he continued to hack away at Kennedy over China, next 
fixing his focus on the issue of Peking's admission to the 
United Nations. In an October 17 speech in Buffalo, a staunch 
anti-Communist stronghold replete with an array of ethnic 
voters, Nixon slashed at one of his all-time favorite targets, 
Adlai Stevenson. Nixon claimed that Stevenson supported a 
"deal with the Communist Chinese which would have us trade, 
for a worthless guarantee of freedom for Formosa," United 
States backing for Communist China's admission to the United 
Nations.74 Stevenson, was a "foreign policy advisor" to the 
Kennedy campaign, and although the Democratic nominee, 
himself, had publicly opposed Peking's admission to the 
international organization, Nixon trotted out his old self to 
try and impugn Kennedy by association. Nixon had used this 
technique time and time again in the previous decade but had 
more often than not tried to smear Democratic candidates by 
any association with the diabolical Dean Acheson, Truman's 
secretary of state.
To stir things up, Nixon demanded that Kennedy clarify his 
position on Communist Chinese entry into the U.N. This was a 
low blow since Kennedy had already supported the Eisenhower 
administration's stance on the matter. Nixon further demanded 
that Kennedy disavow Stevenson's statement. Then
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grandstanding for that nearly-Pavlovian anticommunist vote 
from Erie County (Buffalo and its environs), the Republican 
nominee said "The American people cannot make sense of a 
campaign in which the candidate says one thing on foreign 
affairs and one of his principal advsiers says the opposite 
while campaigning for the candidate."75 All of a sudden, it 
seemed like Richard Nixon was calling for politics without 
politics (Stevenson may have been a nominal "advisor" to 
Kennedy but his true importance in the campaign was to serve 
as a link and reassurance to Democratic liberals, without whom 
Kennedy could not win. So, politically, Stevenson had to 
mollify his constituency with some rhetoric that JFK might not 
have used. After all, Nixon was hardly at one with either 
Nelson Rockefeller or Barry Goldwater, but he welcomed their 
support in the general election. That is not inconsistent in 
a campaign, that is just good politics.). Actually The New 
York Times reported that Kennedy was making "inroads" into 
"traditional Republican pluralities in western New York" and 
that Nixon's attack on Stevenson was intended to try to put a 
finger in that dike. Stevenson had done poorly in this part 
of New York State in both 1952 and 1956, and Nixon was banking 
on rubbing some of Stevenson's unpopularity off onto 
Kennedy.76 Even John Foster Dulles had fared well in this 
area when he ran for election in his own right as U.S. senator 
from New York, despite losing statewide. (Dulles had been 
appointed by New York Governor Thomas Dewey to fill a vacancy 
in the upper chamber.) The future secretary of state had run
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a strong Republican, anticommunist campaign, eerily and 
demagogically invoking the Yalta agreements and the subsequent 
"enslavement of Eastern Europe" in a brazen attempt to get 
ethnic votes. However, Kennedy was destined to do well in 
1960 among those same ethnic voters who despised Communism.
The descendant of Irish Catholic immigrants had particular 
appeal to those who despised that Soviet variety of Communism 
which oppressed so many of the voters' own people in Eastern 
Europe.
Nixon still tried to cash in on Quemoy-Matsu before this 
upstate New York audience. The vice president accused Kennedy 
of "glib double-talk" on the question and raised anew the 
question of the Democrat's powers of judgment and experience 
when he asked "How can the American people have confidence in 
a man who shoots from the hip on matters that gravely affect 
the security of our country?" Nixon suggested that Kennedy 
had "made us sitting ducks for the Communists to push 
around...by drawing a surrender line that would surrender 
Quemoy and Matsu to the Communists at gunpoint." To top of 
this round of criticism, Nixon concluded that Kennedy showed 
"a very dangerous immaturity in world affairs."77 On this 
last score, at least, Eisenhower would agree with him about 
the young upstart's lack of maturity, even though Nixon was 
still hardly Ike's own pride and joy.
Nixon's own gut political instinct was to continue to go 
for the jugular over the offshore islands issue. Nixon wrote 
two years later in his first of what would eventually amount
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to several memoirs, Six Crises, that his campaign's polls 
showed that both Republicans and Democrats favored his 
hardline position on the Chinese Nationalist-held islands and 
that even Kennedy's own surveys were showing very much the 
same thing. But Nixon claimed that his aide, Fred Seaton, had 
"received a curious message from Washington." The gist of it 
was that Chester Bowles, a Kennedy foreign affairs advisor 
best known for founding the phenomenally successful Manhattan 
advertising firm of Benton & Bowles, had called on Secretary 
of State Christian Herter "to indicate Kennedy's concern over 
the way the Quemoy-Matsu debate was developing." Bowles had 
imparted to Herter that the Democratic nominee did not want to 
give the impression that the country was divided in its 
"support of the Eisenhower administration's firm stand against 
Communist aggression." Bowles reportedly said that Kennedy 
was now willing to "modify" his position for the sake of 
presenting a united front on this issue. (It is striking how 
a politician will suddenly see the spectre of the "national 
interest" and the imperative of "national unity" when a 
political argument is not going in his favor.) Nixon recalled 
that he asked Seaton what he thought of this overture and that 
Seaton responded that "Bowles and Kennedy— if Kennedy was 
aware of what Bowles had done— were using this device for the 
purpose of getting me [Nixon] to lay off on an issue that was 
becoming increasingly unpopular for Kennedy."78
Nixon had his own response. "My own reaction," he wrote, 
"was that if Kennedy did modify his position, I would have no
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choice but to drop the issue— except for continuing to point 
to the whole 'shoot first, think later' approach as indicative 
of his lack of experience in the foreign policy area." Nixon, 
as historian of his own life and campaign, naturally wanted to 
appear as though he had dutifully taken the high road when the 
expedient thing would have been to politically exploit the 
issue to the hilt. "While I recognized that I had Kennedy 
over the barrel on an issue which was turning sour for him," 
Nixon reminisced, "I believed that he had the right to change 
his mind. It was important that the the Chinese Communists be 
given no encouragement to st*rt trouble in the Formosa Straits 
because of a hassle in the American presidential 
campaign."79 This was Nixon at his best, but the artist of 
the portrait for posterity was Nixon himself. The most likely 
explanation is that Nixon had gotten a lot out of the issue 
but there was only a finite amount of political gold to be 
extracted when other issues like the big bearish Khrushchev, 
Berlin and Castro's Cuba had to be considered, not to mention 
a host of domestic matters.
In an October 18 speech before the American Legion in 
Tampa, Nixon urged that the United States exercise its veto 
power to ban Communist China from the United Nations until 
Peking stopped violating international law. This was in 
keeping with virtually all his pronouncements on the issue 
since the Communists had marched into Peking. Nixon referred 
again to the Stevenson speech in which the former Democratic 
presidential candidate proposed that America support seating
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Communist China in the U.N. in exchange for Peking's promise 
to guarantee Taiwan's freedom. "Such a promise," Nixon 
warned, would be respected only as long as it served the 
Communists' purpose." For Nixon, the important thing was not 
what the Peking Communists would say they would agree to, but 
what they actually did. He remained unimpressed with their 
track record, citing Communist Chinese aggression in Korea, 
"continued violence against a member of the United Nations, 
free China...ruthless seizure of Tibet, military raids against 
India and Nepal and illegal and unprincipled imprisonment of 
American civilians [these were American pilots] which we have 
been objecting to and which they will do nothing about." The 
Republican presidential candidate then backed the use of an 
American veto in the United Nations "of any effort to admit a 
nation that does not comply as Red China does not comply [with 
United Nations principles.]"80 Nixon was still taking the 
hard line, although changing the emphasis from the ironclad 
defense of Quemoy and Matsu to the question of recognition of 
Peking and whether or not that government should be 
represented in the U.N.
No doubt Nixon was adamant about such opposition as things 
then stood, but this was, after all, in the heat of a 
presidential campaign. Nixon was not going to remind 
potential voters of the subtleties involved and his own past 
remarks at various stages in his vice presidency when he did 
not rule out recognition or admission of Peking to the family 
of nations once Communist China learned to act according to
-324-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
international law and the U.N. charter. But elections are won 
with votes and Nixon was all too aware of how Kennedy had 
erred in trying to show some sophisticated discernment over 
the offshore islands. Nixon was not going to follow suit now 
over the recognition question. Why lose votes on a sure 
thing?
Nixon and Kennedy squared off for the fourth and last time 
in debate on October 21 in New York. Nixon later wrote in Six 
Crises that, except to point out Kennedy's poor judgment, he 
more or less let the offshore islands issue drop after the 
third debate. However, Quemoy and Matsu still figured 
prominently in the final debate, although Cuba dominated the 
proceedings. Nixon sang the same old song on Quemoy and 
Matsu, praising the Eisenhower policy as outlined (or more 
correctly, not outlined) in the Formosa Resolution. The vice 
president also played up his favorite theme of the need for 
never making any concessions to the Communists. Alluding to 
those by now internationally known group of islands, he 
charged Kennedy with having made "recommendations with regard 
to— again— slicing off a piece of free territory, and 
abandoning it, in effect, to the Communists." Trying to 
present himself as the one candidate who could truly preserve 
the peace, Nixon accused his Democratic opponent of showing a 
"lack of understanding of dictators, a lack of understanding 
of Communists, because every time you make such a concession 
it does not lead to peace. It only encourages them to
-325-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
blackmail you. It encourages them to begin a war."81 Mixon 
hardly was ready to let Quemoy and Matsu fade away, let alone 
die as a political issue.
Later in the debate, Nixon reiterated that the offshore 
islands would remain "as a campaign issue just as long as 
Senator Kennedy persists in what I think is a fundamental 
error." The error, Nixon maintained, was that Kennedy voted 
for a Senate amendment in 1955 which omitted Quemoy and Matsu 
from the American defense commitment. Nixon then offered to 
drop the issue, if Kennedy would retract his previous views. 
Kennedy countered that the Eisenhower administration itself 
had sent delegations to Chiang to try and convince him to 
abandon the islands but he also made it a point to say he 
supported the Eisenhower policy.82 It seemed that both 
Kennedy and Nixon were backpeddling on an issue whose nuances 
were not going to be understood by the average American voter 
anyway.
James Reston commented that the fourth debate was "highly 
repetitive" and he noted that "few observers" in Washington 
thought that the "discussion of strategic plans for dealing 
with Cuba and Quemoy and Matsu...[was] in the national 
interest."83 The New Republic raked Nixon over the coals on 
his handling of the Strait issue. In an editorial pungently 
titled "It's No Debate," the magazine said "Those Peskydoreys 
never did have much chance of exciting the passions of a large 
number of voters, but before the argument ends over which 
candidate was or was not willing to stand by our treaty
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commitments in the Formosa Straits, a parting observation is 
in order about about Mr. Mixon's manner of handling issues in 
general."84
"Given a concrete problem, he invokes what he calls a 
principle; in this instance, that of not giving an inch to 
dictators," the journal observed. "It is proferred not as a 
point in argument, but as a device to foreclose argument," The 
New Republic said, breaking through what it considered to be 
Nixon's sophistry. "What is provident and what is feasible 
are no longer to be valid considerations. Indeed, there is to 
be no issue— only a slogan intended to stop discussion, to 
identify the Vice President with virtue, and his opponent with 
fuzzy“mindedness, woolly-headedness, moral slackness, 
etc."85 But then again, The New Republic was never exactly 
in the Nixon camp.
The debates were certainly "historic" but no one reading 
the transcripts over three decades later could ever confuse 
them with being "great." Nixon, himself, discounted their 
ultimate bearing on the election by showing that the polls 
differed little from before the first debate until after the 
fourth debate and that Kennedy's winning margin on election 
day was less than a tenth of a percentage point in the popular 
vote.86 China, through the means of the offshore islands, 
was one of several foreign policy issues discussed, although 
in reality, the islands were not at the heart of the China 
question in 1960. Although both candidates relied heavily on 
warmed-over rhetoric and cliche, one cannot help but be
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impressed with the relatively high level of discourse, 
redundant though it might have been, when compared with the 
banal utterances of America's politicians as we approach the 
21st century.
The Nixon "Surge" Falls short
In the final two weeks of the campaign, Nixon went on the 
old familiar path of the partisan attack. He later described 
his sense of the momentum beginning to turn towards his favor 
and against Kennedy's in those last decisive days.87 He 
continued to hit hard on Cuba, only this time he had charged 
Kennedy with being irresponsible for advocating a U.S.-backed 
invasion. Nixon never forgave Kennedy for this because he 
assumed the Central Intelligence Agency had made JFK privy to 
its plans for an invasion of the island nation by anti-Castro 
rebels. Nixon had maintained publicly that such an invasion 
would be irresponsible and an abrogation of U.S. treaty 
commitments under the Organization of American States. 
Privately, however, Nixon advocated the forceful removal of 
Castro and felt frustrated that Kennedy should use the issue 
in what the vice president considered an improper way which 
potentially could damage the national security. For once, 
Nixon appeared to be the "soft" politician as far as communism 
was concerned, which certainly must have struck the American 
people as yet another "new Nixon."
In an all out effort to win ethnic votes of people whose 
roots lay behind the Iron Curtain, Nixon made a rather
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ridiculous Eisenhowerean promise which amounted to a pledge to 
"go to Eastern Europe," so to speak, "to carry the message of 
freedom into the Communist world." Nixon then topped himself 
by saying he would ask Eisenhower, Herbert Hoover and Harry 
Truman to travel together to that Communist dominated region 
to bring the flame of freedom to Eastern Europe.86 The very 
idea of the two old antagonists, Truman and Eisenhower, 
spending any time together, no matter what the cause, was just 
plain ridiculous. To further aggravate this rather tawdry 
political pipe dream, it should be remembered that Truman's 
distaste for the Republican nominee for president in 1960 was 
no secret.
Eisenhower took off his nonpartisan gloves, altered his 
near legendary above the battle posture, and made several 
appearances for Nixon in the last week of the campaign. 
Eisenhower's dander was up over Kennedy's persistent charges 
that America had lost prestige under the Republican 
administration and that a "missile gap" existed with the 
Soviets soaring ahead in such vital areas as "rocket thrust." 
Nothing could anger the world's greatest living general more 
and he socked it to Kennedy, the man he liked to term the 
"upstart", on the campaign trail. Eisenhower was apparently 
willing to do even more, but Nixon claims that the president's 
physician and his wife, Mamie, feared that too much 
campaigning would be a strain on the Old Man's heart.89 A 
more likely explanation is that Nixon felt compelled to win on 
his own. He knew Eisenhower could help his cause, but he did
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not want to be beholden to the outgoing president. It is hard 
to imagine that Nixon had not built up great resentment 
towards Eisenhower over the latter's inconsistent and often 
inconsiderate treatment of his vice president.
Nixon issued a statement from Los Angeles on November 5, 
summing up the campaign. He again attacked Kennedy on Quemoy 
and Matsu, claiming that the Democrat had "argued in favor of 
open and avowed retreat from a position which he [Kennedy] 
finds uncomfortably close to the Communist menace." Nixon 
continued, "It is as though we could settle something by the 
mere act of withdrawing to a new position. Closeness is not 
the evil," he said. "So long as they hold their aggressive 
design for world conquest, the Communists will always be 
close. The more we withdraw," he concluded, "the closer and 
the faster they will come on."90 Nixon had toned down his 
rhetoric but he had not really retreated from the aggressive 
stance he had previously espoused over these bits of "real 
estate" at the horizon of the free world.
On November 8, in the closest presidential election in 
modern times, the American people chose John F. Kennedy as 
their next president. The popular vote margin was only some 
113,000 and political scientists have gone to great lengths in 
the last 30 years to show how if a few thousand votes had been 
changed in Illinois, Missouri, Texas and some other states, 
Nixon, indeed, might have been the one elected 35th President 
of the United States rather than the man from Massachusetts. 
Undoubtedly there were voting irregularities in Illinois and
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Texas, the former state providing Kennedy's electoral vote 
margin. Although not a few of the Nixon people urged the 
defeated candidate to contest the election, the vice 
president, much to his credit, declined to do so fearing that 
it would only make the nation's transition to a new 
administration all the more unstable. It is not that Nixon 
did not feel that there had been irregularities or 
illegalities in the election process. Nixon did save the 
country the further grief of a recount but it should also be 
noted that such a procedure would have taken time and it would 
have been extremely difficult and costly to overturn even the 
narrow margin of victory that Kennedy had gained.
In his classic, yet somewhat embarrassingly dated book,
The Making of the President 1960. Theodore H. White lionizes 
the presidential election process and the two candidates in a 
way that would simply not be possible for the cynical American 
public and press at the end of the 20th Century. White 
portrays the election as won by the glamourous Kennedy and his 
incredible, impeccable, brilliant, well-greased machine of a 
political organization led by the handsome candidate with 
irresistible charisma and charm. But White does not see the 
election as merely Kennedy's victory. He views it as having 
been lost by a fumbling Nixon who never quite recovered from 
the first debate and made numerous other mistakes in the 
campaign. Yet, Tom Wicker comes much closer to the truth when 
he points out that Nixon was running as the Republican 
candidate, clearly the head of the minority party. Nixon was
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also no Eisenhower in terns of popularity, yet what might 
truly be seen as remarkable, is how close Nixon came to 
victory in 1960. Wicker also notes that the so-called Kennedy 
"magic" was not felt by nearly half the electorate.91
Bringing Them Together
With the election having been such a squeaker, Kennedy 
went out of his way to invite Nixon to meet with him on 
November 14, less than a week after the vote, in Key Biscayne, 
Florida where Nixon was unwinding after the campaign.
Kennedy, although the declared winner, would obviously benefit 
politically from meeting his former opponent. If anything, 
such a get together would inspire a spirit of national unity, 
something much desired by a president-elect who has won the 
highest office in the land by only slightly more than 100,000 
votes. There had been some speculation that Kennedy would 
offer Nixon a position in the new Democratic administration. 
Indeed, in the course of their discussion, Kennedy offered 
Nixon some amorphous, undefined post in the administration. 
Nixon recalled that he thought Kennedy was just doing what was 
expected of him and he turned down the offer, undoubtedly much 
to Kennedy's relief.92 It is impossible to imagine Nixon 
being a part of the Kennedy team. He felt his calling was 
clearly to remain a leader, preferably the leader, of the nuts 
and bolts of any democracy, the loyal opposition.
Kennedy and Nixon met for over one hour and the Republican 
took advantage of the meeting to speak his mind again on the
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China issue. Writing in Six Crises. Nixon recalled that he 
was under the impression that Chester Bowles and other Kennedy 
foreign policy advisors were trying to get the President-elect 
to reevaluate the American position vis-a-vis the recognition 
of Red China and that country's admission to the United 
Nations. Kennedy assured Nixon that he was against U.S. 
recognition of Red China. But Kennedy then went on to tell 
Nixon that "strong arguments had been presented to him in 
favor of the so-called 'two-Chlnas policy.'" The idea behind 
this was that Nationalist China would remain on the Security 
Council while Peking would acquire one seat in the General 
Assembly. What this boiled down to in parliamentary terms was 
that Communist China would only vote in the General Assembly 
and would lack the veto power that accompanies being on the 
Security Council. Kennedy then explained to Nixon that the 
backers of this approach contended that "Red China could not 
do any damage in the U.N. under such circumstances."93
But at this juncture, Nixon was not willing to yield on 
Communist China, despite, as pointed out above, his having 
shown a certain degree of flexibility and open-mindedness on 
the issue throughout the 1950s. "in expressing my strong 
opposition to this policy [the two-Chinas]," Nixon wrote, "I 
pointed out that the issue wasn't whether Red China had one 
vote in the Assembly, or even the veto power. What was really 
at stake was that admitting Red China to the United Nations 
would be a mockery of the provision of of the Charter which 
limits its membership to 'peace-loving nations.' And what was
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most disturbing," Nixon continued, "was that it would give 
respectability to the Communist regime which would immensely 
increase its power and prestige in Asia, and probably 
irreparably weaken the non-Communist governments in that 
area."94
Yet, even here Nixon only went so far in his rhetoric. He 
was realistic enough not to call for the ouster of the Maoist 
regime in Peking. Writing this book in 1962, he omits the 
phraseology he usually applied to the China issue: namely, 
that China needed to act in accordance with international law 
and the United Nations charter if it were to be readmitted 
into the so-called "family of nations." Nor did Nixon go into 
his strong belief that the "friendship" of the Chinese and 
American "peoples" would one day help overcome the differences 
between their governments. But then again, the 
president-elect had only so much time to listen and Nixon's 
editor at Doubleday probably only provided him with just so 
much space to cover this post-election conference with 
Kennedy.
Looking Ahead on China
Despite the nuances of political rhetoric and instances of 
playing to the galleries of certain constituencies 
(particularly the Asia Firsters, Old Guard and China Lobby), 
Nixon had actually been quite consistent in his position on 
Communist China from the time of the Chinese Revolution 
through the election of 1960. He opposed recognition of
*
-334-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Peking and that regime's admission into the United Nations.
But that opposition was not lacking in a sense of realpolitik 
nor was it without conditions that Nixon had clearly spelled 
out from the time of the Korean War. As Nixon retired to 
private life and began the great comeback from political 
oblivion to a triumphant run for the White House in 1968,
China would take on renewed importance, especially in light of 
the Vietnam War. By 1967, in a famous article in the 
prestigious publication, Foreign Affairs. Nixon would call for 
China to be brought back into the "family of nations," more 
than a slight hint at beginning a process that would lead to 
the normalization of U.S. relations with Peking. Yet, this 
was not inconsistent with his previous stance nor was it the 
"Great Turnaround" it is often portrayed to be. For the 
world, especially the Communist world, had changed much more 
than Nixon. By the election of 1968 and in his first term as 
president, he was in a position to take advantage of those 
changes for the United States, and once again, China would be 
the cornerstone of his Asia policy.
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EPILOGUE; r e o p e n i n g t he d o o r 
What had changed most in the world from the vantage point
of the 1960s was the Sino-Soviet split which abolished the
preconceived notion on the American political right that 
communism was monolithic. Nixon eventually came to see this 
as an opportunity in geopolitical terms for the United States 
to reach out to China, not out of idealism or a sense of
romance, but pure national interest on our part as much on the
Chinese. Nixon's rationale was based as much on establishing 
a relationship before Communist China became a major nuclear 
superpower. And this beau geste of the opening to China was 
to have the beneficial effect from the United States point of 
view of inducing the Russians to strike a modus vivendi with 
America through the beginnings of Detente and the first 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. At the time, Nixon played 
down the so-called "China card" but he knew whether it was 
played up or not, the old men in the Kremlin would be quaking 
in their boots at the prospect of a Sino-American 
rapprochement. Detente between the Soviets and the U.S. was 
later to crumble during the Carter administration but not even 
Richard Nixon's most acerbic critics can blame him for the 
deterioration in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations under the former 
governor of Georgia.
Although throughout the 1950s, Nixon had been Communist 
China's most vitriolic critic, this dissertation has shown 
that his rhetoric was often laced with conciliatory language 
and that he never quite shut the door and locked it on the
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prospect of future relations. His language was such as to 
more than mollify the Republican right wing, yet he held open 
the possibility, often through what he did not say as much as 
indirect language that his critics never quite caught on to, 
of future relations with Peking should the Communist regime 
behave in a manner befitting a great nation and within the 
boundaries of international law. Yes, there was a bit of 
condescension in that argument (Be good, and we will accord 
you the proper respect and recognition) but Nixon never closed 
the door on the future, nor did he make the unrealistic demand 
that Mao and his followers be removed from power in Peking. 
Nixon was, if anything, always the realist yet with a 
politician's eye on his domestic constituency. Statesmanship 
is all fine and well but it is impossible to be a statesman in 
our political culture unless one is first elected, and has a 
constituency that is willing to stand by the 
politician-statesman in the midst of good times or a crisis.
Yet, the obvious must be emphasized. Although this study 
has concentrated on the years when Nixon held the nation's 
second highest office, the vice president did not make 
American policy towards China during the Eisenhower 
administration. Under the American system, no vice president 
can determine the foreign or domestic stance of any 
administration. There is little doubt that Nixon would have 
liked to have made those decisions and, it has been said that 
members of the Eisenhower administration thought the young man 
overstepped his bounds on some occassions. Even Nixon's
_ * >  4 « % _
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mentor, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was sometimes 
put off by Nixon's eagerness to speak out in areas that did 
not readily fall under his limited portfolio as vice 
president. Despite Nixon's great ambitions, his role in the 
administration foreign policy should not and cannot be 
overplayed. Nixon often spoke his mind, frequently to the 
displeasure of Eisenhower, but he did not have any appreciable 
influence on foreign policy. The 1950s were, as stated 
previously, a time of "education" and a "gestation" period for 
Nixon's own thinking regarding China and the rest of Asia.
After Nixon was politically and personally humiliated in 
1962 by losing the governorship of California in a landslide 
to Democrat Pat Brown, the former vice president moved to New 
York where he became a partner in a prestigious Wall Street 
law firm. The job gave him ample opportunity to travel and to 
think through his worldview, campaign for Republican 
candidates and eventually mount his own successful drive for 
the presidency in 1968.
Looking back on his China initiative, Nixon told historian 
and Nixon biographer Herbert S. Parmet in 1984 that he had 
been influenced in part by a trip he took to Europe in 1965. 
During this journey, he met separately with French President 
Charles de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. 
Both leaders urged that the United States recognize Communist 
China and de Gaulle said France had recognized China (in 1962) 
because it "is so big, so old and very much abused, including 
by Western colonial power."1
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Nixon then pointed out that although there was historic 
American sympathy for China, the United States had taken the 
part of the Nationalists because the government considered 
Peking part of the Soviet bloc. The Chinese intervention in 
Korea further exacerbated the American attitude toward Peking, 
he said. Nixon recalled that on his first trip to 
non-Communist Asia in 1953, he found a "residual hatred of the 
Japanese but no longer any fear" of them. That old fear,
Nixon observed, was replaced by trepidation over "Red Chinese 
expansionism" and of Peking "supporting 'wars of liberation1 
in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines."2
Recalling the prevalent attitude in the Eisenhower years, 
Nixon mentioned that there was an assumption of a monolithic 
Soviet bloc. "We were convinced," he told Parmet, "that the 
Chinese and Soviets were working together and that the Soviets 
were the senior power. Then came 1961 and the appearance of 
articles indicating that a split was occurring."
Interestingly enough, Nixon claimed that his European travels 
in 1965 and conversations with Pakistani leader Ayub Khan and 
Philippine politician Carlos Romulo showed him that the 
Chinese were "turning around" and that "a different 
relationship should be sought."3
Nixon sounded the trumpet for a new approach in the 
October 1967 Foreign Affairs article. Nixon commented that 
political fear prevented both Kennedy and Johnson from trying 
anything different in U.S. relations with Peking. Nixon 
recognized that hostility toward China "was also built on the
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fact that they were major suppliers of North Vietnam" and that 
Peking's brand of "communism was also a lot more pure than the 
Soviet version," which translated means far more wedded to 
revolutionary ideology. But Nixon made clear to Parmet that 
"the war in Vietnam was not the only reason I undertook the 
rapprochement with China." Nixon also went out of his way 
with Parmet to downplay the influence of the China Lobby and 
he dismissed the notion that the U.S. had a "head in the sand" 
recalcitrant policy toward Communist China that "was due to 
the China Lobby." Nearly ten years after the fall of Saigon, 
Nixon called Ho a "nationalist" (something he would not have 
dared do in the 1950s when "monolithic communism" was part of 
his political vocabulary) but he added that Ho would "accept 
support from whomoever he could get," despite centuries of 
enmity between the Vietnamese and the Chinese. The most 
striking statement Nixon made in this interview was that "Had 
there been no Vietnam war, we would have had to seek new 
relations with China. We had to move in that direction.
Nobody in a responsible position could fail to see such a new 
relationship."4
Even before Nixon was in a "responsible position," when he 
wandered across the vast wilderness outside of public office, 
he began to sense the need to make an overture toward Peking. 
Although an ardent "hawk" on the Vietnam war who criticized 
President Lyndon Johnson for not wholeheartedly pursuing a 
complete victory, Nixon privately advised Johnson in March 
1966 at the White House to make some kind of diplomatic
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communication, albeit unspecified, toward Peking. Nixon 
relates an incredible scene of an informal meeting between the 
two political rivals. While LBJ lay snugly under the covers 
oi the presidential bed, with Lady Bird by his side, Nixon 
told the reclining First couple that "...time is on their 
[Communist China's] side. Now is the time to confront them on 
the diplomatic front."5 Whether this is the pure truth or 
just self-serving memory on Nixon's part, it would remain up 
to the Republican once he was in the nation's driver's seat to 
make the overture to Peking.
In his memoirs, Nixon also recalled a trip he made to Asia 
in 1967 as part of his warm up for the 1968 presidential 
campaign (although he had stated that he was taking a 
six-month "holiday" from politics during the first half of 
1967— a wise choice for him, because it took the heat and 
glare of publicity off him while he further formulated the 
positions he would take in the upcoming election.). Nixon 
visited his old friend Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan and noted 
that the old man still harbored visions of returning to the 
mainland and the Nationalist Chinese leader again asked for 
American support for that operation. Chiang argued that such 
an invasion, assuming its success, would end the Communist 
Chinese nuclear threat as well as Peking's support for the 
Vietnamese communists. Nixon charitably wrote that he 
"wondered whether he [Chiang] might be right" although it is 
incredible to think for a moment that Nixon really thought 
Chiang's idea for a return to the mainland held any place in
-346-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the world of reality. Nixon added that his "pragmatic 
analysis told me that he [Chiang] was wrong" although 
Chiang's "burning desire to return to the mainland was 
understandable and admirable. But," he added, "it was totally 
unrealistic in view of the massive power the Communists had 
developed."0 Chiang's political capital was definitely 
evaporating. Nixon had previously been dispatched by 
Eisenhower as long ago as 1953 to tell Chiang that it was "no 
go" as far as American military support for a Nationalist 
"liberation" of the mainland. But for some, dreams die hard.
Perhaps even more importantly on this trip, Nixon observed 
that although the Asian leaders he spoke to strongly backed 
the American position in Vietnam (often their firmest support 
would be expressed privately to the former vice president), 
there was a new position emerging concerning how Washington 
should regard Peking. "Some who had adamantly opposed any 
change of American policy toward China," he observed, "had 
come around to the view that some new and direct relationship 
between the two nations was essential if there was to be any 
chance at all after the Vietnam war was over to build a 
lasting peace in Asia in which free nations would have a 
chance to survive."7
Nixon's major statement on China during this period took 
the form of the article in the October 1967 issue of Foreign 
Affairs. The piece hardly marked a retreat for Nixon as he 
opened it by defining the United States's military commitment 
in Asia and suggested that there was still credibility to the
-347-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"domino theory."8 He called, as he had so often in the 
previous twenty years, for the United States to have an Asian 
policy on a par with the nation's European policy. Nixon 
called the United States a Pacific power,9 echoing that 
secretary of state of yore, William Seward's remark that the 
Pacific was an "American lake." Nixon cited Communist China 
as posing a new danger to Asia in place of the old European 
colonialism. This, too, was not a new mode of thinking as he 
had frequently expressed the idea in the 1950s that Communism 
was the "new imperialism" in Asia.
The key passages called on the United States to deal with 
the "reality of China." "Any American policy toward Asia must 
come urgently to grips with the reality of China," Nixon 
wrote. But Nixon quickly offered a qualification. "This does 
not mean," he continued, "as many would simplistically have 
it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the 
United Nations and to ply it with offers of trade— all of 
which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present 
course."10
It was because China posed a danger that it had to be 
reckoned with. "Taking the long view," the former vice 
president added, "we simply cannot afford to leave China 
forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its 
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors." The 
important thing was to somehow influence the Chinese to 
change. Was Nixon taking on the garb of a 19th Century 
Protestant missionary? Hardly. Any change by the Chinese
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would be meant not only to satisfy American Interests in the 
region and internationally but to be held forth as 
constructive for the Chinese, themselves, in attempting to 
solve their massive internal problems. "The world cannot be 
safe until China changes," Nixon said in the article. "Thus 
our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be 
to induce change." Nixon proposed just the proper formula to 
do that: "The way to do this," he advised, "is to persuade
China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial 
ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a 
turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward 
toward the solution of its own domestic problems."11 This 
utterance again was really no different from what Nixon had 
repeatedly said in the political furor in the wake of the 
MacArthur dismissal in 1951: namely, that Communist China had 
to be a law-abiding member of the international community, 
follow the precepts of the U.N. charter and abandon its idea 
and zeal for international revolution. The Nixon in 1967 
calling for a new relationship between Washington and Peking 
is much closer to the younger Nixon of the early 1950s than 
most historians have recognized or been willing to admit.
Nixon further stated that the impending emergence in the 
next three to five years of China as a full-fledged nuclear 
power coupled with the prospect of the Soviets reaching 
nuclear parity with America "could create a crisis of the 
first order." Nixon called for "the strengthening of 
non-Communist Asia [as] a priority comparable to that which we
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gave to the strengthening of Western Europe after World War 
II." This also was an echo of Nixon's advocacy in the heat of 
the Korean War for an American Asian policy of equal 
importance to its European policy. Nixon was, in effect, 
still calling for a type of containment of China, even as he 
spoke out for renewed contact with Peking, although he 
preferred the term "containment without isolation." However, 
he warned that the United States could not "go it alone in 
containing China" and that the non-communist nations of Asia 
would have to begin to pick up much of the burden of their own 
defense. This was an early statement of what became known in 
1969 during the Nixon presidency as the Nixon Doctrine. "The 
primary restraint on China's Asian ambition should be 
exercised by the Asian nations in the path of those ambitions, 
backed by the ultimate power of the United States," he 
argued. Nixon was also concerned that any "containment" of 
China with only the United States and European powers would 
arouse the "suspicion of racism."12 Nixon, to his credit, 
was just as aware of the impact of racism, or perceived 
racism, internationally in 1967 as he had been in 1953 when he 
first traveled in Asia.
Nixon's hope was that if the Chinese faced firm opposition 
to their revolutionary designs abroad, Peking could "be 
persuaded to turn their energies inward rather than outward. 
And that," he significantly added, "will be the time when the 
dialogue with mainland China can begin." Nixon desired to 
pull China "back into the world community...as a great and
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progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world 
revolution." In concluding, Nixon called for a "Pacific 
community" which he considered just as vital to the United 
States as the "Atlantic Community."13 Nixon was looking to 
the "Pacific Rim" as vital to the interests of the United 
States long before it was fashionable. What boggles the mind 
is how after the publication of this article, any American 
political observer could have been shocked, or the least bit 
surprised, by Nixon's opening to China as president. He had 
done much more than give the world a hint of what his actions 
as president might be.
It was also hardly a surprise when 1968 rolled around that 
Nixon became a candidate for the Republican nomination. What 
might have astounded many of his previous political obituary 
writers was that he was the front-runner to head the GOP 
ticket. In 1968, China was even less of a direct campaign 
issue than it had been in 1960 when Nixon and Kennedy used up 
so much wind to discuss the fate of those two offshore 
islands, the names of which were difficult for the American 
electorate to remember eight years later. Vietnam and 
domestic turmoil in the anti-war and civil rights movements 
were the major issues in what had to be Nixon's favorite 
year. But it is significant that as early as March, just 
before the New Hampshire primary, Nixon told that most famous 
of presidential election chroniclers, Theodore White, of his 
plans for contacting Peking. "...He said that if he were 
elected President," White later wrote, "the very first thing
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he'd do would be to try to get in touch with Red China. There 
had to be an understanding with Red China. In ten or fifteen 
years it would be impossible to run the world if Red China 
weren't part of it."14 Nixon, no doubt, believed this as he 
was more or less invoking the line he had taken in Foreign 
Affairs, although upping the ante by saying directly that 
Washington should contact Peking. But an historian looking 
back on this cannot help but marvel at how well Nixon could 
play to any audience, even veteran political reporter Teddy 
White. After all, the young Teddy White had made his name as 
a China correspondent for Time magazine, owned and published 
by Chiang's most staunch proponent, Henry Luce. White had 
broken with Luce over the Chinese Civil War, and by 1968, even 
as White was well on his way to becoming a conservative, he 
must have been heartened to hear Richard Nixon talk of America 
extending its hand to China.
Nixon, of course, went on to win the presidency, albeit in 
a squeaker over Democrat Hubert Humphrey and third party 
segregationist George Wallace. Yet, Nixon's margin over 
Humphrey was half a million votes, rather than Kennedy's 
paltry plurality over him in 1960. Despite garnering only 
some 43 percent of the popular vote, Nixon did not feel like a 
minority president, for he reasoned that the 13 percent that 
had gone to Wallace would have more than likely fallen in his 
column if the Alabamian had not been in the race. Even more 
importantly, Nixon had won a solid, unquestionable victory in 
the Electoral College, end that is the only vote that truly
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counts in American presidential elections.
Before assuming the nation's highest office, Nixon 
pondered what he viewed as the continuity of America's foreign 
policy from his early days in Congress to the transition 
period to his own administration in the White House. "As I 
looked at America's position in the world and examined our 
relations with other nations," he later wrote in his memoirs, 
"I could see that the central factor in 1968 on the eve of my 
presidency was the same as it had been in 1947 when I was the 
main defender of the free world against the encroachment and 
aggression of the Communist world."15
Barely a month after being inaugurated, Nixon was on the 
road in Europe. Although he had often expressed much concern 
about America treating its Asian and European policies on 
equal terms, he felt compelled to reassure the United States's 
NATO allies early in his administration that he was fully 
committed to the defense of Western Europe against any 
possible Soviet attack. Once again, he met with General de 
Gaulle. Nixon had especially appreciated the respect that the 
French president had displayed toward him when he visited 
France as a politician out of power. Nixon felt a special 
kinship with de Gaulle for both were all too familiar with the 
frustrations and agony of political exile. The president of 
the Fifth Republic again advised Nixon to recognize Communist 
China. Neither the champion of the French right or the 
American right of center had any illusions about the Chinese 
but Nixon realized the necessity of establishing some sort of
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modus vivendi with China before the world's most populous 
nation became too powerful.16
Within days of the inauguration, even before the trip to 
Europe, Nixon had asked National Security Adviser Henry 
Kissinger to "give every encouragement to the attitude that 
the administration was exploring possibilities of rapprochment 
with the Chinese" although Nixon did not want this to be made 
public at the time. Nixon's first "great leap forward" toward 
Peking as president took the form of his February 1970 Foreign 
Policy Report to Congress. The president commented that "The 
Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain 
isolated from the international community..." Then he 
suggested that Peking's diplomatic status vis-a-vis the United 
States should fall somewhere along the lines of America's 
relations with the Soviet Union. "The principles underlying 
our relations with Communist China are similar to those 
governing our policies toward the U.S.S.R.," the Nixon report 
said. "United States policy is not likely soon to have much 
impact on China's behavior, let alone its ideological 
outlook. But it certainly is in our interest, and in the 
interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we 
take what steps we can toward improved practical relations 
with Peking."17 The Communist leadership saw this as a thaw 
in the ice and in the following two months, the State 
Department announced an easing of official restrictions 
against travel to China and a relaxation of trade regulations.
In the meantime, Nixon had established two "back channels"
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for communication with the Communist Chinese leadership, one 
through the Romanians and the other, and more important of the 
two, through the Pakistani government. (How ironic that 
during the first term of the Nixon administration, it was 
acceptable to look upon Romania's tyrannical ruler Nicolae 
Ceausescu as some sort of liberal reformer simply because he 
tried to distance himself from Moscow.) The president simply 
did not feel at ease going through the standard route of the 
State Department bureaucracy, even though his old friend 
William Rogers was secretary of state. But Nixon even kept 
Rogers in the dark. Make no mistake about it: this diplomatic 
maneuver was going to be controlled by the Oval Office without 
any interference from what many of the Nixon people referred 
to as the "fudge factory" at Foggy Bottom. If anything, Nixon 
became irritated at his chief strategic partner, Kissinger, 
who the president rightly believed was all too eager to 
encourage his own aggrandizement, and for the press and public 
to think that he, the great Harvard professor, was the 
"brains" behind the China opening. But Nixon's brain had been 
absorbed in this tremendously significant issue for twenty 
years, and he was not going to let anyone else take the credit 
for what would be a magnificent diplomatic achievement.
A further hint at the American desire for normalization 
was dropped when Nixon made a reference at a state dinner in 
October 1970 to the People's Republic of China, the first time 
an American president had referred to the Peking government by 
that regime's own choice of name. This particular dinner was
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held to honor Ceausescu, whose Romanian channel would soon 
come through with an encouraging response from Peking that the 
government there would be willing to accept an American 
envoy.18
On February 25, 1971, Nixon released his second Foreign 
Policy Report as president to Congress. In it, he opened the 
door a bit wider to Peking, albeit cautiously. Nixon again 
said that the United States was prepared to see the People's 
Republic of China play a role in the "family of nations." He 
alluded to a new moderation in the internal situation in 
China, the apparent cooling of the Cultural Revolution. "A 
calmer mood now seems to be developing," the president said. 
"There could be new opportunities for the People's Republic of 
China to explore the path of normalization of its relations 
with its neighbors and with the world, including our own 
country." Nixon added that Washington was prepared for 
"serious dialogue" with Peking. No one reading the following 
lines could mistake that Nixon was preparing a major overture 
to the Chinese. "In the coming year," he said, "I will 
carefully examine what further steps we might take to create 
broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and 
American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles 
to the realization of these opportunities. We hope for," he 
continued, "but will not be deterred by a lack of 
reciprocity." Nixon was telling the Communist Chinese 
leadership that he was, in effect, willing to turn the other 
cheek. But in conclusion, Nixon warned about being
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"realistic" and noted that Peking portrayed the United States 
in the "devil's role."19 However, Nixon was not to be 
deterred and the ensuing diplomatic minuet between the two 
nations over the setting up of a summit was superbly 
orchestrated by the maestro in the Oval Office.
The Chinese, or one should more rightly say Chou En-lai 
apparently with the blessings of the aging Chairman Mao, 
finally extended an invitation for Nixon to visit Peking. 
Kissinger had traveled clandestinely to Peking to meet with 
Chou from July 9-11, 1971 (while the beguiled press was told 
that the national security advisor was suffering from a 
stomach virus) where the two had agreed on the Nixon visit.
The president announced to a stunned nation in a three-minute 
telecast on July 15 that he would go to China before the 
middle of 1972. America and the world would have been far 
less stunned had they followed Nixon more closely on the 
subject of what form America's future relationship with China 
should take.
In October 1971, the People's Republic of China was 
finally admitted to the United Nations. What jolted the Nixon 
administration was that at the same time the U.N. accepted 
Peking, it expelled Taiwan from the international body. In 
view of the opening to China and the realization that the 
United States simply no longer could harbor the votes against 
Peking's admission to the United Nations, the Nixon 
administration had withdrawn its objection to Peking joining 
the organization. What is ironic is that the administration
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then supported the idea of ntwo Chinas” in which both Chiang's 
Taiwan and Mao's Peking would each belong to the United 
Nations. This was exactly what Nixon had warned Kennedy 
against in their post-1960 election meeting. But the world 
had changed and Nixon was perceptive enough to change along 
with it. Writing about Peking's entry into the U.N., Nixon 
said "Personally, I have never believed in bowing to the 
inevitable just because it is inevitable. In this case, 
however," he continued, "I felt that the national security 
interests of the United States lay in developing our relations 
with the P.R.C."20 National security was the consistent key 
for Nixon on the China question before and after the opening 
to the giant Communist nation. It was just that those very 
interests had changed as China was rapidly developing into a 
potential major nuclear power and the Sino-Soviet split had 
revealed divisions in the Communist world that could benefit 
the United States geopolitically.
The most startling newsreel footage from the Nixon years 
was shot on February 21, 1972, when Nixon arrived in Peking. 
The president descended the ladder of Air Force One (which had 
been renamed by Nixon "The Spirit of '76" in honor of the 
upcoming national bicentennial) and eagerly held out his hand 
toward Chou En-Lai. It was a deeply moving moment for Nixon 
was well aware of how then-secretary of state John Foster 
Dulles had spurned Chou's offer of a handshake at the 
ill-fated 1954 Geneva Conference. Nixon was going to be a 
little more gentlemanly than the Princeton educated Mr. Dulles
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and Chou greatly appreciated it. "When our hands met," Nixon 
recalled, "one era ended and another began."21
Chou escorted Nixon to an historic hour-long meeting with 
Mao. Nixon portrays Mao as exhibiting great and rapid wit. 
Nixon wrote that he explained to the Chinese leader what in 
his view made it possible for the two countries to build the 
proverbial bridge to one another, despite their differences. 
"What brings us together," he wrote, "is a recognition cf a 
new situation in the world and a recognition on our part that 
what is important is not a nation's internal political 
philosophy. What is important is its policy toward the rest 
of the world and us."22 (This was to become a consistent 
part of Nixon's thinking even into his so-called 
post-presidential years, for the thought expressed here 
foreshadows his position in the wake of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre of 1389. He visited China late that year and 
although he deplored the violence of the government, he firmly 
believed, and let the Chinese understand that he thought that 
Tiananmen should not destroy what had been the burgeoning 
relationship between Peking and Washington.23)
Nixon had no illusions about the major differences that 
remained between the two countries but he was confident that 
the relationship could blossom in spite of those differences. 
Taiwan remained a major source of contention between the two 
sides but the controversial, yet diplomatically adroit, 
"Shanghai Communique" succeeded in downplaying those opposing 
views by simply stating the separate Chinese and American
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positions on the matter rather than trying to resolve the 
issue. Although both sides agreed that Taiwan was part of 
China, the U.S. maintained that it was an internal matter for 
the Chinese to settle themselves. The United States also 
promised to lessen the American military presence on the 
island nation as tensions eased in the area, an obvious 
allusion to Vietnam. America also insisted on a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question. Nixon, was lambasted by 
the right-wing at home, who accused him of selling Taiwan and 
the Generalissimo down the river. But this was a risk that 
Nixon, the statesman-politician, was willing to take. The 
future did not lie with Taipei; rather, it resided in Peking. 
The president basically gave lip service to America's 
commitment to Taiwan, although it is not insignificant that 20 
years later the Republic of China remains a sovereign 
country. But Nixon was willing to the heat of criticism from 
the right-wing at home (He must have thought, as he often did 
in his national political career, where else could it possibly 
turn in the election?). It was actually good politics because 
it made Nixon look all the more like the peacemaker, even 
though the Vietnam war was still being fought (though not at 
the pace and accompanying high casualties of the late Johnson 
years and early part of the Nixon administration.) The China 
opening by Richard Nixon may well be one of the best examples 
in American history of keen statesmanship translating into 
good politics while at the same time that "courageous" 
statesmanship was founded on the bedrock of politics, i.e.,
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votes, the manna.for anyone who aspires to gain or retain 
public office.
Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for far 
eastern affairs, who accompanied Nixon on the China trip, 
later made some insightful observations about the rationale 
for Nixon reopening the door to China. Green, a career State 
Department official with a genuine grasp of domestic political 
considerations in American foreign affairs, was well aware of 
the risks to Nixon in such a move. "Certainly it was out of 
line with the thinking of many in the Republican party," Green 
later said of the Nixon diplomatic maneuver. "It also 
involved a lot of risks— risks that secret preparations might 
leak to the press, risks that the highly publicized summit 
meeting might fail, risks of bad reactions in Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, or elsewhere. Moreover," Green continued, "he was 
undertaking this trip at a time when the war in Vietnam was 
raging and when the U.S. was suffering heavy casualities at 
the hands of an enemy supported by Peking." Furthermore,
Green noted, Nixon's "approach to China could be seen as a bit 
premature. Why not wait," he asked, "until Mao passed from 
the scene— which seemed fairly imminent?,"24 and one might 
add, more logical and politically expedient.
But Green had an apt explanation for the Nixon move. "The 
very fact," he said, "that the President took all these risks 
underlines the great importance he attached to a U.S.-China 
rapprochement...There was a need to move promptly at a time 
when the Chinese leaders were fearful of a Soviet attack and
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when we could not allow the Soviet Union to take Sino-U.S. 
hostility for granted in its policy calculations.”25 Once 
again, diplomacy rested on national interest and realpolitik.
Green put an interesting spin on the China opening, seeing 
it as a plus for domestic political consumption. ”The 
President also had sound internal political reasons for his 
China initiative which was widely popular in the U.S.,” the 
former ambassador to Indonesia explained, "especially in 
academic, press and other circles critical of our role in the 
long, bloody, fruitless war in Vietnam.” (Of course, prior to 
the China trip, the academy and the Fourth Estate had hardly 
been the president's backbone of support.) "For many months,” 
Green concluded, "China took the headlines away from Vietnam. 
It cast U.S. foreign policy in a positive light during a 
critical year for the Nixon administration." That "critical 
year" was 1972, when President Nixon was up for re-election.
As Green correctly observed, there was more to the re-election 
of a Republican president than ensuring the support of the far 
right, China Lobby faction of the GOP. Nixon knew that better 
than anyone and while he was naturally concerned with the 
national security interest, the political interests of Richard 
Nixon were never off his mind. Green also attributed Nixon's 
rapprochement with China to Nixon's grand desire to leave his 
mark on history, which has and always will be a motivator for 
presidential leadership.26
In essence, in terms of domestic politics and the upcoming 
presidential election, Nixon was practicing what he had
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preached as early as 1951 when looking ahead to the 1952 
campaign, he told fellow Republicans that they simply could 
not win nationally with their own party base alone. 
Specifically, he urged them to reach out for the Independent 
and disaffected Democratic vote as the key to victory. Nixon 
did not say this so directly in 1972 (although he certainly 
pandered to the "hard hat" vote which had hitherto been 
solidly Democratic) but his China initiative underlined the 
theme and helped him to build the solid, and anything but 
silent, majority he reaped against George McGovern that 
November. With an historian's hindsight, one might even 
venture to say that prairie populist, neo-isolationist 
McGovern, himself, also did his share in helping Nixon gain 
his landslide victory that year.
The Nixon position on the China "reopening," sans 
sentimentality, was well recorded by the president's 
speechwriter Raymond Price when Nixon addressed the Cabinet 
upon his triumphant return to the White House from the 
Forbidden Kingdom. The Cabinet was one body of domestic 
political opinion that backed the president. After greeting 
the commander-in-chief with an enthusiastic round of applause, 
the first comment Nixon uttered was a caveat that all should 
beware of euphoria over the great events that took place on 
the president's dramatic, telegenic, historic and 
diplomaticaly and politically successful trip. The Cabinet, 
fully assembled, proceeded to be lectured by the hard-headed 
Nixon, grounded in Realpolitik.
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"Some people have a naive assumption that all problems 
will evaporate when we get to know each other," he told the 
men who ran the various executive departments of the American . 
government. "This is nonsense," he quickly added with more 
than a small dose of frankness. "But if we understand one 
another," the president continued, "we mav find some common 
ground. If you don't talk, you don't find it." For further 
emphasis on the reality of the immediate future of 
Sino-American relations, he stated that "The idea that each is 
affected by knowing each other, by the nice gestures, is 
baloney. It helps. I don't believe in hot rhetoric when cool 
rhetoric will work," said the man who had made a rather 
successful political career, albeit with its ups and downs, on 
hot rhetoric. But the Nixon who reached out to China had 
definitely cooled off. "...Let's be under no illusions that 
we will have instant peace," he warned the Cabinet.27
Nixon told the point men in his administration that it 
would have been a mistake to "gloss over our differences" with 
the Chinese. He would have considered that a weakness and 
pointed out that Chou was a dedicated Communist who spoke 
firmly for what he believed while in their discussions, Nixon 
just as strongly advocated the American philosophy. But,
Nixon observed, the two leaders never let the "firmness" 
degenerate into "belligerence."28
Nixon then made some revealing comments about how he 
interpreted the Shanghai Communique. The most significant 
things, he said, "were not the specifics about Taiwan,
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Vietnam, and so forth, though these were what the 
unsophisticated reports in the press emphasized," Nixon 
snidely commented about his good friends in the media. More 
important, the president reported, were "those that concerned 
the profound new relationship. He both agreed we will not 
resort to the threat of force or the use of force in 
international relations and with each other. He agreed that 
no nation should dominate Asia," which was certainly a not so 
veiled Sino-American diplomatic warning signal to the 
Kremlin. Nixon concluded that although there will still be 
differences, "the question is whether we're going to live with 
them or die for them."29
Nixon also reminded the members of the Cabinet of the 
importance of treating the Chinese with dignity.30 They had 
been slighted for centuries by the Hestem powers, including 
the United States. Hith this line, Nixon was again echoing 
what he had so eloquently said upon returning from Asia in 
1953: the need to treat all Asians as equals to Westerners and 
not just people who would be satisfied with a "bowl of rice."
The president was just as aware in 1972 as he had been 
during the 1950s of the importance of power in impressing and 
deterring the Communists, whether they be in Peking or the 
Kremlin. "The real question," Nixon told the cabinet, "will 
be whether in their [the Chinese Communist leadership] minds, 
in their relationship with the United States, they are dealing 
with a nation led by people who have the strength, the 
character, to be a responsible world power." Nixon then made
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an extremely shrewd analysis of Chinese ambiguity toward the 
American military presence in Vietnam. Speaking of Peking's 
reverence for power, even in its adversary's camp, Nixon said 
"That's why, despite the fact that they say [to the United 
States] get out of the Pacific, get out of Vietnam— and they 
must continue to say it— [the Chinese it seems, had domestic 
political considerations of their own...] for the United 
States to fail to meet its responsibilities in the world, even 
though it would fit with their ideology, would lead inevitably 
to their figuring that we did not have that strength and that 
belief [in the American philosophy]."31
When one member of the Cabinet asked the president why the 
Chinese had decided to meet with him, Nixon quickly and 
accurately replied "Cold-blooded interest. Not friendship." 
Nixon discounted that the Chinese chiefly desired trade and 
aid. Their concerns were far more geopolitical in nature. 
"They see the Soviet Union, India, Japan," he pointed out,
"all of them, each in its own way, encircling them— so they 
need somebody who is not antagnostic. They know the Soviets 
have more men on the Chinese frontier than against Western 
Europe," Nixon added. "With India, they've had a little 
squabble," he said, referring to the brief 1962 war between 
India and China. "As for the United States," the president 
observed, "first, we're a long way off; and second, while they 
would never state publicly that India, Russia, and Japan have 
designs on them, they know very well, I think, that we 
don't."32
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The Mixon reopening had in fact, not only alienated the 
Taiwan regime but had come as a shock to Tokyo. Mixon could 
not have been surprised by that but simply speaking, he placed 
a new relationship with China ahead of relations with other 
Asian countries. Just as with conservatives at home, he 
realized that Taiwan would still have to turn to the U.S. for 
trade as would Tokyo, but even in 1972 one might not have so 
readily seen the economic colossus that Japan would soon 
become. But geopolitical considerations can often transcend 
matters of economics and trade.
Raymond Price correctly saw the continuity between the 
Nixon before and after the opening to China and the 
establishment of detente with the Soviets. The linkage lay in 
containment although Price observed that the old policy was 
being acted out against a backdrop of a new geopolitical 
world. "The Nixon detente was not a substitute for 
containment," the speech writer noted. Rather, "It was a 
means of containment— a means created for the new strategic 
environment, in which the United States could no longer rely 
on the massive nuclear superiority it enjoyed a decade 
earlier."33
"In this new environment," the longtime Nixon aide pointed 
out, "policies had necessarily to be more subtle and more 
complex. Unable to dictate to our adversaries, the United 
States had to weave a fabric of interdependencies that would 
supplement traditional deterrence with positive incentives to 
keep the peace rather than to break the peace."34 Price had
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struck right at the heart of the natter. Nixon was no less 
staunchly anti-Communist than before but he had been awakened 
to the potential changes in the nuclear "balance of terror." 
Specifically, he knew that without the resounding edge of 
American nuclear superiority over the Russians, and with the 
Chinese rapidly advancing in their own nuclear capabilities, 
the old Cold War style of containnent with confrontation and 
isolation had to yield to a modus vivendi of negotiation and 
stability based on a new, intricate and terribly delicate 
tripartite balance between the United States, the Soviets and 
the Chinese. Nixon was still battling communism, serving as 
advocate for the American political and economic ethos, but he 
had to resort to new tactics for a new age. The president's 
urgent and persistent call for a "generation of peace" was not 
mere campaign rhetoric. It was a genuine vision of the future 
built on realpolitik, not as Nixon would say, based on 
"woolly-headed idealism." Nixon may have had vision, yet he 
was no mere dreamer and he undoubtedly prided himself on 
having a worldview firmly embedded in reality rather than 
resting upon hopes of a nonexistent angelic human nature.
Nixon, himself, fell far short of the sphere of angels.
His ultimate political demise was brought on by "Watergate," 
now another indelible chapter in American political folklore. 
In August, 1974, after nearly two years of being mired in one 
of what many consider the most ignominious political scandal 
in the nation's history, Nixon became the first American 
president to resign from office. He left the stage in dire
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and humiliating disgrace, although once again, he refused to 
bow out of his much beloved public "arena." He has 
relentlessly gone on for nearly twenty years crafting his side 
of the events he participated in as well as his discussing his 
position on current international affairs through his vast 
(and often repetitive) writing and public speaking.
Nixon's fall was far more pathetic than tragic. William 
Safire has likened Nixon to a multi-layered cake.
Unfortunately for Nixon, and the nation, the man who had 
struggled against the odds to make one of the most remarkable 
comebacks in American political history, fell victim to the 
darker side of his nature. There certainly was Nixon the 
statesman who could thrash out the most intricate diplomatic 
details with Chou En-lai. But there was also the insecure 
Nixon, who remembered every slight, real or imagined, from 
every political enemy, real or imagined, and who all too 
eagerly relished the opportunity for revenge, no matter the 
ethics or legality of the war he waged against his opponents.
Would the course of American diplomacy have been different 
had Nixon "lived" politically? This gets us into the great 
abyss of "ifs," a potentially treacherous trap for any 
historian. One might theorize that Detente with the Russians 
would have survived longer had Nixon not fallen in disgrace, 
leading in no small way to the election of Jimmy Carter, far 
less schooled in the way of the world than the man from 
Whittier. But Nixon's opening to China well survived his own 
political death and ironically, it was the Georgian who
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formally established relations with Peking in 1979. However, 
Nixon must get the credit for the "great leap forward."
Although Tom Wicker spent a great deal of space in his 
recent biography of the ex-president trying to deflate the 
notion of Nixon's expertise in foreign affairs while praising 
his administration's domestic achievements, Nixon certainly 
will be remembered for some of his foreign policy 
accomplishments. Wicker's twist to the variation on the theme 
of Nixon still cannot erase Nixon's record of achievement in 
the foreign policy arena.35 And it goes without saying that 
the most notable, the most historic, was "reopening the door" 
to China.
But just as historians are never finished analyzing and 
theorizing about the past, it seems that Richard Nixon, as 
long as he is able to draw a breath, will never be finished 
trying to secure his own place in history. The master of the 
political comeback has managed through a patient, deliberate 
process to come back yet again into grace for one more encore 
as an "elder statesman." Even many who all those years ago 
despised Richard Nixon are eager to hear his opinions on 
international developments, particularly those concerning 
China, the great land mass that was once known as the Soviet 
Union (now the Commonwealth of Independent States) and the 
fall of communism in Eastern Europe.
In 1976, Nixon was on the road again to Peking where he 
met for a second time with an ailing and failing Mao Tse-Tung. 
Mao commiserated with Nixon over Watergate and could not
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comprehend what the big hubbub was all about. But then again, 
whenever Mao had faced internal opposition, he did not have to 
worry about a Congress and possible impeachment. He simply 
and quite literally destroyed his opposition.
Throughout what has now come to be termed his 
post-presidential years, Nixon has again been remarkably 
consistent on Sino-U.S. relations. It is, in a sense, after 
all, his baby, and his place in history is inextricably locked 
up in how effective and productive those relations are. Is it 
any wonder then, as was pointed out earlier, that Nixon 
insisted that the United States maintain contact with the 
Chinese Communist leadership in the aftermath of the tragedy 
at Tiananmen Square in 1989? Just as in the noted Foreign 
Affairs article of 1967 when Nixon argued for influencing 
China to reform, he not s u r p r i s i n g l y  pleaded his 
post-Tiananmen case based on the impossibility of exercising 
any such influence if the United States cut its contacts with 
Peking. This is not to suggest that Nixon meekly accepted the 
Communists's brutal atrocities against the Chinese students.
In fact, he vociferously protested to the Chinese leadership 
during his October 1989 visit to Peking. But Nixon, the 
realist, knew it would be a mistake to isolate China 
completely and that su,ch an approach would only serve to 
undermine the economic reforms that Deng Xiaoping had put into 
play, even though an ample number of hard-liners remained who 
would have preferred a return to pure Maoism.36
However, there is an irony to the post-presidential
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Nixon. As ardently as he had insisted on isolating Communist 
China in the 1950s, he was just as insistent a proponent in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s for America not to isolate 
China, although he advocated that we make clear our disgust 
and displeasure with its behaviour. But Nixon, the 
pragmatist, saw no purpose in the United States breaking off 
its relations with the world's most populous nation as the 
1990s began.
Was this a more mellow, kinder and gentler Richard Nixon? 
No, for that would be an oversimplification, just as 
historians and journalists who have labeled Nixon's China 
opening a "great turnaround" have missed the nuances and 
consistencies of his approach to the issue. Part of Nixon's 
diplomatic maneuver toward China can be attributed to his 
"foreign affairs" education which went back to his service on 
the Herter Committee in Europe and his 1953 Grand Tour of Asia 
as vice president. That education, both in and out of office, 
led Nixon to accurately surmise in the mid- to late-1960s that 
the world, in geopolitical and strategic terms, had indeed 
changed and this required the United States to reach out to 
China. Lurking in the background of Nixon the statesman was 
Nixon the politician, ever mindful of the need to maintain 
domestic political support. In his reopening of the China 
door, he managed to perform brilliantly and achieve both ends, 
something that occurs all too infrequently in American 
politics. The Watergate scandal will always hover over 
Nixon. Yet, tarnished as he is by his downfall, his China
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initiative remains one of the great accomplishments of 
post-World War II American diplomacy. As he will be 
remembered for Watergate, he will also be remembered for what 
he ultimately did in leading the way to a new era in the 
history of relations between China and the United States.
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